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ARTICLES 
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: ENCOURAGING AND 
ENSURING THE CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES 
Robert P. Mosteller * 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Crawford v. Washington,1 the Supreme Court of the United 
States radically changed Confrontation Clause doctrine, creating 
a very firm rule of exclusion of “testimonial” statements, with ap-
parently quite limited exceptions.2 This Article deals with two 
broad issues: first, what we know and what we can predict about 
the new system and the statements it covers,3 and second, pro-
posals regarding how confrontation could or should develop in re-
sponse to Crawford. 
Many answers to how the new system will operate must await 
future Supreme Court decisions, but some results are clear and 
other implications can be sketched. One of the most important 
questions—whether the class of testimonial statements covered 
by Crawford is extremely narrow or relatively broad—will likely 
be addressed soon. Nevertheless, the message of the introductory 
 
*  Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A., 1970, University of North Caro-
lina at Chapel Hill; J.D., 1975, Yale University; M.P.P., 1975, Harvard University. I want 
to thank John Douglass, Paul Giannelli, Tom Lininger, Jeff Powell, and Andy Taslitz for 
their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft and Michelle Park for her research 
assistance. 
 1. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). 
 2. See id. 
 3. A part of this analysis is how the old system of confrontation under Ohio v. Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), might interact with the new system, if the old system remains 
operable at all. 
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sentence bears repeating: Crawford has changed confrontation 
analysis enormously. Its concrete impact was immediate and sub-
stantial in both appellate and trial courts on the evidence ren-
dered inadmissible.4 It has given real teeth to the Confrontation 
Clause in several frequently encountered and important situa-
tions. For instance, statements made during grand jury proceed-
ings and plea allocutions and statements made by co-participants 
in crime to authorities during police interrogation can no longer 
be admitted against a criminal defendant unless confrontation is 
provided.5 
Crawford involved statements made by one unavailable crime 
participant against another during a police interrogation.6 De-
spite the Supreme Court’s attempt to limit admission of such 
statements in Lilly v. Virginia,7 trial and appellate courts contin-
ued to admit them8 in substantial numbers upon finding that 
they satisfied the Ohio v. Roberts9 ad hoc trustworthiness/reli- 
ability analysis.10 As a result of Crawford, these statements are 
inadmissible, absent confrontation or a couple of other quite lim-
ited exceptions, discussed below.11 
The impact of the Crawford opinion is clear and substantial in 
some respects; however, it is unknown and unpredictable in oth-
ers. One reason for the uncertainty lies literally in the lack of a 
 
 4. See infra note 70 for a list of some of the cases that have been reversed under 
Crawford. 
 5. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. Statements made by defendants themselves during 
interrogation, i.e., admissions, are apparently unaffected by Crawford. Presumably self-
admissions fall under the theory that a party cannot complain about not being able to con-
front himself. EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 265–66 (1962) (stating 
this position with regard to the hearsay rule of admission). In Crawford, the Court said 
nothing about continuing to allow admission of this category of statements, and the opin-
ion gives no basis for such a momentous shift in doctrinal analysis. 
 6. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1357–58. 
 7. 527 U.S. 116, 139–40 (1999). 
 8. Such statements are typically offered under the hearsay exceptions for statements 
against interest. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
 9. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 10. The Court cited the findings of Professor Roger Kirst stating that after Lilly, 
courts had admitted accomplice statements in more than one-third of the cases—twenty-
five out of seventy. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1372 (citing Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court 
Answers to the Confrontation Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 105 
(2003)). The Court showed obvious displeasure with the lower courts’ results under the 
Roberts test, which it termed an “unpardonable vice.” Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1371. Ad-
mission in these situations revealed “its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial 
statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.” Id. 
 11. Id. at 1374. 
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general definition for the opinion’s most critical concept—
testimonial statements. The opinion was authored by Justice An-
tonin Scalia and joined by six other justices; Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice San-
dra Day O’Connor joined.12 Justice Scalia’s opinion points toward 
a narrow construction, which he has previously supported,13 but 
the opinion provides an opening for at least a somewhat broader 
view that is likely favored by some of the other justices who 
joined the opinion. 
Another reason for uncertainty relates to Crawford’s place in a 
dynamic system that can and will respond to the opinion with 
short-term tactical countermeasures and with potentially long-
term legal and institutional changes. Investigative and prosecu-
torial practices are certain to change. For example, the practices 
in some jurisdictions of having victims make statements to inves-
tigating officers on videotape shortly after the crime were once 
very useful to the prosecution, but now produce inadmissible tes-
timonial statements.14 Police and prosecutors are certain to de-
velop alternative investigative methods in an attempt to avoid 
Crawford’s impact.15 
 
 12. Id. at 1356. 
 13. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364–65 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (argu-
ing for a new approach to confrontation limited to “formalized testimonial materials”). 
 14. See People v. Espinoza, No. H026266, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6573, at *16–
18 (Cal. Ct. App. July 13, 2004) (reversing sexual assault conviction because of admission 
of videotaped statement made to police by seven-year-old child who did not testify); People 
v. Kilday, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6290, at *2, *17–22 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2004) 
(reversing convictions for domestic abuse because of admission of videotaped statements 
regarding four instances of abuse); People v. Pirwani, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 675, 684–85 
(Ct. App. 2004) (reversing theft conviction because of the admission of the victim’s video-
taped statement to police); People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757–58 (Ct. App. 
2004) (reversing conviction because of admission of a videotaped interview of a four-year-
old child by a “forensic interview specialist”); People ex rel. R.A.S., No. 03CA1209, 2004 
Colo. App. LEXIS 1032, at *10–11 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004) (reversing finding of de-
linquency based on sexual abuse because of admission of videotape with investigating offi-
cer); People v. Vigil, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1024, at *2, *5–6 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 
2004) (reversing conviction for receipt of videotaped statement by child to police officer 
regarding sexual abuse); State v. Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185, 194–197 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2004) (reversing assault conviction because videotaped interview of child by child protec-
tion worker was testimonial and thus inadmissible unless the child was available for 
cross-examination); Lee v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565, 570 (Tex Ct. App. 2004) (finding a 
statement testimonial where it was made by a witness/co-participant to a police officer in 
a patrol car after the arrest of one suspect because, even though not audible, it was re-
corded on the car’s audio-video system, which indicated it was intended to record testi-
mony for prosecution). 
 15. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
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What Crawford might also do at a conceptual level, which 
could be tremendously important, is to refocus the constitutional 
inquiry away from hearsay law and the trustworthiness and reli-
ability of out-of-court statements toward the positive procedural 
goal of the confrontation right—encouraging and ensuring that 
evidence is presented in the courtroom in the presence of the ac-
cused and subject to adversarial testing.16 I suggest that the path 
of the law’s development will be improved if the clause is read as 
a positive command to afford the accused the right “to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him,”17 rather than principally 
as a negative restriction on the admission of certain out-of-court 
evidence, which has previously been its focus. 
The opinion in Crawford provides the Court’s (Justice Scalia’s) 
view of the historical purpose of the Confrontation Clause. These 
historical materials and the perspective adopted are obviously se-
lective, but they are now the essential materials and the privi-
leged perspective.18 The core of that history lesson is the abhor-
 
 16. While he is not responsible for my errors, I want to thank Professor John Doug-
lass for giving me the global inspiration for this major emphasis of my article. One of the 
major points of his two fine articles on the Confrontation Clause was to develop ways to 
actually let confrontation happen. See John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Con-
frontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 191, 196–97 (1999) (arguing that the Confrontation Clause should be read to con-
front and challenge admitted hearsay and to impeach the declarant rather than just ex-
cluding unreliable hearsay); John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1875 (2001) (developing an approach that allows both hearsay and 
confrontation rather than pitting the two against each other). These are valuable insights 
and an important orientation toward the right of confrontation. 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 18. Somewhat inexplicably, in my judgment, one aspect that this historical treatment 
and preliminary definition leaves out is my particular focus on accusers and accusatory 
statements, as opposed to testimonial statements. I believe there should be a role for the 
concept of “accusatory” hearsay in the analysis because it better describes the core concern 
of the Confrontation Clause than does the testimonial concept. See Robert P. Mosteller, 
Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sex-
ual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 748–49; see also Michael H. Graham, 
The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The 
State of the Relationship, 72 MINN. L. REV. 523, 600–01 (1988); Toni M. Massaro, The Dig-
nity Value of Face-to-Face Confrontations, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 863, 870–71 (1988). I believe 
historical materials support a place for the concern about accusations. See infra note 548. 
On the other hand, I recognize that the decisional moment has been reached and that, 
despite my arguments, the concept of testimonial statements, rather than accusatory 
hearsay or accusatory statements, has been the dominant paradigm. Moreover, if testimo-
nial is defined using the amicus definition in Crawford and, appropriately interpreted, it 
will include most accusatory hearsay. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. Thus, I 
focus on testimonial statements. Nevertheless, I believe the concept of accusatory state-
ments is quite useful in helping to identify those statements that should be identified as 
testimonial.  
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rence of the Framers to the inquisitorial method of both evidence 
development and trial, symbolized by the treason trial of Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh.19 From the Framers’ antipathy to that practice and 
the text of the Sixth Amendment right, particularly its use of the 
term “witnesses,” the Court derived a core meaning for the Con-
frontation Clause, which focuses on whether the statement is tes-
timonial.20 
Although the central issue under Crawford was whether a 
statement was testimonial, the Court declined to adopt a com-
prehensive definition for the term.21 At the very least, Crawford 
has given us a model for treatment of the core of the Confronta-
tion Clause—the exclusion of statements made out of court that 
are inquisitorial in nature, absent confrontation.22 A major part of 
the battle in determining the scope of testimonial statements is 
how closely that term is tethered to the particular historical prac-
tices that the Court identified as inspiring the confrontation 
right. In essence, the issue is whether the core of the Confronta-
tion Clause, covering a relatively small group of statements, is 
instead the complete confrontation right. 
Another issue not resolved by Crawford is what remains of the 
old system under Roberts. If the Confrontation Clause has no role 
in policing the admission of statements that are not determined 
to be testimonial, then this definition takes on even greater im-
portance. Conversely, if the existing protections of Roberts remain 
as a residual policing system for at least some problematic hear-
say that is non-testimonial,23 then restricting the scope of the 
definition somewhat has less significance. 
 
The case law has made relatively little use of the accusatory concept. In re T.T., 815 
N.E.2d 789, 804 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004), is a rare exception that uses the accusatory concept as 
decisive in distinguishing between testimonial and non-testimonial statements. However, 
its particular methodology, which uses the concept to distinguish between testimonial sub-
ject matter (the identity of perpetrator) from non-testimonial subject matter (the nature of 
the condition) within the same statement given by a child victim of sexual assault to a doc-
tor, is probably compatible with the testimonial concept. See infra note 506. 
 19. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1360. 
 20. Id. at 1374. The Court stated that “[w]here testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . 
the Sixth Amendment demands . . . unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.” Id. 
 21. Id. The Court acknowledged that its refusal to articulate a comprehensive defini-
tion would cause “interim uncertainty.” Id. at 1374 n.10. Yet the Court noted that this un-
certainty “can hardly be . . . worse” than the unpredicatable Roberts test. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1374. 
 23. Depending on how the definition of testimonial develops, I believe there may be 
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Crawford places a bold “stop sign” in the way of the admission 
of statements in this core area when confrontation is not pro-
vided. Given the damaging impact on prosecutions—a “stop sign” 
for the statement if it is testimonial—tremendous pressure will 
be placed on courts to narrow the definition. The same sort of 
pressure will be placed on expanding the scope of each of the 
other exceptions, and the breadth or narrowness of those excep-
tions will influence the courts in deciding how broadly or nar-
rowly they can construe the term testimonial. 
Crawford notes a set of exceptions that are limited in number, 
although some of them can be expanded in scope by interpreta-
tion or change in prosecutorial and judicial practices. 
First, if the statement is not within the core area of concern—
that is, it is not testimonial in nature—then the “stop sign” does 
not apply.24 Second, the confrontation right is satisfied during the 
current trial when the person who made the prior statement ap-
pears, testifies, and is subject to cross-examination as required by 
the confrontation right.25 Third, the confrontation right is satis-
fied when the declarant has been previously confronted regarding 
the statement, but he or she cannot be confronted currently be-
cause of unavailability.26 Fourth, the defendant is found to have 
forfeited his or her right to require confrontation if, through his 
or her own actions, the declarant becomes unavailable, rendering 
confrontation of the declarant impossible.27 Fifth, the historic rec-
ognition of dying declarations as an exception to the confronta-
tion right at the time of the Framing perhaps may mean that the 
Confrontation Clause is inapplicable to such statements, even if 
testimonial.28 Sixth, the Confrontation Clause does not bar the 
use of statements, even if testimonial, if they are used for pur-
poses other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.29 
 
sufficient need, as well as doctrinal, historical, and textual support, for some Confronta-
tion Clause protection outside this area of core concern. In particular, the Confrontation 
Clause may have a proper role in screening admissibility of accusatory hearsay that falls 
outside a narrow definition of testimonial, and Roberts’s analysis could have a place here. 
See discussion infra Part VII. 
 24. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. Although this is not really an exception, it is 
probably the most important limitation. 
 25. See id. at 1369 n.9. 
 26. Id. at 1365–66. 
 27. Id. at 1370 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158–59 (1879)). 
 28. Id. at 1367 n.6. 
 29. Id. at 1369 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)). 
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With respect to the future development of the doctrine, this 
last exception is of little consequence because it is limited to a 
relatively rarely encountered hearsay exception that was only 
tentatively recognized by the Court and noted to be sui generis.30 
The other exceptions can be broadly expanded by changing inves-
tigative and prosecutorial practices and by judicial interpreta-
tion.31 One of my major normative arguments in this Article is 
that, consistent with the core concepts of the new doctrine, devel-
opments and expansion should be encouraged in ways that guar-
antee and enhance, rather than limit and deny, the right to con-
frontation and that these developments should concentrate on 
guaranteeing confrontation, rather than excluding evidence. 
The current period of transition between systems is particu-
larly fraught with the danger that confrontation will be unneces-
sarily limited because of a backward-looking concern for Craw-
ford’s impact on the cases that have already been tried but are on 
direct review and where “retroactivity” rules clearly make the 
opinion applicable.32 These cases put pressure on the lower appel-
late courts to narrow the definition of testimonial, to expand ex-
ceptions to preserve convictions, or both. This is true even 
though, had the more exacting requirements been known earlier, 
confrontation could often have been provided and the evidence in-
troduced. Also, a host of prosecutorial actions could have been 
taken either to admit alternative evidence or to avoid creating or 
admitting evidence that violates the Confrontation Clause. This 
Article will have no impact on that type of pressure, and the deci-
sions made under it may unnecessarily warp the doctrine and 
eliminate what might otherwise be pressure for changes in prose-
cutorial practices and legal procedures that would facilitate more 
confrontation. I hope, however, that we can avoid the major un-
necessary damage to the worthy goals of encouraging and ensur-
ing both confrontation and just verdicts. 
 
 30. Id. at 1367 n.6. 
 31. When I treat all of the ways to escape the application of Crawford as exceptions, 
including the determination that the statement is not testimonial, I mean that the defini-
tional exception is expanded when testimonial is interpreted more narrowly. 
 32. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). The Court in Griffith held that a 
“new rule” would be automatically applicable to all cases still on direct review at the time 
the decision was rendered. See id. at 328. Crawford is likely to be considered such a new 
rule. 
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The pressure on the definition of testimonial and the scope of 
Crawford’s exceptions will also be exacerbated by the fact that 
the definition’s application is particularly uncertain and a broad 
application is especially problematic to the prosecution of two 
very sensitive types of cases—domestic violence and child sexual 
abuse. Frequently in domestic violence prosecutions, the com-
plaining witness—usually a wife or girlfriend—is uncooperative 
or unavailable by the time of trial. In many jurisdictions, prose-
cutors have developed ways to prosecute these crimes when the 
alleged victim is absent. Hearsay statements made in 911 calls, 
and on the scene to emergency and medical personnel, as well as 
to investigating officers, have been used frequently as an effective 
alternative method of proof.33 Whether those alternatives remain 
viable will likely depend on how broadly testimonial statements 
are defined and how liberally forfeiture through wrongdoing is in-
terpreted. The obvious temptation will be to narrow the definition 
or expand the exceptions in these cases, which would likely then 
apply to similar statements. 
Crawford’s impact on the types of hearsay often admitted in 
child abuse prosecutions is particularly uncertain. It is unclear 
how the term testimonial will be applied to statements made to 
examining doctors admitted under the exception for statements 
for medical treatment or diagnosis and to statements to family 
members, school teachers, social workers, and police officers re-
sponding to various levels of suspicion of abuse admitted under 
several other hearsay exceptions, including, chiefly, excited ut-
terances, “tender years,” and the general catch-all provision. A 
looming unresolved issue here is whether statements must be 
elicited by questions from a government agent to be testimonial 
or whether questioning by private individuals or interrogators 
working for private groups can also qualify. 
 
 
 33. See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (describing ef-
forts by prosecutors to fashion “victimless” prosecutions in domestic violence cases by us-
ing statements received under the hearsay exceptions as excited utterances and state-
ments for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment, which are received from 
emergency 911 calls, police officers who arrive at the scene of a reported domestic assault, 
and doctors treating injuries at hospitals); see generally Neal A. Hudders, Note, The Prob-
lem of Using Hearsay in Domestic Violence Cases: Is a New Exception the Answer?, 49 
DUKE L.J. 1041 (2000) (describing the way various hearsay exceptions are used to over-
come some of the prosecution’s difficulties with unavailable and uncooperative victims in 
domestic violence cases). 
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Three basic results are possible when a confrontation challenge 
is made. One is a finding that the confrontation right does not ex-
ist or has been forfeited. A second is the finding of the confronta-
tion right and exclusion of an out-of-court statement, the admis-
sion of which would violate the right. The third is providing 
confrontation, which may also allow admission of the statement. 
The goal of enhancing the protection of the confrontation right is 
thus not at all the same as favoring maximum exclusion of the 
evidence under the command of the Confrontation Clause. Exclu-
sion may be a necessary remedy to enforce compliance, but I con-
tend that the goal should generally be more confrontation, not 
necessarily the admission of less evidence, even if such evidence 
qualifies as testimonial out-of-court statements. 
I support an approach that resists excessively limiting the 
definition of testimonial. Likewise, my approach does not lead to 
an expansive reading of forfeiture.34 Of course, my support will 
not matter to the justices who decide future cases. My approach 
might matter to some, however, if it demonstrates that the only 
alternatives are not either to limit dramatically the scope of tes-
timonial statements or to harm greatly prosecutions. My ap-
proach principally encourages more confrontation by having 
available declarants who made testimonial and other problematic 
out-of-court statements appear, testify at trial, and be subject to 
cross-examination. It emphasizes that enforcing the confrontation 
right is compatible with effective prosecution.35 
 
 34. State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004), reflects a somewhat expansive, but toler-
able, interpretation of forfeiture. The court found that the defendant had forfeited his con-
frontation right by murdering the victim during a fight, but did not require an intent to 
silence him as a witness. Id. at 793–94. See also People v. Jiles, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 790 (Ct. 
App. 2004) (treating the possible dying declaration exception to confrontation, which the 
Supreme Court suggested might be excepted from confrontation on historical grounds, 
Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367 n.6, as if it were recognized by the Court as an example of 
“forfeiture by wrongdoing,” id. at 1370, which the Court did not suggest, id. at 1367 n.6); 
People v. Moore, No. 01CA1760, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1354, at *11 (Colo. Ct. App. July 
29, 2004) (following Meeks). If this line of analysis is adopted by the Supreme Court, its 
suggested “dying declaration” exception to confrontation could become a somewhat 
broader exception, but still a rarely encountered exception to the right of confrontation, 
applicable whenever a potential witness is killed during a crime. For a discussion of a po-
tentially more expansive treatment of forfeiture in domestic violence cases, see infra note 
549. 
 35. My approach owes much to the work of Professor Richard Friedman, but it differs 
in some respects. See Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision 
Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2004). Professor Friedman 
encourages a much greater role for forfeiture than I would, but questions the adequacy of 
confrontation provided as to prior statements in the current trial and disparages this 
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My example for expanding confrontation comes from prosecu-
tion practices regarding child witnesses in sexual abuse cases.36 
My perception is that prosecutors in many jurisdictions have 
learned that children can in fact be enabled to testify and be 
available for cross-examination, which broadly permits introduc-
tion of their out-of-court statements under the Confrontation 
Clause. As to other declarants, such as domestic violence victims 
who frequently become unavailable or uncooperative at trial, the 
right and admissibility may both be met by greater efforts to af-
ford confrontation at early adversarial hearings, such as prelimi-
nary examinations and depositions. In the area of testimonial 
statements by co-defendants at grand jury proceedings and dur-
ing police interrogations, the granting of immunity from the 
prosecution may allow confrontation and permit the prior state-
ments to be admitted.37 
An approach that emphasizes and anticipates future develop-
ments is important for many reasons, but is particularly apt for 
Crawford since the decision may have its greatest impact in the 
long-run. Roberts tied the Confrontation Clause to hearsay law, 
and, while only overruling Roberts as to testimonial statements, 
Crawford greatly weakened that link and threatened a complete 
break.38 As long as confrontation and hearsay law were tied to-
gether, fundamental hearsay reform was unrealistic because of 
the accepted premise in American evidence law that the same law 
applied to both civil and criminal cases. The pressure to relax 
hearsay restrictions in civil cases will remain a motivating force 
 
method of satisfying confrontation, which I embrace as a preferable, if imperfect, accom-
modation. See id. at 7–8, 11–12. He raises more questions about the testimonial capacity 
of children than I believe their typically encountered developmental limitations warrant. 
Id. at 10–11. My broad approach to the testimonial determination is much like his, al-
though mine is more functionally oriented in that I find the concept of accusatory state-
ments helpful, and I believe the intent of government agents also matters. See id. at 9 
(discussing the meaning of testimonial). 
 36. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of 
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1989) [hereinafter Medical Hearsay 
Exception I]; Mosteller, supra note 18; Robert P. Mosteller, The Maturation and Disinte-
gration of the Hearsay Exception for Statements for Medical Examination in Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (2002) [hereinafter Medical Hearsay Excep-
tion II]. 
 37. I will not discuss this mechanism since it has been part of a well-developed debate 
that is only given somewhat greater urgency by Crawford. 
 38. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369–70. The Court stated that its analysis “casts doubt” 
on Roberts’s application of the Confrontation Clause across all hearsay, but to resolve the 
Crawford facts, it was not required to decide whether to reverse Roberts on that point. Id. 
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for reform, and if the link between hearsay and the Confrontation 
Clause is ultimately severed, broad scale reform can proceed. If 
this happens, jurisdictions may simply show greater variation as 
to exceptions.39 Perhaps something on the order of the proposal 
made at the time of the development of the federal rules will be 
followed40 and all hearsay determinations will be treated as ad 
hoc trial court determinations based on a mixture of reliability 
and necessity. Perhaps as to declarants who testify, the hearsay 
rule will be eliminated except for the trial court’s discretion to 
avoid wasting time and receiving meaningless repetition through 
prior out-of-court statements. In any case, Crawford opens possi-
bilities for relaxing hearsay’s restrictions on the admissibility of 
out-of-court statements that make the definition of testimonial 
statements even more significant. 
Will this future world be one in which the right to confront is 
substantially expanded or narrowed? It could be either. One pos-
sible view is that there is a narrow core of hearsay in criminal 
cases where confrontation will be fully enforced, but as to all the 
rest of hearsay, no control will be imposed, even as to what is of-
ten viewed as problematic hearsay.41 At the same time, investiga-
tive and prosecutorial practices may be altered to avoid creating 
the types of hearsay excluded by the definition of testimonial but 
to generate the same evidence in other hearsay forms. Another 
vision is that even with a much-relaxed hearsay rule, a broad, af-
firmative requirement of confrontation should be maintained as 
 
 39. Alterations in individual hearsay exceptions are quite possible, such as eliminat-
ing the restriction that the declarant must be unavailable for statements against interest. 
Broad, sweeping reform might occur as well. 
 40. The 1969 proposal for hearsay exceptions under Rule 8-03 of the Proposed Rules 
of Evidence began with the following General Provision: “[a] statement is not excluded by 
the hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances under which it was made offer 
assurances of accuracy . . . .” 46 F.R.D. 345 (1969). Subsection (b) listed the exceptions, but 
did so “[b]y way of illustration only.” Id. The pattern for Rule 8-04 is similar. Id. at 377. 
 41. Without the application of the Confrontation Clause, there would remain some 
overall constitutional protection through the Due Process Clause, but it would likely pro-
tect only against unreliable convictions, not individual pieces of unreliable evidence. A dif-
ferent type of analysis could be used if the evidence was generated by improper govern-
mental practices, as occurs in eyewitness identification cases where the government 
arranges an impermissibly suggestive identification procedure. See Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (stating that “convictions based on eyewitness identifica-
tion at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that 
ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive 
as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification”). Due proc-
ess examination of the ordinary production of evidence and eyewitness identification law, 
however, is not typical. 
MOSTELLER MASTER 392.DOC 11/15/2004 9:05 AM 
522 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:511 
to important and problematic types of hearsay. In this future 
world, practices may be changed, not to avoid creating evidence 
that falls within the narrow ambit of the Confrontation Clause, 
but to allow confrontation. 
In the end, I am not sure that the legal world I support, with a 
broader provision of confrontation, is the one that defendants, 
who the Confrontation Clause sought to protect, would prefer. 
Restricting the admission of evidence under hearsay rules and 
excluding evidence as violating the Confrontation Clause would 
likely be favored by most defendants over affording confrontation 
and admitting incriminating evidence. In many cases, my pre-
ferred approach may result in more confrontation, but also more 
admissible evidence and conviction rates that are little affected. 
Perhaps in addition to not being favored by defendants, broad 
confrontation may not be the best for justice. Confronting wit-
nesses and accusers in the presence of the jury, while they give 
their testimony and are cross-examined, may be a very imperfect 
way to find truth. Confrontation as a procedural mechanism for 
determining reliability is not empirically based, but is historically 
and culturally determined. It is, however, specified by the Consti-
tution.42 The Confrontation Clause may be misguided, but that is 
not my belief or the message of this Article. My focus is on a fu-
ture in which substantially more confrontation may be pro-
vided—Sir Walter Raleigh may win this one.43 
In Part II, I examine the Crawford case and discuss both its 
clear points of application and some of its uncertainties using the 
lower court case law decided under the opinion to provide illus-
trations. In Part III, I suggest resolutions of frequently encoun-
tered situations where I believe the result is relatively clear. In 
Part IV, I examine the specific area covered by the Court in 
Crawford—police interrogations—and expand its rule to other 
citizen-police encounters that I contend should be uniformly 
treated as testimonial. In general, I argue for what I believe is 
the most appropriate approach, but generally also indicate alter-
natives that might reasonably be chosen. In Part V, I discuss a 
doctrinal development that I believe the analysis underlying 
Crawford implies: prosecutors should be required to call wit-
 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 43. See generally Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the Hear-
say Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972). 
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nesses who previously made testimonial statements and attempt 
to secure from them their accusation at trial before admitting the 
prior statement. I also work through the case law on the mini-
mum testimonial presence needed both before and after Crawford 
to satisfy what the Court has termed “availability for cross-
examination.” In Part VI, I examine Crawford’s implications for 
child abuse and domestic violence prosecutions and suggest sev-
eral approaches that, in these difficult cases, both facilitate effec-
tive prosecutions and provide confrontation. In Part VII, I discuss 
a role for a secondary system to police confrontation, probably 
continuing the Roberts framework, because of the existence of 
problematic accusatory hearsay that will probably fall outside the 
boundaries of testimonial statements. 
II.  THE BASIC TEACHINGS AND IMPLICATIONS OF  
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 
A.  The Facts of the Case 
Michael Crawford was tried for assault and attempted murder 
for stabbing a man whom he contended tried to rape his wife, 
Sylvia.44 The police arrested Michael and Sylvia for the stabbing, 
and after giving them both Miranda warnings,45 they interro-
gated both husband and wife twice.46 The challenged statements 
came from the second tape-recorded interrogation of Sylvia, who 
gave a version of the fight between Michael and the alleged vic-
tim that appeared inconsistent with her husband’s self-defense 
claim.47 
Sylvia’s tape-recorded statement was introduced at trial 
against Michael, in the words of the Supreme Court, “even 
 
 44. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1356–57. 
 45. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–69, 471, 473 (1966) (establishing warn-
ings that must be read once a person is taken into police custody and before interrogation). 
 46. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1357. 
 47. See State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 658 (Wash. 2002). The first statements by 
both Michael and Sylvia gave roughly the same account of the assault. Id. The second 
statements, however, which were obtained in independent interrogation sessions, differed 
from the first, and from each other, in the State’s view regarding whether the alleged vic-
tim had something in his hand at the moment (Michael’s version) or after (Sylvia’s second 
version) he was stabbed by Michael. Id. 
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though he had no opportunity for cross-examination.”48 That last 
point is a little unusual. Sylvia was in fact unavailable at trial, 
but this was because of Washington’s marital privilege, which 
Michael could and did invoke.49 The Supreme Court of Washing-
ton rejected the state’s argument that, by invoking the privilege, 
Michael waived his confrontation rights.50 In the Supreme Court 
of the United States, the prosecution did not challenge that hold-
ing, and the Court declined to express an opinion on the issue.51 
Thus, the case was analyzed simply as one where the declarant 
was unavailable. 
The Court of Appeals of Washington and the Supreme Court of 
Washington applied different tests, albeit both grounded in the 
framework described by Ohio v. Roberts, which looks for “ade-
quate ‘indicia of reliability.’”52 The Court of Appeals of Washing-
ton reversed the conviction, finding that there were not sufficient 
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,”53 while the Su-
preme Court of Washington reinstated the conviction, concluding 
that “it bore guarantees of trustworthiness.”54 
B.  General Theory Under the New View of the Confrontation 
Clause 
Examining history, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in 
Crawford, concluded that the “principal evil at which the Con-
frontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal 
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as 
evidence against the accused.”55 This civil law procedure of pri-
vate examination by judicial officers, with its roots on the Euro-
pean continent, stood in sharp contrast to the preferred English 
 
 48. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1357. 
 49. See Crawford, 54 P.3d at 658. Washington’s marital privilege provides that a 
spouse cannot be examined without the consent of the other spouse. WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 5.60.060(1) (West Supp. 2004). Michael Crawford did not call his wife at trial and 
neither did the state. Crawford, 54 P.3d at 658. 
 50. Crawford, 54 P.3d at 660. 
 51. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359 n.1. 
 52. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 
213 (1972)). 
 53. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1363. 
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common law tradition of “live testimony in court subject to adver-
sarial testing.”56 
The Court then turned to the text of the Confrontation Clause 
in the Sixth Amendment, which provides that in criminal prose-
cutions, “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him.”57 “‘Witnesses’ against the ac-
cused” indicated, in the Court’s judgment, that the Confrontation 
Clause was to be applied to witnesses, defined as “those who ‘bear 
testimony.’”58 The Court derived from that terminology its focus 
on testimonial statements. 
“Testimony,” in turn, is typically “[a] solemn declaration or affirma-
tion made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” An 
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears 
testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not. The constitutional text, like the history un-
derlying the common-law right of confrontation, thus reflects an es-
pecially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court state-
ment.59 
The Court left “for another day” an effort to define comprehen-
sively testimonial statements.60 It determined, however, that 
“[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior 
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a 
former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern 
practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confron-
tation Clause was directed.”61 
For testimonial statements, the Court figuratively erected a 
“stop sign” as to admissibility in the absence of confrontation. For 
statements in this category, it firmly rejected the “reliability” or 
“trustworthiness” mode of analysis adopted by Ohio v. Roberts.62 
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the 
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the 
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 
 
 56. Id. at 1359. 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 58. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 59. Id. (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(1828)). 
 60. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1370–71; see Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. (“[T]he evidence must be excluded, at 
least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trust worthiness.”). 
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“reliability.” Certainly none of the authorities discussed above ac-
knowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law 
rule. Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamen-
tally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause’s 
ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a proce-
dural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular 
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause 
thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable 
evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about 
how reliability can best be determined. 
. . . . 
Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reli-
able is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obvi-
ously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.63 
C.  What are Testimonial Statements? 
The dividing line between testimonial and non-testimonial 
statements after Crawford is unclear for a number of reasons. 
Chief among these is that the Court refused to adopt a general 
definition, instead giving us three possible definitions that differ 
as to their range of application. The Court’s avoidance of detailed 
guidance went even further. While it provided some examples of 
statements that are and are not testimonial, these examples do 
not examine close cases. Rather, the Court seemed to give polar 
examples: “An accuser who makes a formal statement to govern-
ment officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes 
a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”64 
The Court also did not pick a consistent dimension on which to 
describe results. Some of its examples related to at least one of its 
suggested general definitions of testimonial as an “off-hand, over-
heard remark,”65 but other examples used categories not directly 
used in any of the Court’s definitions, such as “police interroga-
tion,” which is broader than the most restrictive definition66 and 
 
 63. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370–71. 
 64. Id. at 1364. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. The most restrictive definition was set forth by Justice Clarence Thomas, 
joined by Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in White v. Illinois, which spoke only of 
“confessions” and “formalized testimonial materials,” and much that would be strictly de-
fined as police interrogation will produce neither. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 
(1992). 
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far narrower than the scope of another.67 Other examples related 
to categories of hearsay law—business records and co-conspirator 
statements—appeared even less theoretically connected to the 
suggested definitions.68 
Although not providing a definition, the Court gave some in-
terpretive guidance that is, on the one hand powerful and deci-
sive, and on the other infuriatingly incomplete. It provided his-
torical analogies, a few examples of statements that are and are 
not testimonial, rough rationales (perhaps) for its treatment of 
some statements, and three possible general definitions. Ulti-
mately, it reached a narrow holding.69 The opinion provides an 
assorted set of tantalizing hints, the majority of which appear to 
point in the direction of a narrow scope for the Confrontation 
Clause, but some that leave open the door for a broader view, al-
though that broader construction would likely have to be au-
thored by a different justice. 
The clear meanings, implications, and uncertainties of Craw-
ford can be illustrated by already decided lower court cases, 
which provides a relatively consistent resolution of some issues, 
suggestions for promising approaches in others, and unanswer-
able questions and fundamentally conflicting views in others. 
Several points emerge from examining the lower court case law in 
the immediate wake of Crawford. One is that cases are being re-
versed in substantial numbers.70 It is impossible to know how 
 
 67. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 (suggesting as a possible definition that testimonial 
statements include those “that were made under circumstances which would lead an ob-
jective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial”). 
 68. Id. at 1366–67. 
 69. Id. at 1374. 
 70. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237, 243–45 (Ct. App. 2004) (reversing 
convictions for assault because of admission of statements made to sheriff deputies by an 
unavailable victim); People v. Pirwani, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 675 (Ct. App. 2004) (reversing 
conviction for theft from elderly person in defendant’s care because of admission of video-
taped statement of victim to police); People v. Espinoza, No. H026266, 2004 Cal. App. Un-
pub. LEXIS 6573, at *16–18 (Cal. Ct. App. July 13, 2004) (reversing sexual assault convic-
tion because of admission of videotaped statement made to police by seven-year-old child 
who did not testify); People v. Kilday, No. A099095, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6290, 
at *20 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2004) (reversing convictions for domestic abuse because of 
admission of videotaped statements regarding four instances of abuse, and a statement 
obtained as a result of an “unrecorded, informal questioning” of the victim who was fright-
ened and visibly injured; such statements were adjudged testimonial even if they were not 
an “interrogation” because they were “part of a police investigation aimed at obtaining tes-
timonial evidence.”); People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757–58 (Ct. App. 2004) (re-
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versing conviction because of admission of videotaped interview of a four-year-old child by 
a “‘forensic interview specialist’”); People v. Zarazua, No. H025472, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 3831, at *13–14 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004) (reversing rape and domestic battery 
convictions because of use of videotaped statement of victim); People v. Fry, 92 P.3d 970, 
974–81 (Colo. 2004) (reversing murder conviction because of admission of preliminary 
hearing testimony under the Colorado’s catch-all exception, acceptable under Roberts, but 
was rejected under Crawford because of inadequacy of opportunity for cross-examination 
in the jurisdiction’s preliminary hearings); People ex rel. R.A.S., No. 03CA1209, 2004 Colo. 
App. LEXIS 1032, at *10–11 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004) (reversing finding of delin-
quency based on sexual abuse because of admission of videotape with investigating offi-
cer); People v. Vigil, No. 02CA0833, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1024, at *2 (Colo. Ct. App. 
June 17, 2004) (reversing conviction for receipt of videotaped statement by child to police 
officer regarding sexual abuse); Davis v. United States, 848 A.2d 596, 599–600 (D.C. 2004) 
(reversing perjury conviction where confession obtained during police interrogation of un-
available accomplice in murder, out of which perjury charges arose, was admitted); In re 
T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 800–05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); People v. Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516, 
521–22 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing convictions for aggravated battery and unlawful re-
straint where statements made by victim in obtaining a protective order were used to im-
peach defendant’s testimony; victim was available to prosecution but not called); Snowden 
v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 47 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (reversing conviction for sexual abuse 
because of admission of statement of child to social worker); In re People v. Jones, No. 
246617, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 1457, at *1–3 (Mich. Ct. App. June 10, 2004) (reversing 
armed robbery conviction where statements of two co-defendants obtained during police 
questioning, who were unavailable at trial, were admitted); State v. Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 
185, 194–97 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing conviction for assault because videotaped 
interview of child by child protection worker was testimonial, and its admission violated 
the Confrontation Clause); People v. Woods, 779 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) 
(reversing case for receipt of plea allocution of non-testifying co-participant implicating 
the defendant); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S. 2d 393, 396–97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (revers-
ing rape conviction because of admission of blood test report without affording defendant 
right to cross-examine); State v. Allen, No. 82556, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2764, at *16–17 
(Ohio Ct. App. June 17, 2004) (reversing murder conviction because of admission of state-
ment of accomplice, who did not testify, to the police while in custody that implicated the 
defendant); State v. Cutlip, No. 03CA0118-M, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 1848, at *8–9 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2004) (reversing conviction because of admission of statements of two 
alleged accomplices, who were unavailable, which were made during police interrogation); 
Johnson v. State, 145 S.W.3d 346, 350–51 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); Hale v. State, 139 S.W.3d 
418, 421–23 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing conviction because of admission of written 
statement of unavailable accomplice made during police interrogation); Brooks v. State, 
132 S.W.3d 702, 704–07 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing conviction on admission of a writ-
ten statement made by an unavailable non-testifying co-defendant during police interro-
gation); see also United States v. Massino, 319 F. Supp. 2d 295, 301 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (ex-
cluding guilty pleas of co-defendants from being offered by government in rehabilitation); 
United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901–02 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (denying govern-
ment’s motion in limine to admit testimonial statements elicited by an antitrust division 
attorney during an interview in the co-defendant’s home against other defendant unless 
co-defendant testifies); United States v. Gonzalez-Marichal, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1204 
(S.D. Cal. 2004) (granting motion in limine to exclude testimonial interview with unavail-
able material witness while she was in custody); Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 596 
(Nev. 2004) (affirming trial court’s determination that nurse’s affidavit, prepared in con-
nection with the drawing of blood for admission of evidence regarding intoxication, was 
required to testify because statement was testimonial); People v. Carrieri, 778 N.Y.S.2d 
854, 854–55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (denying motion by government to admit co-defendant’s 
plea allocution unless he testified). 
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many of these cases would have been reversed under Ohio v. Rob-
erts, and some surely would have been, but the number would 
certainly have been much, much lower. One point to note, how-
ever, is that some of the cases are certain reversals because the 
prosecution followed a set of practices that were designed to meet 
a different standard and often exhibited clear errors under the 
vastly different Crawford approach. Such clear errors are thus an 
aberration that is a function of the suddenness and magnitude of 
the change in doctrine and not necessarily indicative of a continu-
ing pattern and the rate of reversals in the future. A second point 
is that the lower courts are taking quite different approaches. 
Some appear to be applying the definition of testimonial rela-
tively expansively to modern practices.71 Other courts are reading 
the definition much more narrowly, focusing on historical exam-
ples and perhaps responding to the concern that the broader defi-
nition of testimonial would have too great an impact on the prose-
cution of cases.72 
The decided cases point to the necessity of changing existing 
practices, such as the practice of police videotaping victim state-
ments shortly after the crime, which is clearly testimonial and 
now inadmissible without confrontation. Presumably, however, 
even if the video equipment is turned off, interviews will continue 
in a modified form. This example shows that confrontation will be 
defined and implemented in a dynamic environment where police 
and prosecutors, and over the longer run, judges and prosecutors, 
can change practices and potentially alter results under Craw-
ford. Relatively common practices that created clearly testimonial 
statements are likely now to simply disappear, only to be re-
 
 71. See, e.g., People v. Kilday, No. A099095, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6290, at 
*20 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2004) (concluding that “unrecorded, informal questioning” of 
the victim, who was frightened and visibly injured, was testimonial even if not “interroga-
tion” because “it was part of a police investigation aimed at obtaining testimonial evi-
dence”); see also infra note 263. 
 72. See, e.g., Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); Fowler v. State, 
809 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In these cases, the Court of Appeals of Indiana found 
that statements to the police in the aftermath of domestic assaults were non-testimonial 
because they involved police “questioning” rather than “interrogation.” Hammon, 809 
N.E.2d at 952; Fowler, 809 N.E.2d at 963–64. The court stated that the practice of ques-
tioning victims shortly after an apparent criminal assault to ascertain the facts did not 
“remotely resembl[e] an inquiry before King James I’s Privy Council.” Hammon, 809 
N.E.2d at 952; Fowler, 809 N.E.2d at 964. The impact of a contrary finding on these con-
victions, and on the prosecution of domestic violence, likely played a part in the courts’ 
decision. See People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 851–57 (Ct. App. 2004) (applying a simi-
lar analysis to Hammon and Fowler). 
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placed by others that are similar in substantive result, but less 
clearly produce testimonial statements. The fact that counter-
measures will be taken highlights the importance of determining 
whether changes in the Court’s noted hallmarks of testimonial 
statements will alter the constitutional status of the statements 
under a general formalistic definition, or whether the threat of al-
lowing statements to escape scrutiny by merely changing a pro-
cedure will cause the Court to cover substantively equivalent 
practices as well. On the other hand, the dynamic environment 
can produce changes of a different sort that provide confrontation 
at prior or current proceedings. Such changes would diminish 
pressure on the definition because they would permit admission 
of the statements regardless of their testimonial status. 
1.  Suggested Possible Definitions 
Without adopting any specific formulation, the Court quoted 
three possible definitions for testimonial statements. The peti-
tioner suggested that testimonial be defined as “‘ex parte in-court 
testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as 
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the de-
fendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial state-
ments that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prose-
cutorially.’”73 A second definition for testimonial, from Justice 
Thomas’s concurring opinion in White v. Illinois, was “‘extrajudi-
cial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.’”74 
The Amici Curiae Brief for the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers suggested the definition to be “‘statements that 
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be avail-
able for use at a later trial.’”75 
These definitions differ substantially in scope, with the third 
definition being the most abstract and having the broadest and 
most general applicability, requiring only a reasonable, objective 
recognition that the statement would be available for trial use. 
 
 73. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 23). 
 74. Id. (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 75. Id. (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers et al. at 3). 
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Justice Thomas’s definition is the narrowest and most concrete, 
at least on its face, being wedded to “formalized testimonial ma-
terials.”76 Petitioner’s suggested definition bridges some of the 
gaps between the two, using formal testimony as its touchstone, 
but expands the category by including “its functional equivalent” 
where “reasonably expect[ed] to be used prosecutorially.”77 
2.  Statements That Are Definitely Testimonial 
The Court gave the following examples of statements that are 
testimonial: “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a 
grand jury, or at a former trial;” “police interrogations;”78 and 
“plea allocution[s] showing existence of a conspiracy.”79 
More generally, but an example rather than a definition, the 
Court stated that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to 
government officers bears testimony.”80 
3.  Statements That Are Not Testimonial 
The Court gave a few examples of statements that are not tes-
timonial, stating that “[a]n off-hand, overheard remark” may be 
“a good candidate for exclusion under the hearsay rules, but it 
bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation 
Clause targeted.”81 This description has two elements: “off-hand” 
and “overheard.” “Off-hand” is defined as “showing no premedita-
tion or preparation,”82 suggesting a lack of purpose or intent 
about the comment and casualness, as opposed to formality. 
“Overheard” buttresses the connotation that the speaker lacks in-
tent at least as to the use of the statement for what might be 
termed official purposes. 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1374. 
 79. Id. at 1372 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021–23 (9th Cir. 
2002)). Presumably, plea allocutions that incriminate another person generally would be 
covered. Statements that incriminate the speaker—admissions—may be testimonial in 
form but are not excluded by the Confrontation Clause. See supra note 5. 
 80. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 81. Id. 
 82. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1567 (1993). Synonyms pro-
vided for “off-hand” include “casual, informal.” Id. 
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Similarly, the Court contrasted “a casual remark to an ac-
quaintance,”83 which does not bear testimony, to “a formal state-
ment to government officers,”84 which as noted above, does.85 
“Casual” is defined as “occurring . . . without calculated intent . . . 
without specific motivation, special interest, or constant pur-
pose.”86 Here, in addition to the lack of intent, is added a lack of 
formality that is solidified by the contrast to the formal statement 
made to the government official. A new component is also added; 
the identity of the person who hears the statement is an ac-
quaintance, presumably a private individual, as opposed to a gov-
ernment officer, with which it was contrasted. 
Finally, the Court described “business records or statements in 
furtherance of a conspiracy” as “by their nature . . . not testimo-
nial.”87 The Court’s statement appeared to signal that hearsay re-
ceived under these exceptions, and indeed most hearsay gener-
ally, was not testimonial,88 although even as to these two 
exceptions, its treatment may not to be as categorical as it ini-
tially appears.89 
While the Court gave no further explanation regarding busi-
ness records,90 it did provide possible interpretative clues in its 
description of co-conspirator statements; first referring to them as 
“statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.”91 Such a characteri-
zation of co-conspirator statements might be seen as emphasizing 
that the statement aids the criminal enterprise, which generally 
means that it excludes “idle chatter,” statements simply recount-
ing past events, and thus, most accusatorial statements.92 Second, 
 
 83. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 349 (1993). 
 87. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367. 
 88. Relying on historical analysis, the Court stated that “[m]ost of the hearsay excep-
tions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial—for example, business 
records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.” Id. 
 89. See infra Part III.D. 
 90. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opinion, construes the majority’s treat-
ment of hearsay exceptions as a categorical exclusion of the exceptions. See Crawford, 124 
S. Ct. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (commending the majority’s analysis of “testi-
mony” because it “excludes at least some hearsay exceptions”). In what was presumably a 
purposeful effort to expand the categories, Chief Justice Rehnquist added “official records” 
to the list of categorically excluded statements. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1367, 1378. 
 92. See infra text accompanying notes 198–200. 
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the Court gave further insight into why it considered co-
conspirator statements outside the testimonial category when it 
described the statement admitted in Bourjaily v. United States93 
as one “made unwittingly to an FBI informant.”94 Instead of talk-
ing in fact to “an acquaintance” or business associate who is a 
private individual, as suggested by the earlier example, in Bour-
jaily the declarant was instead speaking to an FBI informant, but 
believed that person to be a private individual.95 This description 
suggests that the speaker’s knowledge that he or she is talking to 
a government agent is critical. The interpretative clues are inter-
esting and potentially helpful, but they show the cryptic charac-
ter of Crawford, pointing in different directions and providing al-
ternate rationales. 
III.  CRAWFORD’S APPLICATION TO CLEAR CATEGORIES, 
RELATIVELY CLEAR CATEGORIES, AND NON-CATEGORIES 
A.  Clear Categories: Formal, Recorded Statements Made to 
Public and Quasi-Public Officials 
The boundaries of testimonial statements are uncertain out-
side of a few examples and categories. Examining areas of rela-
tive certainty is a useful point of departure. In Crawford, the 
Court stated that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to 
government officers bears testimony.”96 
A number of the statements in this core category involve state-
ments made to fit special hearsay exceptions specifically devel-
oped to satisfy the trustworthiness and reliability requirements 
of Ohio v. Roberts.97 California statutory and case law, involving 
special classes of victims, provide some clear examples. Sections 
1360, 1370, and 1380 of the California Evidence Code were de-
signed to admit hearsay statements regarding child abuse or ne-
 
 93. 483 U.S. 171 (1987). 
 94. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368 (referring to Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181–84). 
 95. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 173. The declarant, Angelo Lonardo, was speaking to 
Clarence Greathouse, an informant working for the FBI, about the purchase of a kilogram 
of cocaine in a conversation that was being secretly tape recorded. Id. 
 96. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 97. 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980). 
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glect,98 domestic violence,99 and elder and dependent adult abuse 
cases.100 Also, cases from California and other jurisdictions that 
vary slightly from the core situations show how quickly ambigu-
ity enters the picture when the circumstances or features of the 
statement are altered. 
Three cases illustrate these prior practices that are now un-
constitutional under Crawford. In People v. Zarazua,101 the ap-
parent victim of domestic violence, which included rape and ag-
gravated assault,102 was interviewed on videotape by a police 
officer in the early morning hours at the police department.103 As 
the court stated, “[b]y the time [the officer] finished setting up the 
recording equipment and began the interview, it was about an 
hour and a half after the incident.”104 A week later, when the vic-
tim was interviewed, she denied that she was raped and did not 
want the defendant incarcerated; she also evaded service and did 
not appear at trial.105 The videotape was played at trial and the 
defendant was convicted.106 The California Court of Appeal re-
versed the conviction on the basis of Crawford.107 
 
 98. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1360, 1370, 1380 (West Supp. 2004). Section 1360(a) provides 
that 
[i]n a criminal prosecution where the victim is a minor, a statement made by 
the victim when under the age of 12 describing any act of child abuse or ne-
glect performed with or on the child by another, or describing any attempted 
act of child abuse or neglect with or on the child by another, is not made in-
admissible by the hearsay rule . . . 
assuming three specific conditions are met. Id. § 1360(a) (West Supp. 2004).  
 99. Id. § 1370(a)(1) (West Supp. 2004). Section 1370(a)(1) provides that hearsay is not 
excluded if “[t]he statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain the infliction or 
threat of physical injury upon the declarant.” Id. 
 100. Id. § 1380(a)(6)(A). Section 1380(a)(6)(A) requires that at the time of the offense, 
the alleged victim was either sixty-five years of age or was a dependent adult, and that 
“[at] the time of any criminal proceeding . . . regarding the alleged violation 
or attempted violation, [the victim] is either deceased or suffers from the in-
firmities of aging as manifested by advanced age or organic brain damage, or 
other physical, mental, or emotional dysfunction, to the extent that the abil-
ity of the person to provide adequately for the person’s own care or protection 
is impaired.” 
Id. 
 101. No. H025472, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3831 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004). 
 102. Id. at *1. The defendant was convicted of rape, assault by force likely to produce 
great bodily injury, and “domestic battery” with corporal injury. Id. 
 103. Id. at *2. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at *4, *7. 
 106. Id. at *7. 
 107. Id. at *12–14; see also People v. Kilday, No. A099095, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. 
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In People v. Pirwani,108 the evidence involved a videotaped 
statement, made two days before a dependent elderly victim died, 
to a police detective and a fraud investigator regarding financial 
transactions with the defendant.109 The defendant was convicted 
of stealing money from the victim, who was in her care.110 The At-
torney General conceded the unconstitutionality of the evidence 
provision that admitted this videotaped evidence.111 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal believed that “[e]ven assuming that the 
statement was not taken specifically with a view towards its use 
at a later trial, it would be reasonable to anticipate its use at trial 
if [the victim] became unavailable to testify.”112 
Finally, in People v. Sisavath,113 the California Court of Appeal 
found that a videotaped interview of a four-year-old child by a 
“‘forensic interview specialist’” at the county’s Multidisciplinary 
Interview Center (MDIC) was testimonial and improperly admit-
ted under Crawford.114 The court noted that, by the time of the 
interview, formal criminal charges had been filed against the de-
fendant, a preliminary hearing had been held, and both the dep-
uty district attorney who prosecuted the case and an investigator 
from the district attorney’s office were present.115 It rejected the 
state’s arguments that the statement was not testimonial because 
the interviewer was not a government employee and that the in-
terview might have been intended for therapeutic purposes or 
removal proceedings rather than prosecution.116 The court con-
cluded that the statement was testimonial, employing the test 
that it was “‘made under circumstances which would lead an ob-
 
LEXIS 6290, at *5, *6, *17 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2004) (ruling that videotaped interview 
of victim taken in her hotel room after the defendant’s arrest concerning domestic abuse 
committed on four separate occasions was testimonial despite the victim not being under 
arrest). 
 108. 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 109. Id. at 675. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 685. 
 113. 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 114. Id. at 757–58; see also People v. Espinoza, No. H026266, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 6573, at *16–18 (Cal. Ct. App. July 13, 2004) (reversing sexual assault conviction 
due to the admission of videotaped statement made to police by seven-year-old child who 
did not testify). 
 115. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 757. 
 116. Id. at 758. 
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jective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.’”117 
These cases illustrate several significant points. First, they ap-
pear to fit the Crawford Court’s description that “[a]n accuser 
who makes a formal statement to government officers bears tes-
timony.”118 The statements were recorded on videotape and were 
all apparently made by the government with an eye to—although 
not necessarily only to—admission under hearsay provisions tai-
lored to the facts of each case. Second, videotaping the statement 
appears obviously an important factor supporting a finding that 
the statement is testimonial in that it indicates an evidentiary 
purpose for the statement.119 Third, two of the cases suggest the 
uncertainty of whose perspective matters—the government’s or 
the witness’s—and how the witness’s perspective is evaluated 
when the actual witness is either a child or an elderly or depend-
ent adult whose perceptive abilities and intellectual functioning 
are below that of ordinary adults. Fourth, even if the person ask-
ing the questions is not a government agent, it is enough if the 
government, particularly the police or prosecutors, are involved 
in some way with the making of the statement.120 
 
 117. Id. at 757 (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364). The court used the test of an 
“objective witness” rather than an objective witness in the same category as the actual 
witness, here a four-year-old. Id. at 758 n.3. 
 118. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 119. Lee v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565, 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a statement testi-
monial that was made by a witness/co-participant to a police officer in a patrol car after 
the arrest of one suspect, even though not audible, because it was recorded on the car’s 
audio-video system, which indicated it was intended to record testimony for prosecution). 
Remarkably, neither Zarazua, Pirwani, nor Sisavath emphasizes the fact that the state-
ments were videotaped; none of these three decisions or Lee seemed concerned with the 
degree to which the witnesses understood they were being videotaped; and, except in 
Zarazua where the court noted the video equipment was set up before the interview be-
gan, the extent to which the witnesses were aware of the taping is unclear. See Zarazua, 
2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3831, at *2. 
 120. See also People v. Warner, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 429 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding in-
terview by a MDIC to be testimonial despite the state’s argument that the statement was 
intended to serve a broader purpose because law enforcement had been involved in the 
training of the interview specialist and a police detective observed the interview); State v. 
Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (finding the videotaped statement of 
child by child protection worker to be testimonial where a police officer observed the inter-
view and interrupted it to have the child draw a picture of the gun used in the assault). 
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People v. Vigil,121 People ex rel. R.A.S.,122 and Snowden v. 
State123 are three other cases, all of which involved children’s tes-
timony, where specific facts made the testimonial designation 
clear. R.A.S. involved a videotaped “‘forensic interview’” by a po-
lice investigator regarding sexual abuse.124 The interview was 
conducted “in a question and answer format appropriate to a 
child” three days after the alleged incident, which had previously 
been reported by the victim to his mother and grandmother.125 
The Colorado Court of Appeals found that the statement was tes-
timonial.126 In Vigil, decided on the same day by the Colorado 
Court of Appeals, the court found a videotaped police interview of 
the victim testimonial, rejecting the state’s argument that the 
questioning did not constitute interrogation because it was con-
ducted “in a relaxed atmosphere, with open-ended, nonleading 
questions.”127 The court also rejected the state’s argument that 
the seven-year-old in the case would not reasonably expect his 
statement to be used prosecutorially because in response to ques-
tions by the police officer regarding what should happen to the 
defendant, the child stated that he “should go to jail.”128 The offi-
cer then told the child he would need to talk to “‘a friend’” in the 
district attorney’s office who would try to put the defendant “‘in 
jail for a long time.’”129 
Snowden, which also found statements to be testimonial, did 
not involve videotaped statements.130 Instead, a licensed social 
worker employed by the county child protective services re-
counted statements made to her by three children who were 
 
 121. No. 02CA0833, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1024 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004). 
 122. No. 03CA1209, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1032 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004). The 
record on the child’s availability is unclear. The court reported that the state initially 
asked the victim to take the stand so the court could determine competency, but after a 
bench conference that was held off the record, the child was not called and a police inves-
tigator testified instead. Id. at *2. 
 123. 846 A.2d 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). 
 124. R.A.S., 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1032, at *2–3. 
 125. Id. at *10. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Vigil, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1024, at *6. 
 128. Id. at *7. 
 129. Id. at *7–8. Vigil also involved two other types of statements: one by the child to 
his father shortly after the incident, which the court found to be non-testimonial, see id. at 
*16, and another by the victim to a doctor who examined the child after the incident, 
which the court ruled was testimonial. Id. at *17–18. 
 130. See Snowden, 846 A.2d at 39. 
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available, but were not called as witnesses,131 as permitted under 
Maryland’s “tender years” hearsay exception.132 The court found 
that the statements were testimonial because the trial court had 
stated that “‘[t]he children were interviewed for the expressed 
purpose of developing their testimony by [the social worker], un-
der the relevant Maryland statute that provides for the testimony 
of certain persons in lieu of a child, in a child sexual 
abuse case.’”133 The appellate court also noted that before the in-
terview, the social worker had received a police report stating 
that the defendant “‘had sexually abused these children.’”134 The 
court’s focus here was also on the intention of the government of-
ficer. If and how the purpose to develop testimony was communi-
cated to the children and whether they reasonably understood 
that fact was not examined.135 
One point that can be seen in these three cases is that the tes-
timonial determination was relatively easy because the govern-
ment was purposefully creating formalized statements for poten-
tial use at trial. In most of the cases, it was directly related to a 
hearsay exception that contemplated the admission of such 
statements if created under circumstances indicating trustwor-
thiness and reliability as defined by Ohio v. Roberts.136 After 
Crawford, however, and the virtually automatic rejection of 
statements made in this fashion, such clear practices almost cer-
tainly will disappear. 
Investigations and conversations, however, will not disappear. 
Countermeasures and avoidance of Crawford’s restrictions are 
certain. Indeed, most of the factors that the courts relied on— 
whether it be the written form of the witness’s statement137 or its 
 
 131. Id. The children, who were ten and eight years old at the time of the incident, 
were treated as available by the court, id., or not shown by the state to be unavailable, Id. 
at 47 n.31. The court did not explain why they were not called as witnesses. See id. at 47. 
 132. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PRO. § 11-304 (Supp. 2003). 
 133. Snowden, 846 A.2d at 47. 
 134. Id. at 42 n.10. 
 135. The description of the social worker’s conversation with the children does not in-
clude any statements by her regarding the anticipated use of the statements at trial. Id. 
 136. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 137. See Brawner v. State, 602 S.E.2d 612, 613–14 (Ga. 2004) (finding a written state-
ment made by uninvolved eyewitness given to investigative detective several days after 
crime testimonial); Samarron v. State, No. 04-01-00124-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8015, 
at *14–15 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2004) (concluding that a statement given by eyewitness 
to detective at station and admitted at trial as excited utterance was testimonial). 
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recording on videotape,138 the training and identity of the inter-
viewer, the statements made by the interviewer to the witnesses 
about the potential use of the statement, conversations with in-
vestigating officers, or the examination of police reports before 
the interview—can be eliminated. 
The facts of Samarron v. State139 present an interesting exam-
ple. Rather than talking immediately to an eyewitness to a mur-
der, who was apparently excited, at the scene, the detective in-
terviewed the cooperative witness at the police station and took a 
typed statement.140 The statement, which was admitted by the 
trial court as an excited utterance,141 was found to be testimonial 
under Crawford, resulting in reversal of the conviction under the 
Confrontation Clause since the witness did not testify.142 The 
court explained: “Garcia [the witness] did not spontaneously tell 
Detective Martinez what had happened at the scene. Instead, af-
ter being questioned by Detective Martinez, he gave a formal, 
signed, written statement to the police.”143 After Crawford and 
the recognition of potential significance of preparing the written 
witness statement, the police may delay the immediate, more in-
formal, and more excited conversation. 
All countermeasures, of course, will not be taken. Particularly, 
countermeasures that interfere with the effective investigation 
and prosecution of crime will not be adopted,144 but many of the 
 
 138. The situation in Lee v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565, 570 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004), presents a 
dilemma for authorities. In Lee, the court held a statement made by a witness/co-
participant to a police officer in the patrol car after the arrest of one suspect was testimo-
nial because, even though not audible, it was recorded on the audio-video system in the 
patrol car, which indicated an intention to record testimony for prosecution of the case be-
ing investigated.  The potential to create an inadmissible testimonial statement under 
Crawford by having the conversation recorded is not likely to cause recording systems to 
be removed from squad cars, but that concern may cause some conversation first to be 
held outside the patrol car rather than inside. 
 139. 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8015. 
 140. Id. at *2–4. 
 141. Id. at *5. 
 142. Id. at *15. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Some of the practices, such as videotaping an interview with the child, are done 
for multiple purposes, and indeed, child advocates have long argued for limiting, where 
possible, the number of times a child who has been sexually abused or otherwise trauma-
tized is questioned about the incident to reduce the additional trauma involved in the 
process of retelling. See, e.g., Kee MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of 
Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 135, 136-37 (1985). Video-
taping a “multi-purpose” interview, so that it can be watched and used by the different 
agencies rather than re-interviewing the child, is part of this effort. Id. at 139. Therefore, 
MOSTELLER MASTER 392.DOC 11/15/2004 9:05 AM 
540 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:511 
indicators of testimonial statements can disappear. If such “cook-
book” changes in form can render the statements non-testimonial, 
avoidance of the restriction of Crawford will prove relatively easy 
for many statements that are not made to police officers, and if 
there is no Confrontation Clause protection whatsoever for those 
statements, serious issues of justice as to problematic accusatory 
statements will go unaddressed. 
B.  Clear Categories: Privately Made Statements—Confidential, 
Purposeful 
On the other hand, statements made to family, friends, and ac-
quaintances without an intention for use at trial have consis-
tently been held not to be testimonial, even if highly incriminat-
ing to another. State v. Rivera145 presents one of many examples. 
In Rivera, a co-participant in the crime confided in his nephew 
during a car trip that he and the defendant Rivera committed a 
burglary together and that when the victim discovered them, the 
defendant choked her.146 The statement was admitted at the de-
fendant’s trial as a statement against the declarant’s interest.147 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut found the statement to be 
non-testimonial because it failed under the most expansive test 
articulated by the Crawford Court: an objective witness would 
not reasonably believe that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial.148 Instead, the witness “made the statement in 
confidence and on his own initiative to a close family member, 
almost eighteen months before the defendant was arrested and 
more than four years before his own arrest.”149 
 
it would be unfortunate, if such videotaped interviews were discontinued. Crawford could 
cause them to be discontinued, but more likely, they will continue even if Crawford ren-
ders them inadmissible, but simply be unavailable for use by the prosecution unless the 
child testifies. See, e.g., People v. Warner, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 424, 431 (Ct. App. 2004) 
(admitting testimonial videotape of a child as satisfying the Confrontation Clause because 
the child testified and was available for cross-examination). The non-testimonial inter-
view, if there is one, will likely be an additional earlier interview. 
 145. 844 A.2d 191 (Conn. 2004). 
 146. Id. at 197. 
 147. Id. at 198. 
 148. Id. at 202. 
 149. Id. 
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Similarly, in People v. Cervantes,150 one of the perpetrators of a 
murder, who was injured while escaping from the crime, made 
statements implicating himself and others in the killing when the 
witness, a medical assistant, happened to visit his nearby home 
the day of the incident.151 Five days later, the medical assistant, 
who knew the perpetrators were members of a gang and was 
afraid to testify, called the police and reported the conversa-
tion.152 The trial court found the statements made by the perpe-
trator to be related to the medical treatment that the neighbor 
was providing outside the normal avenues and was without any 
apparent connection to law enforcement.153 The California Court 
of Appeal rejected the argument that the statement was testimo-
nial, even under the amicus definition: “[W]e subscribe to the 
view that [the co-participant] sought medical assistance from a 
friend of long standing who had come to visit his home. [His] 
statement appears to have been made without any reasonable 
expectation it would be used at a later trial.”154 
The facts of Horton v. Allen155 present an even stronger argu-
ment for non-testimonial treatment. There, the statement, admit-
ted under the state-of-mind hearsay exception, was made by a co-
participant before the crime occurred, describing the motive for 
the subsequent murder.156 The court concluded that the state-
ment was non-testimonial because it was made in a private con-
versation and not “under circumstances in which an objective 
person would ‘reasonably believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.’”157  
 
 150. 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 151. Id. at 777. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 780. 
 154. Id. at 783. 
 155. 370 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 
n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (ruling that Crawford was inapplicable because the statements “were 
made to loved ones or acquaintances and are not the kind of memorialized, judicial-
process-created evidence of which Crawford speaks”). 
 156. See Horton, 370 F.3d at 83. 
 157. Id. at 84 (quoting Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364)). Other cases have found similar 
statements to private individuals, with no clear evidence of an intent to use the state-
ments in criminal prosecutions or to communicate them to authorities, as non-testimonial. 
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2004) (approving admis-
sion of letter written by co-defendant to her boyfriend in private and with no expectation 
that it would be found or used by police as non-testimonial); People v. Griffin, 93 P.3d 344, 
369, 372 n.19 (Cal. 2004) (concluding that a statement by a murder victim to another girl 
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The statements in each of these cases may have been accusa-
tory, but they were made to private individuals not associated 
with the government with no expectation of being conveyed to the 
police, the prosecution, or other officials. They were clearly made 
for a purpose other than prosecution. Accusatory statements that 
are intended to be conveyed beyond the family, friends, or ac-
quaintances to whom they are made, and even those that the 
speaker understands might be conveyed further are different and 
perhaps should be treated as testimonial. Determining where the 
dividing line should be drawn, however, would be a challenge. 
People v. Compan158 applies this same rationale but in what 
might be considered a transition case. In Compan, the victim of 
domestic violence called a friend, told her that her husband was 
“angry and yelling at her,” and asked the friend “to drive over 
and pick her up.”159 About fifteen minutes later, the victim called 
back to say that she had been hurt and would be awaiting her 
friend in the back of her home.160 About fifteen minutes later, the 
friend picked up the victim, and during the ride to the friend’s 
home, the victim recounted that the defendant had punched and 
kicked her, threw her against a wall, and pulled her hair.161 
Shortly after arriving at the friend’s home, the friend took the 
victim to the hospital where the victim spoke with the police and 
a doctor.162 The victim did not testify at trial, and instead her 
friend testified, under the excited utterance exception, to the 
 
at school made on the day that the crime occurred that the “defendant had been fondling 
her for some time and that [the victim] intended to confront him if he continued” was not 
testimonial); People v. Conwell, Nos. A097011, A101881, A101927, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS  2409, at *105, *123 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2004) (ruling that a statement made to 
a private individual at a basketball court, after the discovery of a body, that the speaker 
and Conwell had committed the crime were “unsolicited and unwelcome statements made 
to an acquaintance in a public park” and were not testimonial); Somervell v. State, No. 
5D03-1751, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 11330, at *4–5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 30, 2004) (con-
cluding that a statement that a mother overheard her autistic child make when pretend-
ing to talk to the defendant on the phone was not testimonial); People v. Shepherd, No. 
247945, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 2501 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2004) (finding statements 
to relatives overheard by guards not testimonial); State v. Manuel, 685 N.W.2d 525, 527, 
531–32 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a statement about a murder by the defendant, 
who was arrested two days later, on the night of the crime to his girlfriend that he did the 
shooting was not testimonial). 
 158. No. 02CA1469, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 865 (Colo. Ct. App. May 20, 2004). 
 159. Id. at *1. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at *1–2. 
 162. Id. at *2. 
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statements she made on the telephone and during the car ride be-
fore she calmed down.163 
The Court of Appeals of Colorado concluded that these state-
ments were not testimonial because they were made to a friend 
“unassociated with government activity”164 and because they 
“were not made for the purpose of establishing facts in a subse-
quent proceeding.”165 The conclusion raises, as do many 911 calls, 
the status of statements made to private individuals that put the 
criminal process in motion or were not necessarily intended to 
remain confidential, and thus, depending on the standard, could 
“reasonably” be anticipated to be used at trial or not.166 
Finding an all-purpose “bright line,” rather than a totality of 
the circumstances approach, may be a challenge. In Compan, a 
line suggested, which I will continue to examine later, is that the 
statement was made to a private individual rather than to a gov-
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at *9. 
 165. Id. at *10. 
 166. There are other cases involving statements in this ambiguous area that were 
made to private individuals, but were not necessarily intended to be communicated to au-
thorities or used at trial. However, they are accusatory and have clear potential as evi-
dence. See, e.g., State v. Blackstock, 598 S.E.2d 412, 420 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that 
extended statements made by individual fatally shot during a robbery to his wife and 
daughter while in the hospital were non-testimonial because they were made during a pe-
riod when his physical condition was improving and therefore would not have been antici-
pated by the speaker to be used prosecutorially); State v. Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406, 408 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that an excited utterance made by one crime victim was 
not testimonial because it was “a spontaneous declaration made in response to the stress-
ful event that [the witness] was experiencing,” it was made to a private individual rather 
than in response to police questioning, and the declarant “had no reason to expect that her 
statement would be used prosecutorially”). 
In general, cases where statements are made to family members, and then later intro-
duced in domestic violence cases under the state of mind exception to show various points 
about a pattern of treatment, are problematic. On the one hand, they typically were not 
immediately communicated to the authorities, but, on the other, they were not intended to 
remain confidential—they are about a crime, i.e., accusatory, a type of statement fre-
quently admitted at trial, and not made for an unrelated purpose. Courts often find them 
non-testimonial. See, e.g., Demons v. State, 595 S.E.2d 76, 79, 80 (Ga. 2004) (finding a sta-
tement by a murder victim to a co-worker that the defendant had beaten him and had said 
he was going to kill the victim ruled non-testimonial because it was made to a friend be-
fore the crime occurred and “without any reasonable expectation that they would be used 
at a later trial”); People v. Williams, No. 246011, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 1217, at *2–4 
(Mich. Ct. App. May 13, 2004) (finding that statements to victim’s mother, brother, sister, 
and friend regarding unhappiness, feelings regarding defendant’s stalking and threats, 
fear for her life, and desire to end the relationship with the defendant all to be non-
testimonial). 
MOSTELLER MASTER 392.DOC 11/15/2004 9:05 AM 
544 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:511 
ernment agent.167 If government involvement in receiving the 
statement is strictly required, however, Crawford would be too 
easily avoided in some routinely encountered situations by hav-
ing government functions passed off to private groups. Compan 
attempts to avoid this problem by requiring that to be considered 
private, the individual must be “unassociated with government 
activity.”168 
I suggest one dividing line. When a statement is accusatory 
and intended to be conveyed beyond those who would be expected 
to keep it confidential—to government agents, private agencies 
that perform government functions, and strangers at arms length 
from the witness—it should be considered testimonial. 
In general, where the burden of proof is placed in construing 
the intent of the speaker may be helpful in developing workable 
dividing lines.169 I suggest that when a statement is made to a 
strictly private party, the burden can properly be placed on the 
defendant to show that it was for a testimonial purpose. The criti-
cal determinations are two-fold: whether the statement was accu-
satory, and whether it was intended to be conveyed to those in-
vestigating the crime. Ambiguity would mean exclusion from the 
testimonial category. In concrete terms, it would mean that the 
statements in Compan and similar fact patterns would not be 
considered testimonial.170 In the next Part, I address a different 
situation—statements made to police officers—where I believe 
reversing the burden would clearly be in order. 
C.  Relatively Clear Categories: Privately-Made Statements, 
Formal, and Litigation Focused 
The preceding section began with purely private statements 
made in confidence that were non-testimonial and moved to pri-
vate statements where the speaker had a growing understanding 
that the statement would be communicated further, and its cate-
 
 167. See Compan, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 865, at *10. 
 168. Id. at *9. 
 169. People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), employs this promis-
ing general approach—allocating the burden of proof as to the character of the state-
ment—although its specific application of the approach, which placed the burden for 911 
calls on the government because it is “more in accord with the highly prized protection of 
the right of confrontation” may well not be adopted. Id. at *37–42. 
 170. See Compan, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 865, at *1–2.  
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gorization might be ambiguous. With a slight additional move-
ment to more formal private statements and a specific intent for 
judicial use, the statement’s categorization again becomes clear 
as testimonial. Crawford stated that the role of the government 
in creating the evidence was a central concern of the resistance to 
inquisitorial evidence.171 Indeed, from the lower court application 
and from logic, it appears that open government involvement 
should be sufficient to establish the testimonial quality of the 
statement, even without an intent by the speaker that it was to 
be used testimonially.172 On the other hand, formality and clear 
intent of the speaker to create a testimonial document is appar-
ently also sufficient even without governmental involvement.173 
Justice Scalia provides an excellent, albeit ambiguous, example 
of this latter situation from the prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh, 
the clearest historical example of the abuse the Confrontation 
Clause was designed to remedy.174 Sir Walter Raleigh stated that 
Lord Cobham, his alleged accomplice, “had implicated him in an 
examination before the Privy Council and in a letter,”175 and that 
at his trial these were read to the jury.176 Cobham wrote two let-
ters to the Lords, one on July 29, 1603, after his examination be-
fore the Council on July 20.177 The other, which is much more 
damning, was written just before trial, which occurred in Novem-
ber 1603.178 It explained away Cobham’s recantation of his accu-
sation as occasioned by two letters Raleigh was able to get to 
Cobham while he was in prison, begging him to renounce his for-
mer statements.179 While the voluntariness of the statements may 
be doubted, nothing in the proceedings indicated that the first let-
ter was solicited by the Council and the second was stated to be 
unsolicited.180 
 
 171. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365. 
 172. See id. at 1364. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id. at 1360. 
 175. Id. (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. 
 177. 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 422–23 (1832). 
 178. Id. at 444–46. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 444. “[H]e could not sleep quietly till he had revealed the truth to the Lords, 
and therefore voluntarily wrote the whole matter to them, with his own hand, but yester-
day.” Id. 
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The Crawford Court appeared to consider these letters as tes-
timonial and part of the abuses of the inquisitorial system at the 
core of Confrontation Clause concerns.181 If so, it supports the 
very sensible proposition that intentionally created, formal mate-
rials may be testimonial, even if the government had no direct 
role in creating them. 
Two caveats are appropriate, however. First, since Cobham 
was under the physical control of the government and his life and 
liberty depended upon his cooperation,182 his statements may be 
viewed as created by governmental pressure, regardless of 
whether they were on their face voluntarily produced by him.183 A 
second distinguishing feature might be found in the timing of the 
statement, an issue that will be treated further below.184 These 
witness-generated letters were created after the Lords had inter-
rogated Cobham.185 Statements “volunteered” in that situation 
may not be considered as fully self-generated. More generally, the 
statement was made after the government had begun its efforts 
to prosecute Raleigh.186 Statements made to authorities after au-
thorities have signaled their investigation of a particular individ-
ual as the perpetrator—by an arrest, for example—should, except 
in rare exceptions, be considered testimonial. 
Whether government agents, perhaps criminal investigators, 
must be involved in some way and what type of involvement is 
required—the solicitation or the recording of information—are 
important issues. I will discuss those issues in the next Part, 
which examines police interrogations.187 
D.   Non-Categories: The Irrelevancy of Hearsay Exceptions as 
Strict Categories to the Crawford Definitional System 
Several issues arise concerning the Court’s treatment of sev-
eral hearsay exceptions in Crawford as non-testimonial. The first 
is whether the Court intends to categorically exclude all state-
 
 181. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1360. 
 182. See id. (noting Raleigh’s argument at trial that Cobham had lied to save himself). 
 183. See id. 
 184. See infra Part IV, particularly Parts IV.B.2–3. 
 185. JARDINE, supra note 177, at 445. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See infra Part IV. 
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ments that fit within the identified exceptions, or if this is simply 
a rough and ready division in that most statements coming under 
these exceptions will be excluded. The Court’s heavy reliance on 
history in Crawford makes categorical exclusion unlikely. It ar-
gued that there was no correspondence between the confrontation 
right as it was understood at the time of its framing and the de-
veloping hearsay rule188 and noted that the definition of an excep-
tion at the time of the Framing might have been very different 
than it is today.189 Thus, there is no theoretical basis to assume 
that, simply because a statement falls within a modern-day hear-
say exception, it was intended to be excluded from protection un-
der the Confrontation Clause if that particular statement has tes-
timonial characteristics.190 Rather, the Court’s treatment 
probably was meant to say that, because of the specific require-
ments of the particular hearsay exceptions, most statements 
within them would not meet the testimonial definition. However, 
given the need for, and attractiveness of, a rule-of-thumb for ap-
plication by trial courts, certain hearsay exceptions are likely to 
become practically excluded categories, but they should not be-
come theoretical determiners if the particular statement is oth-
erwise testimonial. 
An examination of business records and statements in further-
ance of a conspiracy is helpful in suggesting an important indica-
tor of when statements are non-testimonial and which particular 
statements, even though falling within a modern hearsay excep-
tion, should be treated as testimonial. That indicator is whether 
the statement is made for the purpose of accusing, or whether it 
is made for another purpose associated with other ordinary hu-
man activities.191 
 
 188. Cf. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 362 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“There appears to 
be little if any indication in the historical record that the exceptions to the hearsay rule 
were understood to be limited by the simultaneously evolving common-law right of con-
frontation.”)  Justice Thomas criticized the majority’s failure to explain the correspon-
dence between “firmly rooted” hearsay exceptions and the historical meaning of the Con-
frontation Clause. Id. at 365–66 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 189. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368 n.8 (recognizing that the exception for “sponta-
neous declarations,” if it existed at all, was much narrower than today’s definition). 
 190. See id. at 1367 & n.6 (finding “scant evidence that exceptions were invoked to ad-
mit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case,” except for the sui 
generis treatment of dying declarations). 
 191. In a slightly different context, Professor Friedman excludes statements “made in 
the course of going about one’s ordinary business.” Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: 
The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1043 (1998). When that is an apt way 
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Some business records may concern matters that are under-
stood at the time they were made to be destined for litigation or 
may be clearly accusatory.192 However, at their core, they involve 
employees, who are recording matters that are ordinary, routine, 
and related to performing their job functions.193 Olesen v. Hen-
ningsen,194 a typical case, involved a telephone operator stamping 
a ticket for a long distance telephone call showing the time the 
call was made.195 As the court noted, the makers of the record 
were wholly disinterested witnesses as to the automobile accident 
case in which their records were offered.196 It considered those re-
cords within the category “‘[w]here the circumstances are such 
that a sincere and accurate statement would naturally be ut-
tered, and no plan of falsification be formed.’”197 
As noted earlier, the Crawford Court characterized co-
conspirator statements as made “in furtherance of a conspir-
acy,”198 a requirement inconsistent with statements made for ac-
cusatory purposes or intended for use in judicial proceedings. 
Rather, the “in furtherance” requirement typically eliminates 
most narratives of past events and instead limits admissibility to 
those that aid accomplishment of the conspiracy.199 Indeed, if lit-
 
to describe a hearsay statement, regardless of specific exception, it should not be treated 
as testimonial. 
 192. Under hearsay analysis, the fact that a statement is made for litigation purposes 
is a factor that counts strongly against admission as a business record. See generally 2 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 288, at 269–72 (5th ed. 1999). Confrontation analysis under 
Crawford should be even more clearly categorical in treating all such statements as testi-
monial. Thus, some statements that would meet the business records exception, should be 
excluded under Crawford. See People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396–97 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2004) (reversing a conviction under Crawford because a blood test report produced by a 
private lab was introduced without confrontation). 
 193. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 192, § 288, at 269–70. 
 194. 77 N.W.2d 40 (Iowa 1956). 
 195. See id. at 41. 
 196. Id. at 44. 
 197. Id. (quoting 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1422, at 204 (James Chadbourn ed., 
1974)). 
 198. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367. 
 199. Occasionally, statements may both meet the “in furtherance” requirement and be 
highly accusatory, which can occur when a co-conspirator recounts past criminal activities 
to entice someone new to join the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 
223, 225 (2d Cir. 2004). Cf. Commonwealth v. Robins, 812 A.2d 514, 518 (Pa. 2002) (in-
volving a similar statement that failed to qualify as a co-conspirator statement because of 
the passage of considerable time since the conspiracy had been active). In these situations, 
whether the statement is considered testimonial would also turn on whether the speaker 
must have an awareness that he or she is speaking with a government agent or whether 
the role of the government in receiving accusatory hearsay renders the statement testi-
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erally applied, the requirement would exclude statements that 
are admissions and instead limit admission to those statements 
that are actually not hearsay because they constitute verbal acts 
that advance and form part of the crime.200 
The exceptions chosen and the bits of evidence provided indi-
cate that whether a statement is testimonial often relates to it fit-
ting a particular modern hearsay exception, but the purpose for 
which a statement is made is the critical determiner of whether it 
is testimonial. Business records and statements made in further-
ance of a conspiracy are generally non-testimonial.201 An accusa-
tory statement made for the purpose of trial, however, even if 
admitted under one of these exceptions, should be treated as tes-
timonial, perhaps automatically so, unless the Court rules that it 
must be made knowingly (or unknowingly) to a government offi-
cer or at least someone exercising government-related functions. 
A point that I have made earlier,202 and to which I will return,203 
is that where the burden is allocated is important and can be a 
useful tool in developing clear lines when statements have multi-
ple possible purposes. 
IV.  POLICE INTERROGATIONS 
A.  The Significance of Labeling Police Interrogations  as 
Testimonial  and the Importance of Categorical Treatment of 
the Genre 
The type of statement specifically examined in Crawford was 
classified by the Court as produced by “police interrogation[],” 
 
monial without the speaker’s awareness of that role. See infra Part IV.C.4. 
 200. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 192, § 259, at 156–57. 
 201. As will be shown in a later treatment of the modern exception for “Statements for 
the Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment,” FED. R. EVID. 803(4), a similar “other 
purpose” rationale should exclude statements made for medical treatment. It should not, 
however, exclude those made strictly for diagnosis when meant for presentation at trial, 
from the testimonial definition. See infra Part VI.A.3. The timing of the statement—for 
example, whether made after an arrest or after the police have conducted their inter-
view—and the determination of whether the burden falls on the defendant or the govern-
ment to establish the purpose of ambiguous statements will affect which of the statements 
made to physicians and other health care providers are considered testimonial. 
 202. See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text. 
 203. See infra notes 305–11, 337. 
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which it held was testimonial.204 Even as to police interrogations, 
the Court declined to be revealing, and in fact seemed to go out of 
its way to avoid clarity, using the term “interrogation” “in its col-
loquial rather than any technical, legal sense.”205 It acknowledged 
that several different definitions might be imagined, but chose 
none.206 The Court stated that it was not required to select among 
definitions because Sylvia Crawford’s questioning qualified “un-
der any conceivable definition,”207 and it declined to explicate. 
In limiting its application only to police interrogations, the 
Court did not necessarily reject a broader inclusion of statements 
to police as testimonial, but it left open that possibility. If the 
Court meant to adopt the amicus definition that testimonial 
statements included all those “‘made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial,’”208 virtually 
every statement made to a person known to be a police officer 
would qualify. When one “describes criminal activity” to someone 
known to be a police officer,209 the amicus definition is generally 
satisfied. Interrogation would not be required, and indeed, ques-
tioning might not even be needed. The Court did not reject that 
possibility, but what it decided was far narrower: statements 
made in response to police interrogation were testimonial.210 
Providing clear, categorical answers to the police and to the 
lower courts are important practical concerns in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, as Justice Thomas expressed it in his influential 
concurring opinion in White v. Illinois.211 His opinion objected to 
the suggestion of the United States, as amicus curiae, that not 
only should formal testimonial materials “such as affidavits, 
depositions or confessions that are made in contemplation of legal 
 
 204. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 205. Id. at 1365 n.4. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 1364. 
 209. Friedman, supra note 191, at 1042. 
 210. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4. 
 211. 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“If not carefully formulated . . . 
this approach might be difficult to apply and might develop in a manner not entirely con-
sistent with the crucial ‘witnesses against him’ phrase.”). 
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proceedings” be treated as testimonial, but also “the functional 
equivalent.”212 Justice Thomas wrote: 
In this case, for example, the victim’s statement to the investigating 
police officer might be considered the functional equivalent of in-
court testimony because the statements arguably were made in con-
templation of legal proceedings. Attempts to draw a line between 
statements made in contemplation of legal proceedings and those not 
so made would entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties. Few 
types of statements could be categorically characterized as within or 
without the reach of a defendant’s confrontation rights. Not even 
statements made to the police or government officials could be 
deemed automatically subject to the right of confrontation (imagine 
a victim who blurts out an accusation to a passing police officer, or 
the unsuspecting social-services worker who is told of possible child 
abuse). It is also not clear under the United States’ approach 
whether the declarant or the listener (or both) must be contemplat-
ing legal proceedings.213 
Whether they are as important as Justice Thomas contends, 
these concerns remain sound; trying to develop workable bright 
lines is a worthy goal. It is likely to be the Court’s strong prefer-
ence, although admittedly the Court follows and sometimes in-
sists upon a “totality of the circumstances” test.214 
B.  The Elements of Police Interrogations 
Other than eliminating the possible requirement that the 
statement be made under oath, which could not have been satis-
fied by the facts of Crawford or by the vast majority of police in-
terrogations, the Court was not required to exclude any of the 
major factors that might reasonably be required under the “tech-
nical legal sense” of “interrogation” because Sylvia Crawford’s 
“interrogation” met them.215 The Court described her statement 
as a “recorded statement, knowingly given in response to struc-
 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. The Court, for example, is committed to a totality of the circumstances approach 
for the finding of consent to search under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. 
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (insisting that consent be determined under a “totality 
of the circumstances” test, rather than giving special weight to a warning of the right to 
refuse to permit the search). The Fourth Amendment finding of probable cause is deter-
mined under this same standard. See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795, 800 (2003). 
 215. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4. 
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tured police questioning.”216 Moreover, although not relied on or 
even noted by the Supreme Court, Sylvia Crawford had been ar-
rested for the offense, and thus was both a suspect and in custody 
at the time of the questioning.217 
Despite the Court using the term in a “colloquial” rather than a 
“technical sense,”218 the term “interrogation” invites analysis 
linked to constitutional criminal procedure concepts, which have 
been largely absent from Confrontation Clause analysis.219 This 
analysis also invites an examination of one of the major historical 
practices—statements taken before examining magistrates under 
the Marian Statutes—that the Court believed the Framers 
sought to prohibit.220 
Six potentially significant factors were present in Sylvia Craw-
ford’s interrogation. The Court described it as a “recorded state-
ment, knowingly given in response to structured police question-
ing.”221 That description thus indicates that the statement was (1) 
made to a government agent (2) by a person who knew she was 
speaking to a government agent (3) in response to structured 
questioning that (4) was officially (mechanically) recorded.222 Syl-
via was also (5) a suspect and (6) in custody, having been ar-
rested.223 
One important point of demarcation in constitutional criminal 
procedure as to other guarantees of the Sixth Amendment is ab-
sent. No one in the case—suspect or witness—had been formally 
charged with a crime at the time of the police interrogation.224 
With respect to the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, 
the initiation of judicial proceedings is required “‘whether by way 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 n.6 (Wash. 2002). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights, 54 
S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 332–43 (1981) (arguing that evidence scholars’ treatment, particularly 
Wigmore, of confrontation in conjunction with hearsay as opposed to academics specializ-
ing in the Constitution generally or in criminal procedure, had an important role in shap-
ing the mode of analysis and the content of the doctrine). 
 220. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365. 
 221. Id. at 1365 n.4. 
 222. It appears that Sylvia Crawford was aware that the statement was being re-
corded. At two different points, the police recorded on tape the questioning of Sylvia. Brief 
for Petitioner at 2, Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) (No. 02-9410). 
 223. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 663 n.6 (Wash. 2002). 
 224. See id. at 658. 
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of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, 
or arraignment.’”225 
Thus, as to the Confrontation Clause, formal accusation is 
clearly not required, for in Crawford, that stage in the proceed-
ings had not been reached.226 An important point also is that the 
concern of the Confrontation Clause is not about obtaining evi-
dence from the accused. The confrontation right, which is a “trial 
right,”227 is a right of the accused, and he or she has the status of 
the accused at the time of trial when the evidence is offered. At 
the time the statement is made, the focus is on the government’s 
conduct as well as on the witness.228 This point may not tell us 
much, but it does open the possibility that the perspective of the 
witness—who is not being protected by the right—does not al-
ways have the central status that the perspective of the defen-
dant has under Miranda.229 
C.  Seeking a Categorical Solution to Treatment of Police 
Interrogations as Testimonial Statements 
1.  Formality as to Tangible Form of the Statement 
The fact that police interrogations are a category of statements 
to be treated as testimonial230 makes it difficult to place much 
significance on the formality of the statements in terms of their 
tangible form, whether it is one that is mechanically recorded, or 
 
 225. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682, 689 (1972)). 
 226. See Crawford, 54 P.3d at 663 n.6. 
 227. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52–53 (1987) (noting that the right has 
been described in these terms by a number of prior decisions of the Court and ruling that 
it guarantees the defendant the right to cross-examine witnesses fully at trial, but does 
not force the government to provide discovery materials to aid in contradicting those wit-
nesses during cross-examination). 
 228. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364–65 (concluding that the Confrontation Clause 
applies to interrogations by law enforcement officers as well as testimony from “wit-
nesses”). 
 229. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980) (noting that although in-
jecting some factors to make the test more readily applied by the police, its primary focus 
was on the perceptions of the suspect, which “reflects the fact that the Miranda safe-
guards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection 
against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent 
of the police”). 
 230. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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embodied in a signed statement, or given orally and remembered 
and recounted by the officer. Statements made during police in-
terrogations, even under structured questioning, are formally re-
corded or remain unrecorded for a myriad of reasons, most of 
which are unrelated to the concerns of the Confrontation Clause. 
Statements might not be mechanically recorded because the of-
ficer does not want the often unseemly interrogation process cap-
tured on the record, because no working equipment is available, 
because the witness insists on talking without recording, or be-
cause the officer does not know the significance of the statement 
until after he or she hears it or learns other information about 
the case.231 The last point—the officer not recognizing the signifi-
cance of the statement at the time made—could relate to a testi-
monial concern in that statements that are of no relevance to the 
criminal investigation are not likely to be considered testimonial 
by either the witness or the officer. If the statement relates to a 
crime, however, that should satisfy the relevance requirement to 
make the statement at least minimally testimonial, even if not 
immediately recognized by the police.232 
Indeed, all statements made knowingly to a police officer 
should be considered formally given, in that they should be ex-
pected to be admitted in evidence if of value to the government. 
Thus, every statement made to a police officer, whether formally 
recorded or not, could, and I contend should, be considered formal 
in the sense of “on the record.” The officer may have a notebook in 
which to record what was said, the officer may rely on memory, or 
the officer may record the statement in a more technical, formal 
way. When made to a known police officer, however, the state-
ment is subject to use in a criminal investigation and at trial, and 
is in a form sufficient to be received in evidence if other limita-
tions on its admissibility, such as satisfying some hearsay excep-
 
 231. Many of the same, largely irrelevant, concerns go into whether the conversation is 
memorialized in a signed witness statement, which is typically done for statements that 
are perceived to be important if time permits and the witness is willing. 
 232. Moreover, if the witness’s perspective is critical, there is no necessary connection 
between the officer’s perception of the significance of the statement, as indicated by re-
cording, which might be clear to the witness or largely unexpected. The fundamental point 
is that if a citizen is talking to a police officer about a crime, the conversation will fall on 
the formal, rather than the casual, side of the line. This is true whether initiated by the 
police officer, which has important implications for the citizen’s perception of importance, 
or initiated by the citizen, which has different but typically equally significant implica-
tions. See, e.g., Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529 (1987). 
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tion, are met. Every reasonable person knows or should know 
that statements to the police are “on the record.” 
On the other hand, the formality of recording, which includes a 
written, signed statement or tape recording, affirmatively indi-
cates that the statement was created for potential use at trial,233 
but it is very difficult to require formality in the tangible em-
bodiment of the statement. To do so would exclude from the cate-
gory, under present practices, a large number of statements that 
are in every other way police interrogations. Perhaps more im-
portantly, imposing formal recordation as a requirement would 
allow crass manipulation by authorities, who could consciously 
pick some statements not to be recorded and thereby free them 
from exclusion as testimonial statements, while suffering mini-
mal loss in investigative efficiency. 
The potential for changing the testimonial character of a 
statement by altering its form means that whether a statement 
was recorded before the Crawford decision may have different 
evidentiary significance than the failure to record after the deci-
sion. Both before and after Crawford, the fact that a formal state-
ment was taken by the police, whether openly recorded by me-
chanical means, signed by the witness, or provided with similar 
formality, shows the statement is testimonial regardless of the 
type of questioning used to produce it.234 Before Crawford, the 
failure to record might be an imprecise proxy, for the perceived 
unimportance or irrelevance of the statement heard. After Craw-
ford’s adoption of the testimonial approach, however, which ap-
parently gives significance to the form of the statement,235 failure 
 
 233. Widespread availability of recording equipment means that even the taping of a 
statement may have no affirmative impact on making the statement testimonial unless 
the fact of recording is known to the speaker or unless the witness is talking to a govern-
ment agent and the receiver’s perspective matters. See Lee v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565, 570 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a statement is testimonial when made by a witness/co-
participant to a police officer in the patrol car after the arrest of one suspect because, even 
though inaudible, it was recorded on the car’s audio-video system, which the court, appar-
ently using the receiver’s perspective, found to indicate an intention to record testimony 
for prosecution). Recording may be acknowledged by the police, may be automatic and 
known or unknown (recording device on front of car), or may be hidden and unknown to 
the speaker. See People v. Torres, No. F041547, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2670, at 
*29 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2004) (ruling that a conversation between arrested indi-
viduals recorded by a taping system, which was partially concealed and apparently un-
known to them, was not testimonial). 
 234. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 235. Id. 
MOSTELLER MASTER 392.DOC 11/15/2004 9:05 AM 
556 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:511 
to record the statement may simply be a countermeasure to avoid 
the testimonial label and subsequent exclusion of the statement, 
even if it is recognized as important and expected to be offered in 
evidence. 
Thus, the fact that a statement was officially recorded should 
indicate to the reasonable person that the statement may be used 
in court, which should render the statement testimonial. Antici-
pated use in court may exist, however, without formality as to the 
tangible embodiment of the statement. Statements made to a 
known police officer about a crime, except for comments coming 
figuratively “out of left field,” should be sufficient to satisfy any 
requirement as to form.236 More could be required, particularly if 
the scope of the confrontation right were tied to some specific his-
torical practice, but in terms of workable and sensible theory, 
nothing more should be required. 
2.   Requirements Beyond Statements Knowingly Made to a 
Police Officer About a Crime 
Perhaps all statements made knowingly to police officers 
should be considered testimonial. Indeed, I believe drawing the 
line at this point is critical so as not to complicate the definition 
or exclude statements that are substantively indistinguishable 
from clearly testimonial statements. On the other hand, I cannot 
ignore the strong signal in Crawford that testimonial is a rela-
tively narrow concept confined to a core interest of the Confronta-
tion Clause and that the term interrogation was also used.237 
The Crawford opinion, however, attempts to define the phrase 
“witnesses against” in the Constitution through the term testi-
monial,238 which appears to have no direct link to an interroga-
tion concept. The task is interpreting the Constitution, not decid-
ing history for its own sake. In this determination, a conflict 
exists between the language and logic of the Amendment, which 
broadens interpretation, and historical practices, which could 
lead to a narrower scope. I contend that, although advanced in 
 
 236. See id. at 1365 n.4. 
 237. Id. at 1374. 
 238. See id. at 1364. 
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Crawford as an important category, interrogation is not a consti-
tutionally based requirement. 
a.   Structured Questioning and Implications of the Term 
Interrogation  
The Crawford Court characterized the police’s questioning of 
Sylvia Crawford as “structured.”239 The term might mean that 
some or all volunteered statements, perhaps even if clearly accu-
satory, are not testimonial; the term could also mean that state-
ments not in response to structured questioning, whatever that 
term means, would not be testimonial or that those statements 
not in response to structured questioning when the witness is 
free from custody would be classed as non-testimonial. 
Although Fifth Amendment analogies must be used carefully, 
since the right against compulsory self-incrimination and the 
Sixth Amendment’s confrontation right are conceptually very dif-
ferent, “interrogation” has been explored extensively in the 
Miranda context,240 and some examination of this doctrine is il-
lustrative. One requirement of Miranda is that the questioning 
occur while the defendant is in custody, which is critical to creat-
ing a compelling atmosphere that is the equivalent of formal 
compulsion historically required by the Fifth Amendment.241 That 
requirement seems obviously not sensible as a requirement for 
police interrogation under Crawford. 
The facts of Beckwith v. United States242 provide a good mental 
exercise. In that case, Beckwith, who was not under arrest, sat 
 
 239. Id. at 1365 n.4. 
 240. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980) (concluding its discussion 
of interrogation by stating that “Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in 
custody is subject to either express questioning or its functional equivalent”); Blake v. 
State, 849 A.2d 410, 418–19 (Md. 2004) (discussing interrogation in the context of 
Miranda and concluding that “[i]nterrogation means more than direct, explicit question-
ing and includes the functional equivalent of interrogation”). 
 241. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966). The Court stated in Miranda: 
[W]e are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to in-
formal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement officers during in-custody 
questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police cus-
tody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of 
persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to 
speak. 
 Id. 
 242. 425 U.S. 341 (1976). 
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down at the dining room table in his home with agents from the 
Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service.243 The 
agents informed Beckwith that one of their functions was to in-
vestigate the possibility of criminal tax fraud and that they were 
assigned to investigate his income tax liability for a period of six 
years.244 While Beckwith was clearly the focus of a criminal inves-
tigation, the Court held his interrogation was not within the pro-
tection of Miranda because he was not in custody.245 There can be 
little doubt that had the statements provided by the defendant in 
this situation incriminated another, they would be considered tes-
timonial under Crawford.246 Clearly, custody is not required.247 
b.   Historical Analogy to Inquisitorial Judicial Examinations 
In Crawford, the Court contrasted the common law right of 
confrontation to the civil law practices of “examination in private 
by judicial officers.”248 As noted earlier, the central example of the 
despised inquisitorial practice—“one of the most notorious in-
stances of civil-law examination”—was the treason trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh.249 The more general practice of pretrial examina-
tions occurred under two statutes adopted during the reign of 
Queen Mary, known as the Marian statutes, which dealt with 
bail and committal.250 As the Court described these statutes, they 
“required justices of the peace to examine suspects and witnesses 
in felony cases and to certify the results to the court.”251 
In finding “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of 
interrogations” as “testimonial under even a narrow standard,” 
Justice Scalia observed that “[p]olice interrogations bear a strik-
ing resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in Eng-
 
 243. Id. at 343. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 345–47. 
 246. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364–65. 
 247. For a recent application of this principle, see United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 
2d 896, 901–02 (S.D. Ind. 2004). In Saner, the district court concluded that custody was 
not required. Statements elicited by an antitrust division attorney during an interview in 
the defendant’s home were testimonial despite the fact that the witness was not in cus-
tody. Id. 
 248. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359. 
 249. Id. at 1360. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
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land.”252 This analogy could provide the elements of a bright line 
test. Indeed, given Justice Scalia’s strong desire to moor constitu-
tional principles to historical practices, it is likely to have impor-
tance. Unless an extremely narrow definition is chosen, however, 
the analogy does not provide a simple solution with easily dis-
cernable and logically consistent demarcation lines. 
Justices of the peace under the Marian statutes253 were re-
quired to examine the suspect and the witnesses to determine 
whether to grant bail to the suspect and to determine whether to 
commit the defendant to pretrial detention until the time of 
trial.254 The justice of the peace was also to bind over or issue an 
order compelling the victim and accusing witnesses to appear at 
trial.255 The examinations occurred in situations where a suspect 
had been apprehended and brought to the justice of the peace.256 
Thus, an arrest was presumed. The witnesses, however, were 
clearly not in custody, although they were present before the jus-
tice of the peace in a modestly formal setting, likely the justice of 
the peace’s “parlor.”257 The witnesses examined were the “bring-
ers,” those who brought the suspect before the magistrate—often 
including the victim and other accusing witnesses.258 The magis-
trates were required to record their examinations, but the com-
mittal statute required only that it be done within two days, 
which did not contemplate verbatim depositions.259 
The court in People v. Cage260 uses this historical analogy to 
identify the type of police interrogation that should be covered by 
Crawford and other police-citizen encounters that it contends 
should not be covered.261 A number of other lower courts have 
employed something of this analysis to exclude informal “field in-
 
 252. Id. at 1364. 
 253. See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: 
ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE 5–54 (1974) [hereinafter PROSECUTING CRIME]; JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 40–47 (2003) [hereinafter 
ORIGINS]. 
 254. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME, supra note 253, at 7–8. 
 255. Id. 
 256. LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 253, at 40–41. 
 257. Id. at 41. 
 258. Id. at 40–41. 
 259. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME, supra note 253, at 17–18. 
 260. 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 261. Id. at 852–57. 
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terviews,”262 although others have found statements obtained in 
similar circumstances testimonial.263 
 
 262. In Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), and Fowler v. State, 809 
N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), the Indiana Court of Appeals found statements made to 
the police in the aftermath of domestic assaults to be non-testimonial because they in-
volved police questioning rather than interrogation. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952; Fowler, 
809 N.E.2d at 963. The court stated that the practice of police questioning of victims 
shortly after an apparent criminal assault to ascertain the facts did not “remotely re-
sembl[e] an inquiry before King James I’s Privy Council.” Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952; 
Fowler, 809 N.E.2d at 964. See also People v. Newland, 775 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2004) (treating “a brief, informal remark to an officer conducting a field investigation” 
as non-testimonial); Cassidy v. State, No. 03-03-00098-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 4519, at 
*10 (Tex. Crim. App. May 20, 2004) (ruling that the statement of a victim of aggravated 
assault, when “interviewed” by a police officer at the hospital one hour after the assault in 
which he described his assailant and the facts of the assault, was not testimonial); Cf. 
State v. Barnes, 845 A.2d 575, 577 (Me. 2004) (concluding that statements made by defen-
dant’s mother to the police at the station house where she went after an earlier assault 
were not testimonial because they were initiated by the witness, made while she was ex-
cited, and not part of structured questioning because the statements were not about previ-
ously known criminal activity). But see, e.g., Wall v. State, 143 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2004) (disagreeing explicitly with the decision in Cassidy v. State and concluding 
that a police interview of a witness at the hospital was testimonial). 
Like Cage, State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), is a very problematic 
case. The North Carolina Court of Appeals found a statement made by a kidnapping and 
assault victim non-testimonial because “Crawford protects defendants from an absent 
witness’s statements introduced after formal police interrogations in which the police are 
gathering additional information to further the prosecution of a defendant.” Id. at 27. In 
Forrest, the statement was received after the police, in response to an order to “take [him] 
down,” had forcibly subdued Field and rescued the witness. Id. at 24. After the defendant 
was removed from the scene, a police officer whose task was to interview the victim, ap-
proached the victim, but asked no questions until after the victim “abruptly started talk-
ing.” Id. at 27; see also id. at 28, 30 (Wynn, J., dissenting). Despite the fact a specific sus-
pect had been arrested, the court concluded that, principally because the statement was 
initiated by the witness and in the immediate aftermath of a traumatic event, the state-
ment was non-testimonial. Id. at 27. 
Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2004), is arguably a different type of case. In 
Leavitt, the Ninth Circuit did not consider statements that were made by a citizen, who 
called police to her home—the night before her murder—regarding a prowler who at-
tempted to break in as testimonial. Id. at 683. The statement also included her thought 
that the prowler was the defendant because of his earlier efforts to talk his way into her 
home. Id. The court found the statement non-testimonial because it was initiated by the 
victim for the purpose of seeking help in ending a frightening home intrusion. Id. at 683 
n.22. 
 263. See People v. Kilday, No. A099095, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6290, at *20 
(Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2004) (concluding that “unrecorded, informal questioning in the 
[hotel] lobby” of a victim who was frightened and visibly injured was testimonial even if 
not interrogation because it was “part of a police investigation aimed at obtaining testi-
monial evidence”); Moody v. State, 594 S.E.2d 350, 353–54 (Ga. 2004) (finding statements 
made to police during “field investigation” regarding what a murder victim told police 
shortly after defendant shot into the bedroom, in which she had been sleeping, was testi-
monial, although the error was harmless); Heard v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-CA-002494-
MR, 2004 WL 1367163, at *1, *4–5 (Ky. Ct. App. June 18, 2004) (concluding that state-
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In Cage, the court used the English justice of the peace analogy 
to exclude from the testimonial category statements made by a 
crime victim to a police detective at the hospital where the victim 
was waiting for medical treatment for a five- to six-inch cut on his 
face.264 The detective testified that he asked John, the victim, 
“what had happened between [him] and the defendant?”265 He re-
cited the victim’s statement, which is highly accusatory, as fol-
lows: 
[T]here was an argument, a fight between his mother and him over a 
belt. She became angry because she thought he was messing up the 
house. She began pushing him, and . . . he fell on . . . the glass top of 
[a] coffee table, and th[e] coffee table broke. 
About th[at] time . . . , his grandmother came downstairs and had 
grabbed ahold of him. While she was holding him, [defendant] 
grabbed a piece of glass and came over and cut him. [W]hen she 
started to go and cut him a second time, he broke free and ran from 
the residence.266 
The state categorized the conversation as “‘pre-investigative, 
informal[ ] fact gathering’ rather than ‘an attempt to gather evi-
dence in anticipation of a criminal prosecution,’”267 a description 
which the court in essence accepted. The court stated its reason-
ing as follows: 
We cannot believe that the framers would have seen a “striking re-
semblance” between Deputy Mullin’s interview . . . at the hospital 
and a justice of the peace’s pretrial examination. There was no par-
ticular formality to the proceedings. Deputy Mullin was still trying 
to determine whether a crime had been committed and, if so, by 
whom. No suspect was under arrest; no trial was contemplated. 
Deputy Mullin did not summon John [the victim] to a courtroom or a 
station house; he sought him out, at a neutral, public place. There 
was no “structured question[ing],” just an open-ended invitation for 
John to tell his story. The interview was not recorded. There is no 
evidence that Deputy Mullin even so much as recorded it later in a 
police report. Police questioning is not necessarily police interroga-
 
ment made to police, who arrived at victim’s home within minutes of the report of an as-
sault, identifying the defendant as having hit her in the head with a gun was “testimo-
nial,” but the admission of the statement was harmless); State v. Clark, 598 S.E.2d 213, 
215–17 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (treating statements of identification during officer’s initial 
investigation as testimonial). 
 264. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 856–57. 
 265. Id. at 849 (alteration in original). 
 266. Id. (alteration in original). 
 267. Id. at 856. 
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tion. When people refer to a police interrogation, however colloqui-
ally, they have in mind something far more formal and focused.268 
On this basis, the Court found the statement non-testimonial.269 
It reached a different conclusion, however, as to a later state-
ment made by the victim “during a classic station-house inter-
view. It featured structured police questioning and tape re-
cording.”270 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that 
the witness was not in custody, as it noted Sylvia Crawford had 
been in custody, and, apparently from the court’s silence, the de-
fendant had not been arrested yet either.271 Thus, while Cage re-
lies on the analogy to the Marian statute interrogations by a jus-
tice of the peace, it did not require an arrest at least where the 
questioning was structured, occurred at the police station, and 
was recorded.272 
Requiring an arrest is unreasonable because, if for no other 
reason, it is too easily manipulated by the police. In many cases, 
arrests could be delayed momentarily while a few key witnesses 
were interrogated. Using the existence of probable cause or “fo-
cus” on the defendant instead of arrest would avoid the difficulty 
of manipulation. Imposing either as a requirement, however, is 
problematic for a number of reasons. 
As to focus, the concept would be very difficult to define in any 
definite way and is almost hopelessly impractical.273 The exis-
 
 268. Id. at 856–57. Remarkably, in State v. Barnes, 845 A.2d 575 (Me. 2004), the Maine 
Supreme Judicial Court held that statements made by the victim—the defendant’s 
mother—about an earlier assault were not testimonial even though the statements were 
made to police officers at the station house because the witness went there on her own and 
initiated the conversation while still excited and was not subjected to structured question-
ing because the police did not know about the criminal activity prior to her report. Id. at 
577 n.3. 
 269. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 848. Although the court did not attribute any signifi-
cance to this point, finding the statement non-testimonial is even more questionable be-
cause the first citizen-police contact was initiated by the police and the police asked the 
first question for the purpose of determining whether a crime took place. Id. at 849. This 
situation is therefore not in the potentially distinguishable category of a citizen-initiated 
contact for a purpose, such as medical attention or safety, other than criminal prosecution. 
See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (finding statements 
non-testimonial because they were not the equivalent of formal pretrial examination but 
rather typically made by a victim for the purpose of saving her life). 
 270. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 854. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. A more minimalist approach to focus could be workable, as will be discussed be-
low. It would be the identification of a specific suspect, or the clear recognition that a 
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tence of probable cause perhaps is more promising, but still im-
practical as a requirement. If the government has not arrested 
the person, it would have the incentive to show that probable 
cause did not exist. Requiring the defense to prove in unclear 
cases, such as the frequent disputes of who was the victim and 
who was the attacker in injuries between family members, or to 
cumulate the information available to the police that established 
probable cause would be a daunting task in a relatively large 
class of cases. 
Moreover, the historical analogy does not indicate that an ar-
rest was theoretically required rather than merely part of exist-
ing practices. While the magistrates conducted their examina-
tions where a “prisoner” existed, it was the manner of making 
this evidence that was so opposed. Having a “prisoner” present 
when testimony was taken from a witness would likely have been 
seen as preferable for providing face-to-face encounters.274 Had 
statements from witnesses been taken by magistrates without an 
arrest, as Justice Scalia stated as to another type of arguably 
nonexistent historical practice, “there is no doubt what its appli-
cation would have been.”275 
While the witness neither being a suspect nor in custody 
should be required,276 custody of the witness surely counts heavily 
 
crime was committed in situations where identify is unknown. This limitation could effec-
tively allow the initial reports of crime, or parts of them, to be received as non-testimonial. 
See infra Part VI.B.2 (discussing 911 calls). 
 274. See Mosteller, supra note 18, at 740–41, 741 n.246 (describing as apparently not 
objectionable the receipt of evidence taken under oath by committing magistrates in the 
presence of the defendant but without cross-examination); see also id. at 744–45 (describ-
ing the differing importance placed on personal presence of the defendant during the re-
ceipt of the accusatory statements). 
 275. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.3 (concluding that unsworn testimonial statements 
would not have been admissible for evidentiary reasons at the time of the Framing; how-
ever, had that evidentiary rule changed, the Framers would certainly have considered 
their admission a violation of the Confrontation Clause). 
 276. In United States v. Saner, 313 F. Supp. 2d 896 (S.D. Ind. 2004), the court con-
cluded that a statement elicited by an antitrust division attorney during an interview in 
the suspect’s home, which incriminated both the suspect and another person, would be 
testimonial if it was offered against the other person even though the suspect was not un-
der arrest. Id. at 901–02. In United States v. Gonzalez-Marichal, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1200 
(S.D. Cal. 2004), the district court held that an interview with a material witness while 
she was in custody was testimonial even though the witness was not a suspect in the 
crime for which the defendant was prosecuted. Id. at 1201–03. Similarly, in Brawner v. 
State, 602 S.E.2d 612 (Ga. 2004), the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the state’s argu-
ment that Crawford should be limited to cases where the witness is a suspect. Id. at 614 
n.2. 
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in favor of a statement being testimonial.277 Even ostensibly vol-
unteered statements made by a witness to government officers 
while in custody should be seen as the product of government ac-
tion because of the likely coercive force of custody on the witness 
and the desire of witnesses to curry favor with those who can af-
fect their release.278 Also, when the witness is in custody, it 
greatly affects the witness’s perspective, making statements to 
any government agent very likely to be seen by that person as for 
evidentiary purpose. 
Similarly, when the defendant has been arrested or an arrest 
warrant has been issued, it has the effect of demonstrating the 
government’s interest in the criminal prosecution of a particular 
individual. Thus, while I argue that accusatory statements made 
to private individuals somewhat at arms length—not made to 
those who would be expected to keep information confidential as 
intimates, such as family and friends—should be considered tes-
timonial, such statements are more clearly testimonial once an 
arrest has occurred or an arrest warrant has been issued. Arrest, 
which publicly demonstrates an official commitment to criminal 
prosecution of a particular person, eliminates any ambiguity 
about the testimonial status of an accusatory statement made for 
dissemination beyond those expected to keep confidences. 
Moreover, once the defendant has been arrested, the authori-
ties should not be able to develop statements through private or-
ganizations or officials and still have them considered non-
testimonial. Thus, a witness’s conversation with a doctor about 
criminal actions, which might not be considered testimonial be-
fore arrest, should be treated as testimonial after the defendant’s 
arrest.279 
 
 277. Gonzalez-Marichal, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. 
 278. For a discussion of the Court’s recognition that the letters sent by Cobham to 
those prosecuting Raleigh were testimonial, see supra notes 174–86 and accompanying 
text. 
 279. However, the courts in Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, and Heard, 2004 WL 1367163, 
ignored this factor entirely. See infra Part VI.A.3. 
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3.  Field Investigation/Non-Custodial Interrogations 
The Court in Miranda described two types of non-custodial 
questioning not covered by the Fifth Amendment privilege. One 
was “[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning.”280 
When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, 
of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against 
him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under re-
straint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a 
crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding 
process is not affected by our holding. . . . In such situations the 
compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interro-
gation is not necessarily present.281 
Interrogation outside Miranda and outside the station house, 
loosely termed field investigations,282 can be conducted to develop 
statements to be used against suspects who have already been 
arrested. Since field investigations, like a “classic station-house 
interview,”283 can include questioning for the explicit purpose of 
gathering evidence against arrested suspects, that category 
should not define when statements are non-testimonial. Field in-
vestigations do take place in a more public or less official setting 
than the interrogations that historically were particularly de-
spised. I believe, however, that had English justices of the peace 
gone into the field to question witnesses and record their an-
swers, “there is no doubt what [the Confrontation Clause’s] appli-
cation would have been.”284 It would have applied and excluded 
the evidence. 
Miranda also stated that it did not apply to volunteered state-
ments produced without questioning.285 The Court stated: 
 
 280. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477–78 (1966). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Compare People v. Newland, 775 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (assum-
ing that a “brief, informal remark to an officer conducting a field investigation, not made 
in response to ‘structured police questioning’ . . . should not be considered testimonial 
since it ‘bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause tar-
geted’”), with Moody v. State, 594 S.E.2d 350, 354 n.6 (Ga. 2004) (assuming testimonial 
included the type of “field investigation of witnesses” that occurred in that case). 
 283. People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 854 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 284. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.3. 
 285. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. 
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There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police 
station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person 
who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he 
desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred 
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by 
our holding today.286 
It is much more reasonable to exclude the sub-class of volun-
teered statements made by individuals not in custody from the 
category of testimonial statements than to exclude the entire 
class of statements produced from police questioning in the field. 
Finding a meaning for structured questioning, the description 
given to Sylvia Crawford’s questioning by the Court,287 might also 
provide a promising area for further development. That term in-
dicates the statement was produced by government questioning 
and was not volunteered or unexpected. The potentially pointed 
nature of the questions might suggest potential prosecutorial use 
to reasonable people and thus is an alternative to an accusatory 
purpose by the speaker, or it effectively creates accusation. Struc-
tural questioning might also suggest that a specific suspect has 
been identified,288 indicating that the case has moved beyond 
simple initial neutral fact gathering. In trying to achieve Justice 
Thomas’s desire for clear application,289 which factors individu-
ally or in combination matter and why? If clarity and simplicity 
are desired, I suggest that statements made to the police must be 
considered testimonial either quite early in the investigative 
process or quite late, perhaps only in circumstances closely 
analogous to the examinations under the Marian statutes. 
A mental exercise should be useful to get a feel of whether 
clear and workable lines can be drawn using any of these factors. 
As to all of the situations described below, assume the witness is 
talking to a person he or she knows to be a police officer in the 
 
 286. Id.. 
 287. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4. 
 288. This might mean use of the focus standard as employed in Escobedo v. Illinois, 
378 U.S. 478, 490–92 (1964), but abandoned quickly thereafter in Miranda. 384 U.S. at 
444 n.4. See also Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) (ruling that inter-
view with government agents from the IRS Intelligence Division did not violate Miranda 
even though the taxpayer was clearly the focus of a criminal investigation because he was 
interviewed in his home and was not in custody). The fact that the police did not initiate 
contact for the purpose of seeking evidence against a particular suspect has been noted as 
a reason why a statement should not be considered testimonial. See People v. Moscat, 777 
N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004). 
 289. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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field. Assume further that each of these citizen-police encounters 
end with a two paragraph statement like that obtained in People 
v. Cage from the victim by the police officer at the hospital that 
incriminates a specific individual in a crime.290 
Using the key factors that could characterize the police receiv-
ing information from a citizen, some of the differing situations in 
which a statement might be obtained are as follows: 
1. The witness makes an accusatory, but volunteered, statement 
to an officer with a notepad. 
2. The witness makes an accusatory, but volunteered, statement 
that she knows is being mechanically recorded. 
3. The witness makes an accusatory, but volunteered, statement 
after a suspect has been identified or arrested or both. 
5., 6., & 7. In each of the above situations, assume that the wit-
ness begins by volunteering the accusatory information, but after a 
period of time, some questions from the officer in follow-up and to 
clarify points enter the conversation. 
8. The witness is questioned with a single “softball” question—
“Do you know anything about X?” or “What happened?”—in a 
situation where the existence of a crime is unclear. 
9. The witness is questioned with a single “softball” question—
“Do you know anything about X?” or “What happened?”—in a 
situation where the existence of a crime is clear but no suspect has 
been identified. 
10. The witness is questioned with a single “softball” question—
“Do you know anything about X?” or “What happened?”—in a 
situation where the existence of a crime is clear and a suspect has 
been identified. 
11 & 12. The witness is asked several questions, and the exis-
tence of a crime is (or is not)  clear. 
13. & 14. The witness is asked several questions, and a suspect 
has (or has not) been identified. 
15. & 16. The witness is asked several questions, and a suspect 
has (or has not) been arrested. 
 
 290. See People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 849 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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17. & 18.  The witness is questioned extensively, and the exis-
tence of a crime is (or is not) clear. 
19. & 20. The witness is questioned extensively, and a suspect 
has (or has not) been identified. 
21. & 22.  The witness is questioned extensively, and a suspect 
has (or has not) been arrested. 
23. The witness volunteers the statement while in an excited 
state. 
As I hope examining the above set of situations makes clear, 
neither the concept of structured questioning nor any other obvi-
ous set of factors is serviceable in developing dividing lines that 
are both theoretically sound and practical. 
In addition, requiring structured questioning would likely be 
historically inaccurate. Many of those examined by the justices of 
the peace were extremely willing witnesses who were among the 
“bringers.”291 While the magistrates had a clear prosecutorial 
bent,292 leading, rather than clarifying, questions were likely un-
necessary. 293 
In Cage, the second statement to the police was considered tes-
timonial because it was at the station house, tape recorded, and 
made in response to structured questions.294 If these are critical 
factors, at least the first two factors can easily be manipulated. 
Statements, once taken at the station house, could henceforth be 
made in the field, and they might not be formally recorded. Even 
as to the structured questioning, a bright line could sometimes be 
avoided. The first interview with a victim might be conducted by 
an officer using only a single or a few “what happened?”-type 
questions. 
One response to my analysis might be that all of the state-
ments made outside the station house should be considered non-
 
 291. LANGBEIN, ORIGINS, supra note 253, at 40–01. 
 292. Id. at 43. 
 293. It is not at all clear to me that the questioning of many victims and “bringers” 
would have very much differed from what happened in State v. Barnes, 845 A.2d 575 (Me. 
2004), where the defendant’s mother fled to the station house to tell the police about the 
assault committed against her. The court, nevertheless, found that the statements were 
not testimonial because they were initiated by the witness, made while she was excited, 
and, not in its judgment, in response to structured questioning. Id. at 577. 
 294. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 854. 
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testimonial because they are not in situations like that of the ex-
aminations before the justices of the peace under the Marian 
statutes.295 Rather, they are like the statements made to the con-
stable or sheriff who helped arrest the person, which were not the 
source of concern of the Framers.296 
I accept that such statements outside proceedings before jus-
tices of the peace proceedings were not of concern, but again that 
was because those statements were not used as evidence. The 
hearsay rule of that time did not have the ready exceptions avail-
able today.297 Accusatory, testimonial-type statements, other than 
some dying declarations and a very limited number of excited ut-
terances, were not admissible.298 Thus, they were not of concern 
as to the common law right of confrontation because they were 
not admissible. If the historical practice had been different, would 
the statements have likewise been seen as violating this common 
law right? I suggest yes, but I insist that the absence of specific 
historical analogy should not count as a strong argument for ex-
cluding such statements from the testimonial category because, 
given that the evidence of concern was not admitted, the confron-
tation concern never arose. 
4.   Role of Governmental Action in Creating Evidence and the 
Specific Dangers Involved in Testimonial Statements and 
Unconfronted Accusations 
From the point of testimonial, why should the nature of the po-
lice questioning matter? Three broad purposes for Confrontation 
Clause protection are possible. One possibility is that the Con-
frontation Clause is concerned solely with the government’s ma-
nipulation of the witness in creating the evidence—manipulating 
the words uttered.299 If this concern is decisive, then volunteered 
statements, whether the person is excited or not, and those pro-
 
 295. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1360. 
 296. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 297. Compare Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367 n.6, with FED. R. EVID. 803. 
 298. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367 n.6. 
 299. This may be what the Court had principally in mind when it stated, “[t]he in-
volvement of government officers in the production of testimonial evidence presents the 
same risk, whether the officers are police or justices of the peace.” Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 
1365. 
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duced by very light questioning would not have much, or as 
much, potential for this type of manipulation. 
A second purpose is clearly present in the view of some au-
thors, Blackstone in particular.300 That is the government’s 
“dressing up” of the statement, which is governmental manipula-
tion of the recording of the statement rather than manipulation 
of what was said.301 Several responses may be made to this con-
cern. One is that it should not be a Confrontation Clause concern, 
assuming the person who recorded the statement testifies in 
court. Indeed, the standard hearsay response is precisely of this 
sort—the problem with hearsay is not with the “ear witness” be-
cause that person can be cross-examined about what he or she 
heard.302 That response, however, is clearly historically inaccu-
rate. In the Raleigh case, some of the same judges who sat at Ra-
leigh’s trial had been interrogators of Cobham and had explained 
from the bench the circumstances under which Cobham’s state-
ments were taken.303 Raleigh was not at all satisfied to have ac-
cess to them,304 and neither were the Framers.305 Instead, con-
fronting Cobham was the issue and his goal.306 
Moreover, officials who will manipulate the content of the 
statement received will also lie about that manipulation. That 
dishonesty can be cross-examined, but it can better be exposed if 
the person whose words were manipulated can contradict the 
manipulation with the response: “No that is not what I said at all. 
Here is what I said and what I meant.” Those who favored viva 
voce proceedings over the inquisitorial method—which Black-
stone famously recounted—knew well of all these advantages.307 I 
can find no indication that, in giving defendants the right to be 
 
 300. See infra note 367 and accompanying text. 
 301. See id. 
 302. See, e.g., 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 192, § 245, at 93 (noting that as to the witness 
who reports the statement, all three of the ideal conditions—oath, personal presence at 
trial, and cross-examination—exist). 
 303. 30 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 6342, at 262 (1997); cf. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965) 
(“Nor was the opportunity to cross-examine the law enforcement officers [who took the 
statement] adequate to redress this denial of the essential right secured by the Confronta-
tion Clause.”). 
 304. 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 303, § 6342, at 262 (stating that Raleigh de-
manded confrontation with Cobham, not just Cobham’s unsworn statements). 
 305. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370–71. 
 306. 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 303, § 6342, at 262–63. 
 307. See infra note 367 and accompanying text . 
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confronted with the witnesses against them, the Framers meant 
to restrict that beneficial impact only to government manipula-
tion of the words uttered rather than the alteration or selective 
recording of what was in fact said. 
A more limited response may be that mechanical recording, if 
done fully and well, may eliminate this concern. When state-
ments are accurately recorded in their entirety, then manipula-
tion of what was said is not possible.308 Interestingly, this particu-
lar concern is not eliminated—but exacerbated—by the failure to 
record the statement when it is made, which a focus on formality 
in recording gets backward.309 In fact, the possibility of govern-
mental manipulation is even greater with informal statements 
because witnesses are not constrained by contemporaneous writ-
ten records that may check additions and modifications. 
A third purpose is to protect the defendant from malicious 
falsehoods or even errors by the witness independent of govern-
mental manipulation. The historical practices that the Crawford 
Court dealt with were those of the Privy Council, which was cen-
tered in political trials where governmental manipulation was 
probably the greatest concern,310 and the preliminary examina-
tions before justices of the peace under the Marian statutes, 
which were concerned principally with ordinary crime and initi-
ated largely by private action.311 If the Framers’ historical con-
cern extended to practices under the Marian statutes, which the 
Crawford Court states it did, and to regulation of ordinary crime, 
as the Court held in granting relief to Michael Crawford,312 then 
it seems difficult to dismiss concern about unchecked witness er-
ror independent of government manipulation. If the product of 
the Marian statutes was seen as contrary to the common law 
right of confrontation, it was likely in substantial part because 
the critics believed that ordinary evidence should be presented 
before the trier of fact and subjected to testing, even if the only 
 
 308. The fact that the entire 911 call is recorded does eliminate the argument that the 
statements are being “dressed up.” 
 309. For example, the court in People v. Cage said that because the statement to the 
officer was not written down but recited from memory, the statement was non-testimonial. 
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 857 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 310. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1360. 
 311. Id. at 1359–60. 
 312. Id. at 1363–65. 
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concern was the error of the private accuser or others, who gave 
their evidence to the magistrate.313 
The third concern with unconfronted private error suggests 
that even privately made statements should be covered by the 
Confrontation Clause. It may be that a governmental role in re-
cording the statement in other contexts is such a central part of 
the historical practices of concern to the Framers that the line 
must be drawn for Crawford’s “stop sign” between statements 
made to government officers, or to those functionally associated 
with them, and truly private conversations, even if intended to be 
accusatorial. Alternatively, perhaps both the risk of government 
manipulation and of witness error or maliciousness must exist 
before the full force of the Confrontation Clause is triggered, 
meaning that some governmental involvement is required.314 For 
the above reasons, burdens might be allocated differently, as I 
suggested earlier,315 when statements are given to private indi-
viduals. As to private statements, the requirement might be that 
a statement must be clearly or exclusively intended to be used 
testimonially where as a statement to the police or another gov-
ernment official must be treated presumptively as testimonial 
unless the evidence shows that it was clearly or exclusively in-
tended for another purpose. 
Whose perspective matters is also affected by the policies iden-
tified as important. I contend that when a government officer re-
ceives the statement, the perspectives of both the witness and the 
government officer should matter, and if from the reasonable per-
spective of either person the statement is clearly for a testimonial 
purpose, it should be covered by Crawford.316 The defendant, who 
is protected by the Confrontation Clause, is harmed just the same 
whether the need for confrontation is the result of government 
manipulation of what was said or reported, or from the malevo-
lence or error of the witness. Nothing in the text of the Confron-
tation Clause’s guarantee of the right of the defendant to confront 
 
 313. Id. at 1365 n.3. 
 314. Id. at 1364. 
 315. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 316. See infra notes 560–64 and accompanying text (discussing this issue in the context 
of 911 calls). 
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the “witnesses against” him restricts the protection to only gov-
ernment action.317 
With regard to the narrow issue of whether purely private 
statements can ever be testimonial, the lower court case law has 
not developed any consensus. This is unsurprising since the vast 
majority of statements made to private individuals are made for a 
purpose other than creating evidence, and thus relatively few 
statements made to private individuals would qualify as to pur-
pose, even without a government involvement requirement.318 
Such statements are typically made to convey information to ac-
complish other purposes, or for no real purpose other than to 
share the burden of an emotional event. Moreover, most state-
ments made to private individuals tend to be made without any 
anticipation by the speaker that the statement will be conveyed 
beyond the immediate audience, let alone that it will be used at 
trial.319 Thus, most private statements, even if accusatory, are not 
candidates for being considered testimonial.320 
Even if government action is required, however, not as a mis-
placed “state action” component,321 but as a historical defining 
factor—so that privately made statements are generally not tes-
timonial, even if they are accusatory and intended to be conveyed 
to others, a few types of privately made statements should be cov-
ered. First, the testimonial concept should include formal state-
ments that a private individual creates for testimonial purposes 
and either delivers to authorities or gives to another person to 
serve as a conduit to the prosecution.322 This category of state-
ments, however, is likely to be rarely encountered. 
 
 317. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”). 
 318. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 319. Id. 
 320. For a discussion of the case law involving privately made statements, see supra 
Part III.B. 
 321. Imposing a requirement of “state action” in the making of the statements is theo-
retically unsound. Moreover, it would require the Court to admit the unauthorized exer-
cise of power over state court rulings.  Under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), privately 
made statements, such as those in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 809–11 (1990), were sub-
ject to constitutional scrutiny without any issue of constitutional power being raised.  Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. at 68–74.  Furthermore, if Crawford were suggesting a new barrier to its 
power to adjudicate confrontation challenges, which is fundamental and obvious if “state 
action” is required, it should not have suggested the possible continuing validity of Rob-
erts, even with its greater flexibility.  See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. 
 322. See Friedman, supra note 191, at 1042 (describing and arguing for inclusion of a 
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Other situations that are somewhat more common should be 
covered under Crawford’s framework even if government in-
volvement is required. These include statements given to a non-
government agent when the individual or agency is exercising a 
governmental function of investigation.323 For example, state-
ments made to private organizations that investigate suspected 
child abuse or support domestic violence victims should be cov-
ered. Statements received by private individuals should also be 
attributed to the government when the government has substan-
tial involvement by requesting the information or through en-
forcement of reporting requirements, interrogation systems, or 
physical presence.324 Similarly, in People v. Vigil,325 the Colorado 
Court of Appeals concluded that the statement of a child about 
the sexual abuse to a doctor who examined him after the incident 
was testimonial.326 The court described the facts and its reasoning 
as follows: 
The doctor was a member of a child protection team that provides 
consultations at . . . area hospitals in cases of suspected child abuse. 
He had previously provided extensive expert testimony in child 
abuse cases. He was asked to perform a “forensic sexual abuse ex-
amination” on the child and spoke with the police officer who accom-
panied the child before performing the examination.327 
In State v. Geno,328 the Michigan Court of Appeals reached a 
different conclusion as to an interview conducted by the executive 
director of the local Children’s Assessment Center, a private or-
 
version of what I term the “conduit” theory). 
 323. See Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 595–96 (Nev. 2004) (finding that an affidavit 
prepared by a registered nurse, in connection with the drawing of blood for use in evidence 
regarding intoxication, was testimonial, despite her apparent private status); People v. 
Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 396–97 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (ruling that a test done by a pri-
vate lab was non-testimonial as a business record, because, among other reasons, private 
labs are regularly relied on by state police because they do not perform such tests them-
selves). See also supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 324. See Rogers, 780 N.Y.S. 2d at 396–97; cf. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 
791–93 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing the general dimensions of governmental action required 
to render a private action subject to Fourth Amendment sanctions and finding the re-
quirement satisfied by a search conducted by a private airline employee because of the 
expectation created by other searches that had been encouraged and rewarded by a gov-
ernment agency). For another example of the treatment of statements to a nongovernment 
entity, see supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text. 
 325. No. 02CA0833, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1024 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004). 
 326. Id. at *18. 
 327. Id. at *17–18. 
 328. 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
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ganization.329 In People v. Cage,330 the California Court of Appeal 
concluded that a statement made by a child to an emergency 
room physician, who was not a government employee, was not 
testimonial.331 In both Geno and Cage, the courts relied heavily on 
the fact that the person receiving the statement was a private in-
dividual.332 Differences also existed, however, as to the clarity of 
the evidentiary purpose, in that in both of these cases the state-
ments were elicited by single questions rather than following 
structured forensic interview protocols.333 Moreover, unlike in 
People v. Sisavath and People v. Vigil, which found the state-
ments testimonial, here the interviewer had no direct contact 
with the police before the interview and no prosecutorial person-
nel were present during the interview.334 While factual distinc-
tions might justify different treatment of Geno and Cage,335 in 
general, agencies that perform governmental functions and are in 
the business of helping to investigate crimes should not be 
treated differently than police investigators—the Confrontation 
Clause has no requirement of government involvement336—when 
the questioning they do is designed to develop testimony or evi-
dence for a criminal trial. 
5.  Excited Utterances 
As to all hearsay statements, those made for purposes other 
than testimony, or more generally prosecutorial court use, or 
those that are non-accusatory, can properly be excluded from a 
testimonial concept. An important general consideration is that 
statements may be made for mixed purposes, and resolving how 
such statements are to be construed is a key issue. One approach 
 
 329. Id. at 691–92. 
 330. 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 331. Id. at 854–55. 
 332. See id. at 854; Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 692. 
 333. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 849 (“Dr. Russell asked John what had happened.”); 
Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 689 (“The interviewer . . . asked the child if she ‘had an owie?’”). 
 334. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 849; Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 689. 
 335. For example, in a case like Cage, had the statement to the physician been made by 
a patient seeking treatment before the police became involved by interviewing the victim 
and obtaining from him a clearly accusatory statement that seemed almost certain to have 
a prosecutorial purpose, I would find the statement to the doctor as potentially being for 
the purpose of seeking medical attention and conclude that it was non-testimonial. 
 336. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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could be to treat statements as non-testimonial as long as the tes-
timonial or accusatory purpose is not the primary or exclusive 
purpose. Conversely, the statement could be considered testimo-
nial unless made primarily or exclusively for another purpose. 
Finally, the presumption could change depending on whether the 
statement was made to a private party or—knowingly perhaps—
to a government agent.337 
The excitement of the witness when making a statement has 
two possible functions. First, it may be a historical exception to 
the rights of the Confrontation Clause, like dying declarations.338 
Second, it may be associated with a finding that the statement 
was made for a purpose other than providing evidence to the au-
thorities about a crime.339 
In Crawford, the Court noted that the result in White v. Illi-
nois340 was “arguably in tension with the rule requiring a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.”341 Thus, it questioned, but did 
not directly reject, the argument that excited utterances should 
be received as a historically recognized exception to the confron-
tation right.342 Unlike its willingness to entertain the possibility 
that testimonial statements that constituted dying declarations 
might be received because historically they were admitted under 
the common law, the Court observed that if spontaneous or ex-
cited statements would have been admitted at the time the Sixth 
Amendment was adopted, that exception was very narrow.343 It 
was limited to statements that were almost part of the event it-
self and made so soon after the event that the declarant had no 
 
 337. See text accompanying supra notes 169, 316–22. 
 338. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367 n.6. 
 339. Id. at 1364. 
 340. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 341. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368 n.8. The California Court of Appeal in People v. 
Lockett, No. A099945, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6326 (Cal. Ct. App. July 6, 2004), 
treated this language by the Supreme Court as a “historical aside” that had no effect on 
the admission of excited utterances. Id. at *36. Cases such as Harmon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 
945, 952–53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), and Rogers v. State, 814 N.E.2d 695, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2004), accomplish the same result without explicitly reading out of the opinion the Su-
preme Court’s uncertainty about treating excited utterances as an exception to confronta-
tion. Instead, these cases take the view that because of the nature of excited utterances 
and the formality required for testimonial statements, “[i]t is difficult to perceive how such 
a statement could ever be testimonial. Hammon, 809 N.E.2d at 952. 
 342. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368 n.8. 
 343. Id. 
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time to develop a self-serving statement.344 The modern version of 
the exception345 is much more expansive, and only a few of the 
statements currently received under it would likely meet that 
more limited historical antecedent.346 
Another use of an element associated with excitement is likely 
more theoretically productive and of broader, but still somewhat 
limited, application. Contacts with the authorities made for the 
purpose of securing help, as opposed to statements for the pur-
pose of accusing or creating evidence, could be excluded from the 
testimonial category. Whatever else the characteristics of the pre-
liminary examinations under the Marian statutes and examina-
tions in the Privy Council, the statements were made for judicial 
or evidentiary purposes and not to accomplish another task, such 
as getting medical aid347 or securing safety from attack.348 
I have previously argued that as to statements knowingly 
made to a police officer about a crime, a bright line should be 
drawn early in the process that treats as testimonial any state-
ment about a crime, and that the major workable alternative, 
which is theoretically inferior, is to begin application very late us-
ing an analogy to pretrial examinations under the Marian stat-
utes.349 The same should be true even as to excited utterances 
knowingly made to police officers about a crime. There are no 
clear demarcation lines between different types of statements 
made in this context, other than a statement made to receive 
immediate protection or secure medical attention. When not 
made to police officers, however, statements that are excited ut-
terances constituting the entirety of some 911 calls and parts of 
others could legitimately be excluded from the testimonial cate-
gory, both because many are made for these other purposes and 
because they are not clearly made to police officials who are ei-
ther investigating a crime or whose unmistakable and primary 
function is to do so.350 
 
 344. Id. 
 345. FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 346. See, e.g., People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276–77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (admit-
ting 911 calls for help made during the course of the assault). 
 347. See, e.g., People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 846, 849 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 348. See, e.g., Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 276–77. 
 349. See supra Part IV.B. 
 350. See infra Part VI. 
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V.   IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRAWFORD APPROACH FOR OTHER 
RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES 
In addition to suggesting dividing lines as to what are and are 
not testimonial statements, my purpose in this Article is to sug-
gest ways to encourage and ensure confrontation. One of the 
ways confrontation can be provided as to testimonial statements 
is by providing it at the current trial. The testimonial approach is 
new; with it should come an examination of related components 
of the confrontation right at the current trial. 
A.  Requirement that the Witness Testify in Addition to Being 
Available for Cross-examination 
The Supreme Court of the United States has never decided 
whether prior statements of a witness can be admitted under the 
Confrontation Clause as a result of confrontation at the current 
trial, or whether the witness simply being available to be called 
and cross-examined by the defendant is sufficient. While appar-
ently remarkable that it has not addressed the issue, the Court 
has never had to face it because witnesses have always given tes-
timony under hearsay exceptions for prior statements and testi-
mony that were conditioned on receiving such testimony.351 
In Crawford, the Court stated that “when the declarant ap-
pears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause 
places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial 
statements.”352 The Court’s language is ambiguous on the issue of 
whether direct testimony is required. It stated only that the “de-
clarant appears for cross-examination.”353 While it did not state 
that the declarant must first testify for the prosecution and then 
be subject to cross examination, the Court also did not say that 
the declarant merely had to be available for cross-examination, or 
subject to subpoena by the defense under the Compulsory Process 
 
 351. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), the statement at issue was admitted 
as a prior inconsistent statement, which required inconsistency with current testimony 
under California law, and the defendant testified. Green, 399 U.S. at 150–52. In United 
States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), the statement involved a prior identification, which 
requires the witness to testify, and the witness testified for the government on direct ex-
amination. Id. at 556; see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C). 
 352. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 162). 
 353. Id. 
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Clause, which would have squarely put the responsibility for en-
suring both testimony and cross-examination on the defense.354 
Moreover, the Court described the common law tradition, which 
provided the Framers with the concept of confrontation, as one of 
“live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing.”355 
As authority for its statement, the Court cited California v. 
Green,356 where the Court stated, “[f]or where the declarant is not 
absent, but is present to testify and to submit to cross-
examination, our cases, if anything, support the conclusion that 
the admission of his out-of-court statements does not create a 
confrontation problem.”357 In Green, the witness, Melvin Porter, 
did in fact testify as required by the state’s hearsay exception for 
prior inconsistent statements, although he proved “‘markedly 
evasive and uncooperative on the stand.’”358 Thus, the language, 
while supportive of the obligation of testimony, may have been 
merely descriptive. 
The Court again examined the satisfaction of the Confrontation 
Clause as to prior statements of a witness appearing at trial and 
subject to cross-examination in United States v. Owens.359 In 
Owens, the witness testified on direct examination for the gov-
ernment, as he was required to do by the federal hearsay provi-
sion for statements of prior identification under Rule 
801(d)(1)(C).360 
Is it a requirement of the Confrontation Clause, or perhaps 
some combination of provisions in the Sixth Amendment, that the 
witness in such situations be called by the prosecution and testify 
 
 354. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Moreover, when the issue is solely the treatment of 
the witness’s prior statements about the defendant’s conduct, rather than testimony about 
the conduct itself, cross-examination is all that is required. See infra notes 386–88 and 
accompanying text. 
 355. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359. 
 356. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
 357. Id. at 162. Some inferential weight is given to the possibility that this description 
is too broad, as the Court also stated, “[v]iewed historically, then, there is good reason to 
conclude that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-
court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and 
effective cross-examination.” Id. at 158. The latter part of that statement—“full and effec-
tive cross-examination”— was limited by United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
 358. Green, 399 U.S. at 150–52. 
 359. 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
 360. Id. at 556. The rule requires that the “declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and 
is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.” FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) (em-
phasis added). 
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in some fashion on direct examination? The answer must be 
yes.361 
In cases where statements have been admitted as testimony 
given at an earlier trial, the Court has recognized a constitutional 
preference under the Confrontation Clause for present testi-
mony.362 It requires that the witness testify in front of the present 
jury to the facts, unless he or she is unavailable.363 Particularly 
given the focus of Crawford on the anti-inquisitorial roots of the 
Confrontation Clause, a similar constitutional preference should 
be recognized here as well. The Constitution is best read to re-
quire direct testimony rather than just availability for cross-
examination. 
Trial by dossier was the evil at which the Confrontation Clause 
was directed; trial by live testimony of witnesses was the pre-
ferred form.364 As noted earlier, the Court found the confrontation 
concept rooted in English common law tradition, which “is one of 
live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing, while the 
civil law condones examination in private by judicial officers.”365 
For this proposition, the Court cited Blackstone’s Commentaries 
on the Law of England.366 The relevant, well-known, and cele-
brated passage states as follows: 
This open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all 
mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth, than 
the private and secret examination taken down in writing before an 
officer, or his clerk, in the ecclesiastical courts, and all others that 
have borrowed their practice from the civil law: where a witness may 
frequently depose that in private, which he will be ashamed to tes-
tify in a public and solemn tribunal. There an artful or careless 
scribe may make a witness speak what he never meant, by dressing 
 
 361. I have previously made this argument. See Mosteller, supra note 18, at 753 & 
n.294; see also Graham, supra note 43, at 135. 
It would be rash to suppose that Green means that a state could permit the 
prosecution to prove its case by affidavits so long as the witnesses are 
brought to court for questioning by the defendant. Without excusing circum-
stances, this is too similar to the continental trial by dossier which the draft-
ers of the Sixth Amendment meant to prohibit. 
Id. 
 362. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). 
 363. See id.; see also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (describing this as 
a constitutional preference for the better evidence under the Confrontation Clause). 
 364. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1363. 
 365. Id. at 1359. 
 366. Id. 
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up his depositions in his own forms and language; but he is here at 
liberty to correct and explain his meaning, if misunderstood, which 
he can never do after a written deposition is once taken. Besides, the 
occasional questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, pro-
pounded to the witnesses on a sudden, will sift out the truth much 
better than a formal set of interrogatories previously penned and 
settled: and the confronting of adverse witnesses is also another op-
portunity of obtaining a clear discovery, which can never be had 
upon any other method of trial. Nor is the presence of the judge, dur-
ing the examination, a matter of small importance: for, besides the 
respect and awe with which his presence will naturally inspire the 
witness, he is able by use and experience to keep the evidence from 
wandering from the point in issue. In short by this method of exami-
nation, and this only, the persons who are to decide upon the evi-
dence have an opportunity of observing the quality, age, education, 
understanding, behaviour, and inclinations of the witness; in which 
points all persons must appear alike, when their depositions are re-
duced to writing, and read to the judge, in the absence of those who 
made them: and yet as much may be frequently collected from the 
manner in which the evidence is delivered, as from the matter of it. 
These are a few of the advantages attending this, the English, way 
of giving testimony, ore tenus. Which was also indeed familiar 
among the ancient Romans, as may be collected from Quintilian; 
who lays down very good instructions for examining and cross-
examining witness viva voce. And this, or somewhat like it, was con-
tinued as low as the time of Hadrian: but the civil law, as it is now 
modelled, rejects all public examination of witnesses.367 
A requirement of direct testimony by the witness—the point I 
am arguing for—has been described or implicated in several opin-
ions. In Mattox v. United States,368 one of its earliest Confronta-
tion Clause cases, the Court recounted the purposes of the Con-
frontation Clause, giving emphasis to cross-examination, but also 
recognizing the elements of personal presence and the examina-
tion of the witness.369 
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to 
prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes 
admitted . . . against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination 
and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an 
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the con-
 
 367. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 373–74 (photo. reprint 1978) (1783) 
(footnotes omitted). This quotation contains much, in addition to cross-examination, such 
as the witness’s personal presence before the jury and the examination of witnesses there, 
that Blackstone considered part of the common law tradition. See id. 
 368. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
 369. Id. at 242–43. 
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science of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face 
with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his 
demeanor upon the stand . . . whether he is worthy of belief.370 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Coy v. Iowa371 provides strong indi-
rect support for the right to have direct examination given in the 
presence of the defendant.372 In Coy, the Court concluded that the 
Confrontation Clause included, absent adequate justification for 
dispensing with it, the right of the defendant to have his accusers 
meet him face to face to deliver their accusation.373 These accusa-
tions are to be delivered, presumably, on direct examination. 
Justice Scalia cited numerous examples that dealt with per-
sonal presence, but also included the presentation of direct testi-
mony and accusation: 
Shakespeare was thus describing the root meaning of confrontation 
when he had Richard the Second say: ‘“Then call them to our pres-
ence—face to face, and frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear 
the accuser and the accused freely speak . . . .”374 
. . . Similarly, in Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 . . . 
(1911), we described a provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights as 
substantially the same as the Sixth Amendment, and proceeded to 
interpret it as intended “to secure the accused the right to be tried, 
so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such 
witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial, who give their testi-
mony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of 
cross-examination.”375 
. . . In this country, if someone dislikes you, or accuses you, he 
must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow. . . .376 
Look me in the eye and say that.377 
. . . A witness “may feel quite differently when he has to repeat his 
story looking at the man whom he will harm greatly by distorting or 
mistaking the facts.”378 
 
 370. Id. 
 371. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). 
 372. Id. at 1016. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING 
RICHARD II, act 1, sc. 1). 
 375. Id. at 1017. 
 376. Id. at 1018 (quoting President Eisenhower’s description of the “code” of Abilene, 
Kansas, from Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 
8 J. PUB. L. 381, 381 (1959)). 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 1019 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 35 
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Certainly, some of these same benefits can be obtained by 
cross-examination of the witness, but it is absolutely clear that 
the preferred method of taking testimony in the English common 
law tradition was by direct testimony rather than presentation of 
evidence by dossier followed by cross-examination. Where there is 
no justification for the prosecution being relieved of the obligation 
of asking the witness to testify about the defendant’s misdeeds 
before introducing  testimonial statements about them, direct tes-
timony should be required. Much of Ohio v. Roberts has been un-
dercut, and indeed, its view of a general unavailability require-
ment has been abandoned.379 Its description, however, of the core 
of the confrontation right—“the Framers’ preference for face-to-
face accusation”—is apt. 380 
There is, or should be, a constitutional preference for live tes-
timonial statements at trial, if they can be obtained from the wit-
ness, rather than, and certainly before, proof of past events by 
prior  testimonial statements. Indeed, we can only know if  testi-
monial statements can be obtained in front of the jury in the pre-
sent trial or if the weaker substitute is needed if the prosecution 
attempts to secure such statements through direct testimony. 
That preference should be imposed as a matter of constitutional 
requirement on the prosecution, not the defense.381 
Perhaps the witness will not repeat the accusation, but if so, 
the goal of many of the quoted statements would have been satis-
fied, not thwarted. The witness is expected to have a more diffi-
cult time repeating the accusation to the defendant’s face than he 
or she did in making it earlier. The benefit of that different ver-
sion is anticipated by the descriptions of the English common law 
practices that were well known to the Framers and a part of our 
cultural values. 
This set of arguments may seem to ring inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Inadi382 and White 
v. Illinois,383 because they are largely irreconcilable. Differences 
 
(1956)). 
 379. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370–72. 
 380. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
 381. See State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 938–39 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting state’s ar-
gument that defendant waived his confrontation right because he accepted the trial court’s 
invitation to subpoena and call the witness who had given a statement to police). 
 382. 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
 383. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
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are to be expected because those cases deal largely with non-
testimonial hearsay, and use an analysis that admits the state-
ments when found reliable and trustworthy and admits uncon-
fronted statements without a requirement of even available wit-
ness’s testimony because the statements have “independent 
evidentiary significance.”384 That approach is very different than 
Crawford’s for policing statements at the core of the Confronta-
tion Clause with a robust requirement of confrontation, which I 
contend also includes a preference for direct accusation. 
As to one form of testimonial statements—prior testimony—
Inadi did recognize a constitutional preference: “When two ver-
sions of the same evidence are available, longstanding principles 
of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause 
analysis, favor the better evidence.”385 That logic should mean 
that the in-court accusation should be preferred over the out-of-
court accusation as well. Indeed, the theory of testimonial state-
ments strongly supports an across-the-board requirement of in-
court accusations because testimonial statements, like prior tes-
timony, are, or approach, explicit substitutes for in-court testi-
mony.386 
Assuming the Court imposes a requirement of in-court testi-
mony on the witness when testimonial statements are admitted 
so as to satisfy the Confrontation Clause in the present trial, the 
question becomes what are the essential elements of direct ex-
amination required of the prosecution? The constitutional re-
quirement, although somewhat related to the concept of adequate 
memory or testimony to satisfy cross-examination, is distinct. 
The requirement is simply that the prosecution ask the witness 
to make the accusation in court. If the witness does so, the re-
quirement is clearly satisfied. If the witness is unwilling, then 
the better in-court testimony is not available, and prior state-
ments can be received consistent with the Confrontation Clause. 
 
 384. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Many of the clearest testimonial statements lack independent evidentiary signifi-
cance, as defined in Inadi, but, some could qualify. Prior testimony clearly lacks inde-
pendent evidentiary significance, and the same is obviously true for grand jury testimony, 
which, without cross-examination, is a weaker form of prior testimony. Statements 
against interest require unavailability, indicating a perception of the weakness of at least 
some of the statements within that exception. A good argument can be advanced, however, 
that because they are against an interest at the time they are made, and are unlikely to be 
repeated at trial, such statements do have independent evidentiary significance. 
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The prosecution may also want to ask the witness about prior 
statements he or she has made, because it may be effective trial 
strategy, may jog the witness’s memory, or may be necessary to 
set up admissibility under evidentiary rules. As a matter of con-
frontation theory, however, it should not be required. What is re-
quired is the effort to get the accusation on direct examination 
and not to elicit all prior statements.387 The distinction is that the 
question needs only go to what the defendant did, and not what 
the witness has previously said about the defendant’s conduct.388 
The state courts of Washington have developed a good frame-
work in the area of child testimony. They have concluded that a 
child did not “testify” regarding abuse, as required by its statute, 
when the child was asked by the prosecutor only about innocuous 
subjects, such as the school she attended, the birthday presents 
she received, and her pet’s name, but not about abuse.389 The re-
quirement is satisfied if the prosecution asks about the abuse, 
even if the witness denies it,390 but is not satisfied if the prosecu-
tor provides the child with an invitation and a “means to avoid 
 
 387. In re L.J.P., 587 S.E.2d 15 (Ga. 2003), is consistent with this treatment of the re-
quirement. In L.J.P., the child testified and was asked to make an in-court identification 
of the defendant, but was unable to do so. Id. at 16. Even though the victim was not asked 
about the pre-trial identification by the prosecution and left the stand before another wit-
ness testified about it, the testimony satisfied the Confrontation Clause because the wit-
ness could have been cross-examined about the prior identification. Id. at 17; see also 
Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1189–90 (Ind. 2004) (ruling that where the witness was 
asked on direct examination by the prosecutor about the incident and stated that he re-
membered nothing, the ability of the defendant to recall the witness for cross-examination 
after the prior statement was introduced was sufficient); cf. People v. Warner, 14 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 419, 424, 429–30 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding testimony to be sufficient when a child 
testified on direct examination about an incident of improper touching, but was not ques-
tioned about the prior statement, which was admitted after she stated she did not remem-
ber it). 
 388. A distinction must be drawn regarding the testimony and cross-examination of a 
prior out-of-court statement, however, if the Confrontation Clause is being satisfied by 
earlier cross-examination and present unavailability, rather than testimony and cross-
examination at the present trial. Where earlier cross-examination is relied on and ques-
tions cannot be asked currently, the defendant must have had an opportunity to cross-
examine the prior statement. Realistically, that is only available if the prior statement 
was introduced at the earlier proceeding by the prosecution, and the defendant was given 
an opportunity to recall the witness, if necessary, and cross-examine. 
 389. State v. Rohrich, 939 P.2d 697, 699 (Wash. 1997). But see State v. Nelson, 725 
P.2d 1353, 1356–57 (Utah 1986) (concluding that there is no requirement that the witness 
be asked about or testify regarding the alleged offense). 
 390. See State v. Clark, 985 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1999). The Clark court went too far, in my 
judgment, as to the constitutional minimum in requiring that the child be asked about the 
prior statement, which it did. See id. at 382. 
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answering by telling her that she could respond, ‘I don’t want to 
talk about it.’”391 
B.  Constitutionally Adequate “Availability” for Cross-
Examination 
Crawford stated that the prior statement can be received 
“when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial” and 
that admission of a prior statement was not barred “so long as 
the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.”392 Thus, 
as to prior statements that were not subject to confrontation at 
the time made, the Confrontation Clause requires that the decla-
rant be available for cross-examination at the current hearing. 
The rough dimensions of what “availability for cross-
examination” means are relatively clear and the requirements 
are quite limited. In United States v. Owens,393 the Court stated: 
Ordinarily a witness is regarded as “subject to cross-examination” 
when he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly 
to questions. Just as with the constitutional prohibition [of the Con-
frontation Clause], limitations on the scope of examination by the 
trial court or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine 
the process to such a degree that meaningful cross-examination 
within the intent of the Rule no longer exists. But that effect is not 
produced by the witness’ assertion of memory loss . . . .394 
Owens dealt with actual memory loss as a result of the alleged 
criminal assault by the defendant at issue in the trial.395 The wit-
ness, who testified as fully as he could, was unable to recall the 
underlying incident although he had memory of the earlier iden-
tification of the defendant during an interview with an FBI 
agent.396 The Court concluded that neither his memory loss re-
garding the underlying incident nor his prior statement rendered 
him unavailable for cross-examination.397 As to the adequacy of 
cross-examination, where the witness cannot remember the prior 
 
 391. In re Personal Restraint of Grasso, 84 P.3d 859, 867 (Wash. 2004) (quoting the 
trial transcript). 
 392. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9. 
 393. 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
 394. Id. at 561–62. 
 395. Id. at 556. 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. at 560–61. 
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statement, the Court relied upon its decision in Delaware v. Fen-
sterer,398 from which it quoted: 
The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every witness 
called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is 
marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the 
Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given 
a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities 
through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the 
factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’ testi-
mony.399 
Before examining the constitutional minimum that satisfies 
“availability for cross-examination,” I will note the limited situa-
tions where the opportunity is clearly inadequate. As Owens ob-
served, successful assertion of a privilege, whether based on the 
Constitution, such as the Fifth Amendment,400 or an evidentiary 
privilege, such as the marital privilege asserted in Crawford,401 
renders the witness unavailable for cross-examination.402 Signifi-
cant judicial restrictions on cross-examination have the same ef-
fect,403 but those restrictions must be truly significant to render 
cross-examination constitutionally inadequate.404 
Finally, the witness’s refusal to answer questions makes him 
or her unavailable. Douglas v. Alabama405 presents the best 
known example of a refusal. In Douglas, Loyd, an apparent ac-
complice, was tried first and convicted of assault with intent to 
 
 398. 474 U.S. 15 (1985). Fensterer dealt with the testimony of an expert, who testified 
as to the opinion he had formed, but could not remember the basis on which he formed it. 
Id. at 17. 
 399. Id. at 21–22; see Owens, 484 U.S. at 558. 
 400. See, e.g., People v. Redd, 553 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. 1990). 
 401. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1357 (stating that Crawford had “no opportunity for cross-
examination because of the state marital privilege”). 
 402. Owens, 484 U.S. at 562. 
 403. Id. at 561–62; see United States v. Wilmore, 381 F.3d 868, 871–73 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(finding witness unavailable, confrontation denied, and Crawford violated with regard to 
prior testimonial statement where trial court prohibited defense counsel from asking any-
thing about prior grand jury testimony after witness asserted her privilege against self-
incrimination as to statements to the grand jury). 
 404. See, e.g., State v. Crocker, 852 A.2d 762, 784–87 (Conn. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding 
that cross-examination at preliminary hearing by a lawyer with conflict of interest was 
substantively adequate and constitutionally sufficient); State v. Stiernagle, No. A03-1422, 
2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 776, at *12–14 (Minn. Ct. App. July 6, 2004) (ruling that trial 
court’s limitation of cross-examination did not render it inadequate). 
 405. 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
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commit murder.406 When called as a witness, he gave his name 
and address but invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege in re-
sponse to all questions concerning the crime, and despite the trial 
court’s ruling that the privilege was invalid, he persisted in refus-
ing to testify.407 He was ruled unavailable for cross-examination 
under the Confrontation Clause.408 
United States v. Torrez-Ortega409 presents a recent example of 
such a refusal. In Torrez-Ortega, a co-participant in a drug distri-
bution conspiracy, who had been granted immunity by the prose-
cution, asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, which the court 
accepted as invalid.410 On direct examination, he was declared a 
hostile witness, and the prosecutor read his testimony before the 
grand jury to him, to which he responded with a refusal to an-
swer on the basis of the Fifth Amendment claim.411 On cross-
examination, the witness apparently answered a few questions,412 
which the court characterized as “too elliptical and confusing to 
demonstrate that the defendants were ever presented with an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination.”413 The court ruled 
that the case was clearly “settled” by Douglas.414 
Cases in the refusal-to-testify category, which is both doctri-
nally solid and clearly recognized, are relatively rare.415 The pau-
city of examples is probably because the inadequacy of cross-
examination must result from a direct refusal, which “earns” the 
witness contempt of court and incarceration, rather than an indi-
rect form of refusal, such as lack of memory.416 This softer version 
of refusal has the same benefit in that it avoids incriminating the 
defendant and risking retaliation, but also generally finessing a 
 
 406. Id. at 416. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. at 419. 
 409. 184 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 
(4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 410. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d at 1131 (“Such a witness, we conclude, is not sufficiently 
available for cross-examination to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation 
Clause. . . .”). 
 411. Id. at 1131–32. 
 412. Id. at 1132. 
 413. Id. at 1133. 
 414. Id. 
 415. See Barksdale v. State, 453 S.E.2d 2, 3–5 (Ga. 1995) (involving a witness who re-
fused to testify in the face of threat of imprisonment). 
 416. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 16–17 (1985). 
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contempt finding and perjury charges.417 It also renders the wit-
ness constitutionally available for cross-examination. An interest-
ing semantic point is that United States v. Owens stated that the 
witness must “respond[ ] willingly to questions,”418 while at the 
same time recognizing as constitutionally acceptable “‘testimony 
that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion.’”419 
Nelson v. O’Neil420 deals with a related situation where the 
witness was apparently “evasive.”421 In Nelson, a co-participant in 
a robbery took the stand, denied making a prior statement that 
implicated O’Neil, and testified that its substance was incor-
rect.422 The Court concluded there was no violation of the Con-
frontation Clause,423 ruling that a witness does not have to affirm 
either the prior event or the prior statement to create the ordi-
nary situation where adversarial cross-examination occurs.424 
Memory lapses and mental impairments of the witness do not 
render the opportunity to cross-examine inadequate where those 
lapses and impairments are real.425 Similarly, what are appar-
ently bogus claims of memory loss, even if total, also do not elimi-
nate confrontation.426 Thus, what is little different from a “refusal 
 
 417. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER 
THE RULES § 8.64, at 1280 (2d ed. 1999). 
 418. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561 (1988). 
 419. Id. at 558 (quoting Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 21–22) (emphasis added). 
 420. 402 U.S. 622 (1971). 
 421. See id. at 624. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. at 629–30. The defendant actually conducted no cross-examination, but was 
free to do so. Id. at 624. 
 424. Id. at 628–29. 
 425. United States ex rel. Hamilton v. Ellingsworth, 692 F. Supp 356, 358–59 (D. Del. 
1988) (finding opportunity for effective cross-examination despite the fact the witness was 
suffering from amnesia as a result of a car accident and was unable to remember the inci-
dent or the statement made); Wassilie v. State, 57 P.3d 719, 721–23 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2002) (admitting statements by ninety-year-old witness who stated at trial he had no 
memory of the event or prior statement); Hall v. State, 788 A.2d 118, 125 (Del. 2001) (find-
ing a witness was available for cross-examination despite suffering memory lapses as an 
elderly, mentally impaired witness); State v. Jenkins, 23 P.3d 201, 206 (Mont. 2001) (find-
ing confrontation adequate where witness suffered from Alzheimer’s related memory loss, 
but had been ruled competent to testify by the trial court). 
 426. United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding adequate confron-
tation where witness claimed lack of memory about events and prior statement apparently 
because of alleged drug addiction and near mental breakdown, but recalled some informa-
tion that tended to discredit prior grand jury testimony); People v. Perez, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
522, 526 (Ct. App. 2000) (ruling a witness was available when they answered every prose-
cution question about the event and prior statements with failure of memory, but re-
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to answer,” if delivered in the guise of “I don’t remember” or “it 
never happened,” leaves the witness “available for cross-
examination.”427 In connection with my examination of Craw-
ford’s implications for statements in child abuse prosecutions in 
the next part, I examine for child witnesses the minimum that 
satisfies availability for cross-examination. 
VI.   PROSECUTIONS OF CASES OF SPECIAL CONCERN: CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
In earlier parts, I have dealt with general principles of the 
Crawford decision and illustrated the analysis with recently de-
cided cases from a number of areas. In this part, I will examine 
the difficult issues of application in child sexual abuse and do-
mestic violence prosecutions. In general, I have argued for a rela-
tively broad definition of testimonial statements.428 I hope to 
demonstrate in these cases that such a definition can do much 
less damage to law enforcement interests than might be feared if 
the prosecution focuses on securing confrontation and removes 
Crawford’s “stop sign” by putting witnesses who have made tes-
timonial statements on the stand. The end result can be one that 
is not bad for prosecutors and provides confrontation to defen-
dants. I believe that many declarants may be more available than 
 
sponded to a few defense questions relevant to bias); State v. Robinson, 746 A.2d 210, 
213–14 (Conn. Ct. App. 2000) (ruling a witness examination was sufficient where witness 
testified that he recognized the signature on the prior statement but did not remember the 
statement because he was high on marijuana at the time it was made); Makell v. State, 
656 A.2d 348, 350, 354–56 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (finding confrontation adequate de-
spite witness’s claim of remembering nothing—a “warm body with no testimonial func-
tion” in the words of the defense—as a result of a continuous multi-year drug stupor). But 
see David Greenwald, Comment, The Forgetful Witness, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 167, 180–81 
(1993) (questioning the treatment of feigned forgetfulness as satisfying admission). 
 427. See People v. Wheatley, 543 N.E.2d 259, 265 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting the ar-
gument that the witness did not “respond[ ] willingly to questions” as required by Owens 
where he instead testified that he did not remember). United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 
(2d Cir. 1971), suggests that if direct refusals to testify are present, and perhaps predomi-
nant, then the witness may be unavailable despite some “I don’t recall” answers. Id. at 
114. The witness in Fiore also refused to take the oath. Id. The refusal of the witness to 
answer some questions may, however, be constitutionally acceptable. See State v. Maier, 
977 P.2d 298, 303, 306–07 (Mont. 1999) (ruling that failure to answer certain questions 
concerning the defendant’s culpability was a tolerable evasion given the witness’s confir-
mation that he had made prior statement implicating the defendant). 
 428. See supra Parts III & IV. 
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they presently appear, given the current lack of incentives to se-
cure their live testimony.429 
A.  Providing Confrontation in Child Sexual Abuse Cases 
I describe here one model for satisfying Crawford that comes 
from the area of child sexual abuse prosecutions. Through good 
fortune, I recently spent a period of time at the University of Ore-
gon School of Law and taught a seminar there on evidence issues 
in child sexual abuse prosecutions. As a result, I saw something 
of the practice under Oregon’s special exception for hearsay in 
such cases.430 That exception is like many other states’ exceptions 
in providing for admission of hearsay based upon an ad hoc de-
termination of reliability and trustworthiness where the child is 
unavailable.431 It differs from most, if not all, the others in that 
any and all hearsay describing “an act of sexual conduct with or 
on the child” is admissible if the child “testifies at the proceeding 
and is subject to cross-examination.”432 Thus, under the exception, 
the hearsay rule disappears as a restriction, and all prior state-
ments are admissible if the Confrontation Clause is satisfied by 
confrontation at the current trial under California v. Green433 and 
United States v. Owens.434 
Under this rule, very powerful out-of-court statements are ad-
missible, including the initial “disclosure interview” recorded by 
videotape and made by a professionally trained interviewer at the 
local child advocacy center.435 These are clearly testimonial 
 
 429. In United States v. Inadi, the Supreme Court ruled that unavailability was not 
required before the prosecution could introduce co-conspirator statements, and in Illinois 
v. White, it reached the same conclusion as to excited utterances and statements for medi-
cal treatment, conclusions that presumably apply to all hearsay exceptions considered to 
have “independent evidentiary significance.” United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 
(1986); see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355–57 (1992). The pressure on the prose-
cutor to find and call witnesses who made admissible prior statements was thereby re-
moved, putting the burden on the defendant to call these incriminating witnesses accord-
ing to the Compulsory Process Clause. White, 502 U.S. at 355; Inadi, 475 U.S. at 397–98. 
 430. For a discussion of Oregon’s hearsay exceptions, see Rachel L. Melissa, Comment, 
Oregon’s Response to the Impact of Domestic Violence on Children, 82 OR. L. REV. 1125, 
1146–47 (2003). 
 431. OR. R. EVID. 803(18a)(b). 
 432. OR. R. EVID. 803(18a)(b), 803(24). 
 433. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
 434. 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
 435. See OR. R. EVID. 803(18a)(b). 
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statements under Crawford, which calls for exclusion absent the 
child testifying.436 Such statements are usually devastating to the 
defendant, but also incredibly revealing of potential suggestive-
ness. In addition, statements made to family members, school 
counselors, friends and acquaintances, teachers, and police offi-
cers are admitted under this exception.437 Many might have been 
admissible under other theories, but all come under this expan-
sive exception in child sexual abuse cases if the child testifies and 
is subject to cross-examination.438 
The hearsay exception has given prosecutors incentives to en-
courage children to appear and testify and to help them to do so 
by, for example, making them comfortable in the courtroom and 
leading them through what happens during testimony.439 This in-
centive dovetails with the general perception among child abuse 
prosecutors that having the child testify in person is helpful to 
successful prosecutions.440 In Maryland v. Craig,441 the Supreme 
Court ruled that the Confrontation Clause allows children to tes-
tify without physically being in the presence of the defendant.442 
My perception is that the practice is used relatively rarely, 
probably because prosecutors feel that having the child testify in 
the courtroom is more effective, and they have concentrated their 
efforts on enabling children to testify in the defendant’s presence 
rather than from a remote location. 
I suggest that the idea of incentives be generalized and ana-
lyzed in ways to encourage confrontation. I take a specific exam-
ple from Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Ohio v. Rob-
erts.443 There he argued that the state had failed to show a “good-
faith effort” to secure the witness’s presence at trial, and he sug-
 
 436. See supra Part III.A (discussing People v. Sisavath, People ex rel. R.A.S., People v. 
Vigil, and People v. Warner). 
 437. See State v. Lamb, 983 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (admitting statements 
to “school counselors, a friend, and another adult woman” under exception). 
 438. OR. R. EVID. 803(18a)(b). 
 439. See Gail S. Goodman et al., Face-to-Face Confrontation: Effects of Closed-Circuit 
Technology on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony and Jurors’ Decisions, 22 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 165, 166 (1998) (reporting that prosecutors prefer to present children in person 
because of the greater perceived impact on juries through greater emotional empathy than 
with televised testimony). 
 440. Id. 
 441. 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
 442. Id. at 860. 
 443. 448 U.S. 56, 77 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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gested that “[i]t is difficult to believe that the State would have 
been so derelict . . . had it not had her favorable preliminary 
hearing testimony upon which to rely in the event of her ‘un-
availability.’”444 
Having children testify and be available for cross-examination 
may provide something of a model for practices that can develop 
in other areas that ensure confrontation as Crawford is refined 
and implemented. It also illustrates what I suggest as a question 
about the impact of the Confrontation Clause on justice. Much 
unreliable hearsay may be admitted under this rule. Indeed, the 
Oregon rule places absolutely no reliability or trustworthiness re-
striction on hearsay when the child testifies and is subject to 
cross-examination.445 Cross-examining children can be extremely 
difficult. I have seen few lawyers who have the sensitivity and 
skill to do it well, and it is unclear whether jurors have the ability 
to evaluate accurately what they see and hear from such wit-
nesses.446 Whether adversary testing leads to reliable and trust-
worthy evidence with children is uncertain, but I have even less 
confidence that there is any better alternative. 
Receiving such testimony from particularly young or mentally 
immature children is especially problematic. As discussed below, 
the constitutional minimum for mental awareness and intellec-
tual development required for competency to testify has not been 
specified, but it is very low, and perhaps theoretically inadequate 
for justice.447 Confrontation is being provided in these child sexual 
abuse cases, however, and they can be a model for the future. 
One alternative, where I believe courts could easily go wrong, 
is to define away the need for confrontation with much hearsay 
given by children through a narrow definition of testimonial 
statements. Should it matter that the child is very young, and 
perhaps not appreciative of the use that will be made of the evi-
dence, if a government employee is creating evidence to be admit-
ted under a hearsay exception, perhaps using videotape? I believe 
that it should not.448 Should it matter that the videotaped state-
 
 444. Id. at 79–80 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 445. See, e.g., Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing the avail-
ability of a child even when the child has a poor memory). 
 446. See Goodman et al., supra note 439, at 169–70. 
 447. See People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 448. See infra Part VI.A.2. 
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ment is created by a private organization; that the interview is 
not videotaped; or that the statement is taken during a medical 
examination? Does it matter whether the statement is made to a 
police officer, a social worker, a school teacher, or a psychologist? 
What should be the impact of police intervention in the case be-
fore the statement is taken or police conversations with a child 
victim or the interviewer before interviews conducted by private 
officials? 
Obviously, lines must necessarily be drawn to define testimo-
nial statements. None of those lines are significant under the 
Confrontation Clause if the child testifies and is subject to cross-
examination, because all prior statements may be admitted.449 
Where those lines are drawn, however, will help determine 
whether the child will be encouraged to appear, prepared for tes-
timony, and called by the prosecution. Thus, the definition of tes-
timonial is interdependent with the satisfaction of confrontation. 
The system I suggest has the benefit that it puts the incentive 
for encouraging testimony on the prosecutor—the party who has 
the practical ability to accomplish the task in child abuse cases. 
Giving the defense that responsibility would be unseemly and in-
effective. The defendant cannot, and in many cases should not, 
realistically have full access to the child. If he or she did, the de-
fendant would not typically have the trust of the child or the 
child’s immediate care givers. The prosecutor is the right party to 
have this responsibility. If the prosecutor also has the incentive 
to make the child available, and enable the child to testify, such 
testimony will more likely occur. 
1.  Application of the Green/Owens Theory to Children 
Courts have generally ruled that a witness being a child does 
not affect the principle that a witness who “responds [somewhat] 
willingly to questions,” but who may be directly or indirectly eva-
sive and have real or feigned limitations, is constitutionally avail-
able for cross-examination and satisfies confrontation.450 For ex-
 
 449. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9 (2004). 
 450. See, e.g., Bugh, 329 F.3d at 505 (applying OH. R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(C)). “[A] state-
ment is not hearsay if . . . [t]he declarant testifies at trial, and the statement is . . . one of 
identification of a person soon after perceiving him, if the circumstances demonstrate the 
reliability of the prior identification.” Id. 
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ample, in Bugh v. Mitchell, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit treated as available for cross-examination a 
child who was four at the time she first reported sexual abuse to 
her mother, and either four or five at the time of trial.451 The child 
testified about one act of abuse verbally and then responded only 
by nodding affirmatively or negatively or by shrugging, which the 
court interpreted as a failure of memory.452 The court explicitly 
rejected any general distinction between the treatment of adults 
and children.453 Central to the decision and the analysis, I believe, 
was a determination of the state trial court, which the federal 
appellate court did not challenge, that the child was competent to 
testify at trial,454 which will be examined below. 
Numerous other cases have applied the Green/Owens analysis 
to prior statements by children who take the stand at trial.455 One 
court found sufficiently available a child witness to a murder, 
who was three at the time of the incident, seven at the time of 
trial, and whose current memory of the incident was “essentially 
non-existent.”456 Another court found that a child, who was four 
at the time of the alleged abuse, and seven at the time of trial, 
and who responded with a simple “yeah” to the question on direct 
examination of whether the defendant did anything to her, but 
could not remember what was done,457 was adequately avail-
able.458 Similarly, a child who was three at the time of the abuse 
and ten at the time of trial was found adequately available459 
when, after responding to questions regarding age, the name of 
her parents and the need to tell the truth for the apparent pur-
pose of showing her competency, she explained that she could not 
remember anything that happened before the third grade.460 Un-
 
 451. Id. at 499. 
 452. Id. at 507. 
 453. Id. at 509. 
 454. Id. at 502. 
 455. See, e.g., People v. Warner, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 430–31 (Ct. App. 2004) (finding 
four-year-old child, who recalled some of the molestation, but not the prior statements 
that were admitted, and was subject to cross-examination, adequately available). 
 456. State v. Jenkins, 483 N.W.2d 262, 271 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). The court noted that 
the defendant did not attempt to probe the memory on cross-examination. Id. at 271 n.11. 
 457. United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 895 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 458. Id. at 900. The court also relied upon something of a “forfeiture argument” arising 
from the defendant’s choice not to cross-examine the child, which the court assumed might 
have jogged the child’s memory. Id. 
 459. Vaska v. State, 74 P.3d 225, 226, 228–29 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). 
 460. Id. at 226. In this case as well, the defendant asked no questions on cross-
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questionably, the child’s denial in direct examination that abuse 
or other offense took place does not render the child unavailable 
for cross-examination.461 
Although it is possible that mere physical presence on the 
stand is all that the Confrontation Clause requires, the Supreme 
Court has never taken such a view, which is inconsistent with the 
importance the Court has placed, in addition to physical pres-
ence, on the opportunity for cross-examination.462 In United 
States v. Spotted War Bonnet,463 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit stated a general, albeit vague, cau-
tionary note that recognizes the limiting case: 
To be sure, simply putting a child on the stand, regardless of her 
mental maturity, is not sufficient to eliminate all Confrontation 
Clause concerns. If, for example, a child is so young that she cannot 
be cross-examined at all . . . the fact that she is physically present in 
the courtroom should not, in and of itself, satisfy the demands of the 
Clause.464 
Confrontation theory, the Due Process Clause, or the compe-
tency concept must provide some constitutional floor, albeit cer-
tainly at a very low level, as to minimal testimonial adequacy. To 
date, courts have gone no further than Spotted War Bonnet in 
recognizing that a limit must exist, but not yet attempting a con-
crete definition. 
 
examination. Id. In United States v. Martindale, 36 M.J. 870 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1993), 
the child was ruled adequately available for cross-examination when he either could not 
remember the acts of sexual abuse and the contents of prior statements about them or 
“chose not to.” Id. at 874–76. 
 461. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 954 P.2d 956, 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (finding testi-
mony by an allegedly abused child sufficient even when the child denied that abuse oc-
curred). 
 462. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845–46 (1990) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of “rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding” of which physical 
presence plays a part, but only a part). 
 463. 933 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 464. Id. at 1474. In an earlier article, I argued that availability for cross-examination 
should be interpreted to require more than the minimum willing, but vacuous, warm body 
of Owens. See Mosteller, supra note 18, at 762. That argument is very hard to maintain 
given the Court’s definition of testimonial statements in Crawford, which appears to fit 
the statements in Owens, that were obtained by police questioning regarding the identifi-
cation of the perpetrator. Owens, 484 U.S. at 556. Thus, Owens decided the minimum re-
quired for admissibility in a core confrontation fact pattern. See id. at 559. There is no re-
maining issue. 
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2.  Competency and Incompetency as a Constitutional Matter 
I also believe that the child must have the requisite mental 
ability to satisfy a constitutionally based level of competency. The 
Supreme Court has yet to deal with an issue of the adequacy of 
confrontation involving a witness ruled incompetent or with a 
constitutional concept of minimal competency. Idaho v. Wright465 
raised that issue but did not resolve it.466 
In Wright, the witness was a child who was two and one-half 
years of age at the time of the out-of-court statements and three 
at the time of trial.467 The trial court determined that the child 
was “‘not capable of communicating to the jury.’”468 The Supreme 
Court was extremely cautious in its interpretation of this finding, 
assuming, without deciding, that if a finding of unavailability 
were required for admission under the Confrontation Clause, the 
trial court’s finding established that the child was unavailable.469 
Getting closer to the issue of competency, but again not decid-
ing it, the Court rejected the argument that the statements were 
“per se unreliable, or at least presumptively unreliable,” because 
the child had been found incompetent to testify at trial.470 The 
Court disagreed that the child had been found incompetent 
rather than unavailable.471 The Court noted that the trial court 
had certainly not found the child “‘incapable of receiving just im-
pressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, or of 
relating them truly’” as required for incompetency under Idaho 
law,472 but it had only found the child incapable of communicating 
to the jury.473 The Court believed that implicitly the trial court 
 
 465. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
 466. Id. at 815–16. 
 467. Id. at 808–09. 
 468. Id. at 809. 
 469. Id. at 816. 
 470. Id. at 824. 
 471. Id. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988), provides some indirect support 
for reconciling this apparent inconsistency. In Owens, the Court found acceptable the ap-
parent inconsistency that a witness may be unavailable, because of lack of memory for a 
hearsay exception, but available for cross-examination under the Court’s construction of 
that right under both the evidence rules and the Constitution. Id. at 563–64. The two 
characterizations, it argued, were made for different purposes and need not coincide. Id. 
 472. Wright, 497 U.S. at 824 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 9-202 (Supp. 1989); IDAHO R. 
EVID. 601(a)). 
 473. Id. 
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found that the child “was capable of receiving just impressions of 
the facts and of relating them truly” at the time the out-of-court 
statements were made.474 It refrained from constitutionalizing a 
specific rule of competency as a per se determiner of exclusion for 
lack of trustworthiness because it felt to do so would inhibit the 
states in developing the law of evidence.475 
That reticence to mark out a particular rule of competency as 
an absolute indicator of untrustworthiness is a very different 
matter than recognizing that some basic testimonial competency 
is required for a witness to be available for cross-examination to 
satisfy the Confrontation Clause. The basic formulation of Idaho 
law—the ability “to receiv[e] just impressions . . . and . . . relat[e] 
them truly”476 can be, if applied generously, the basis for a consti-
tutional standard. Georgia’s standard that a child is incompetent 
if “she does not have the use of reason”477 is also a reasonable 
starting point. 
Certainly, the ability to take an oath in a technical sense is not 
required. While the taking of an oath was historically impor-
tant,478 the formal taking of an oath, or the ability to understand 
its particular intricacies, would not seem critical in the modern 
world. Federal Rule of Evidence 603 has recognized the impor-
tance of flexibility in dealing with children as witnesses,479 and 
there is no suggestion that, as to ordinary testimony, the right of 
confrontation is violated by such flexibility.480 Thus, the technical 
requirements of the oath should not bar children from giving tes-
timony, although the refusal of an ordinary witness to take an 
oath or otherwise to agree to its substantive concerns of agreeing 
 
 474. Id. at 825. 
 475. Id. 
 476. IDAHO R. EVID. 601. 
 477. London v. State, 549 S.E.2d 394, 396 (Ga. 2001) (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-9-5, -
9-7 (1995)). The Georgia statute excepts from this requirement children who are the vic-
tims of or witnesses to criminal offenses. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-5(b) (1995). 
 478. See Mosteller, supra note 18, at 740 (describing the importance placed on the oath 
by English evidence scholars in the eighteenth century). 
 479. See FED. R. EVID. 603. The advisory committee’s note recognizes the rule’s in-
tended flexibility, inter alia, with mentally deficient adults and children. Id. 
 480. A number of courts have established flexible rules for competency in child abuse 
cases that either directly or effectively eliminate a firm oath requirement. See Mosteller, 
supra note 18, at 703 nn.48–50 (citing state rules and court decisions that either eliminate 
the technical requirement of an oath for children, flatly declare children in sexual abuse 
cases competent, or give courts flexibility in finding an understanding in the child of the 
need to tell the truth rather than an understanding of the oath). 
MOSTELLER MASTER 392.DOC 11/15/2004 9:05 AM 
2005] CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 599 
to tell the truth and understanding that serious consequences 
flow from a violation should remain important substantive re-
quirements.481 
In line with my suggestion that children should be encouraged 
to testify, legislatures will probably need to revise their evidence 
rules and courts will need to interpret competency requirements 
with more flexibility to allow for testimony and cross-
examination. Likewise, oath requirements will need to be revised 
in some states. If a child’s out-of-court accusatory statement is 
sufficiently valuable to be received in evidence, it makes little 
sense to prevent the child from being available to testify in court 
and to be cross-examined on the basis of competency rules or the 
oath requirement.482 Concerns about trauma from testimony are 
of another sort and can, of course, be recognized. Incompetence on 
this basis, however, rather than the inability to testify without 
impairment of the ability to testify effectively, is relatively rare 
and accommodation, rather than denial, of confrontation should 
be the goal.483 The goal throughout should be to satisfy the Con-
frontation Clause—which can be accomplished better by showing 
generosity in determining whether a child can testify and be sub-
ject to cross-examination—rather than by making confrontation 
impossible but still receiving the child’s accusatory hearsay.484 
 
 481. See United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1971) (relying, in part, on 
the fact that the witness refused to take an oath when it found the witness unavailable for 
cross-examination). 
 482. Admittedly, as to excited utterances, which theoretically interfere with the ability 
of witnesses to prevaricate, a theory exists as to why such out-of-court statements should 
be received from witnesses who might not be able to take an oath. See 2 MCCORMICK, su-
pra note 192, § 272, at 210. Also, when the courtroom experience is so traumatic as to ren-
der the child incapable of testifying, the out-of-court statement may be the only available 
evidence. In most cases, however, there is little theoretical justification to receive the 
hearsay if the child is unable to testify. 
 483. For a discussion of the distinction between incompetence and the impact of 
trauma as justification for receiving testimony outside the presence of the defendant, see 
Mosteller, supra note 18, at 780–95. 
 484. For example, states may use closed-circuit television or other mechanisms that 
allow the child to testify outside the presence of the defendant, but still render them sub-
ject to contemporaneous cross-examination, if those procedures make it possible for the 
child to be confronted. See State v. Smith, 59 P.3d 74, 79–82 (Wash. 2002) (requiring trial 
courts to consider using closed-circuit television to obtain a child’s testimony before it 
finds the child unavailable if that mechanism might allow the child to testify). 
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3.   Statements for the Purpose of Medical Treatment and 
Diagnosis 
As noted earlier, the Crawford Court explicitly appeared to ex-
clude business records and co-conspirator statements from the 
category of testimonial statements485 and suggested that even tes-
timonial dying declarations might be exempted from the Confron-
tation Clause for historical reasons,486 while questioning similar 
treatment for excited utterances.487 Although the Court did not 
explicitly mention statements for medical treatment, its omission 
implicitly suggested non-testimonial status. In dealing with re-
sults in its prior cases, which the Court stated reached results 
that were consistent with its new approach,488 the Court men-
tioned the excited utterance made by a child to a police officer in 
White v. Illinois489 as perhaps being a case where admission of a 
testimonial statement had been permitted.490 It did not question 
the admission of another statement in that case received under 
the hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of 
medical treatment.491 The Court’s favorable view of statements 
for the purpose of medical treatment was, however, only implicit. 
The modern formulation of the hearsay exception for the pur-
pose of medical diagnosis or treatment admits statements made 
only “for . . . diagnosis” that are made for a clear litigative pur-
pose.492 When the exception has been construed as satisfying the 
Confrontation Clause, however, it has been treated as containing 
only statements that were made for a purpose different than tes-
timony—the treatment of injury or disease.493 In its influential 
amicus brief in White, the United States argued that the Confron-
tation Clause should not cover the statements involved because 
they were not made “‘for the purpose of establishing or making 
proof of some fact.’”494 Rather, they were statements of “a young 
 
 485. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1367. 
 486. Id. at 1367 n.6. 
 487. Id. at 1368 n.8. 
 488. Id. at 1367–69. The Court acknowledged that although the results of prior cases 
had been generally consistent, the rationales had not been. Id. at 1369. 
 489. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
 490. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368 n.8. 
 491. See id. 
 492. FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
 493. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
 494. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States of America at 18, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
MOSTELLER MASTER 392.DOC 11/15/2004 9:05 AM 
2005] CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 601 
patient who describes the nature of an assault to medical person-
nel in order to enable them to ascertain her condition and design 
an appropriate course of medical treatment.”495 While the major-
ity in White did not follow the amicus’s argument and recast Con-
frontation Clause theory, it did adopt its description of the state-
ments, which the Court considered to have been “made in the 
course of receiving medical care.”496 
In Idaho v. Wright, by contrast, the Court took a different view 
of statements made to a pediatrician, which it construed as not 
made under conditions “comparable to those required” for this ex-
ception, characterizing the statements instead as “accusatory 
hearsay.”497 Furthermore, in its amicus brief in White, the United 
States construed what occurred in Wright as consistent with a 
testimonial approach because the nature and circumstances of 
the “questioning suggests that it was designed to develop evi-
dence for a criminal case.”498 
Crawford should mean that the expansion of this hearsay ex-
ception beyond its traditional rationale for treatment purposes to 
include those statements made solely for the purpose of enabling 
the doctor to testify—termed “diagnosis—violates the Confronta-
tion Clause because they are testimonial.” The starkness of the 
difficulty under Crawford for that expansion is clear. The Advi-
sory Committee Note states that “[c]onventional doctrine has ex-
cluded from the hearsay exception . . . statements to a physician 
consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify. . . . The 
distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by 
juries. The rule accordingly rejects the limitation.”499 
Prior to Crawford, I made the argument that this relatively 
radical alteration of the traditional exception moved the ex-
panded part of the exception into an area of special scrutiny un-
 
346 (1992) (No. 90-6113) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for the United States in White]. The 
United States took this phrase from Justice Scalia’s definition in Maryland v. Craig, 497 
U.S. 836, 864 (1990). 
 495. Amicus Brief for the United States in White, supra note 494, at 18. 
 496. White, 502 U.S. at 355. See generally Mosteller, Medical Hearsay Exception II, su-
pra note 36, at 75–76. 
 497. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 (1990). 
 498. Amicus Brief for the United States in White, supra note 494, at 18. 
 499. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee’s note. See generally Mosteller, Medical 
Hearsay Exception II, supra note 36, at 56–61 (tracing the history of the enactment of this 
expansion, which focused on civil cases and apparently did not anticipate an impact in 
prosecution of child sexual abuse cases). 
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der Ohio v. Roberts,500 in that it was not “firmly rooted” and 
therefore not automatically assumed to have the requisite reli-
ability and trustworthiness.501 A few courts adopted a view con-
sistent with that argument, requiring a connection to treat-
ment,502 and others have imposed related restrictions.503 
In those earlier articles, I also suggested some dividing lines. 
Depending on how narrowly or broadly the Court ultimately in-
terprets testimonial statements, some of these lines may be well 
placed, although exclusion should more firmly be the result when 
they are crossed. In general, I was trying to draw a rough and 
easily applicable line between statements made in a treatment 
context and statements made in a context that was clearly for in-
vestigative or prosecutorial purposes, and such a division is 
roughly consistent with Crawford’s approach. I suggested gener-
ally that statements made to doctors and psychologists who were 
actively treating the child, particularly those who first treated 
the child after the report of injury or abuse, should generally be 
admissible under a treatment purpose rationale, although if a 
statement was made to the medical member of an abuse investi-
gative team, it should be subjected to greater scrutiny.504 State-
ments made after treatment had been completed, particularly for 
a second opinion or a diagnosis-only purpose, should be carefully 
screened under the Confrontation Clause.505 Unless, as discussed 
below, the Confrontation Clause can only be violated if the state-
ment is received by a government agent, statements in that sec-
ond category should now be excluded under Crawford. 
If testimonial statements are broadly defined, as suggested 
elsewhere, statements received by doctors who are part of inves-
tigative teams after the case has been identified as suspect 
should be considered testimonial under Crawford as well. More-
over, statements received by doctors after the police have inter-
viewed the child, or the defendant has been arrested, should be 
 
 500. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 501. Mosteller, Medical Hearsay Exception I, supra note 36, at 291–92; Mosteller, 
Medical Hearsay Exception II, supra note 36, at 52; Mosteller, supra note 18, at 796–99. 
 502. See e.g., Low v. State, 705 A.2d 67, 72–73 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (requiring a 
showing of treatment interest and a caregiving relationship with examiner); State v. Hin-
nant, 523 S.E.2d 663, 670–71 (N.C. 2000) (prohibiting admission after immediate medical 
needs have been satisfied). 
 503. See Mosteller, Medical Hearsay Exception II, supra note 36, at 50 n.6. 
 504. Mosteller, Medical Hearsay Exception II, supra note 36, at 95. 
 505. Id. at 90–95. 
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covered absent truly unusual circumstances that show an en-
tirely pristine treatment motivation. 
The post-Crawford case law has begun to examine statements 
for medical treatment or diagnosis but has yet to impose a consis-
tent categorical treatment.506 One major issue yet to be resolved 
by the Supreme Court, which may dramatically affect the analy-
sis, is whether government involvement in receiving the state-
ment is a prerequisite to finding it testimonial. To be covered by 
Crawford, must the person receiving it be a law enforcement offi-
cer or a government employee; must the person have some con-
nection—perhaps a private employee associated with the investi-
gation in the particular case or generally performing related 
functions, such as a doctor who regularly performs child sexual 
abuse examinations; or may the person be a strictly private indi-
vidual, if the statement is intended to be testimonial? 
The cases decided thus far regarding statements to doctors are 
mixed. In State v. Vaught,507 upon discovery by her father’s wife 
during bathing that the four-year-old child had swelling and red-
ness in the genital area, the child was taken to the hospital emer-
gency room for examination.508 After explaining that he was going 
to do an examination, the emergency room physician asked the 
child what had happened and she described what had been done 
and named her uncle as the perpetrator.509 Although the child 
had apparently named that individual to her father’s wife earlier, 
the case gives no indication that the police had been notified or 
been in contact with the child before the examination.510 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska concluded that the statement 
was not testimonial. It stated: 
 
 506. The Illinois Court of Appeals adopted a quite idiosyncratic perspective regarding 
confrontation in In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004).  Subsequent to statements 
by a child sexual abuse victim to the police and a social worker, which the court found to 
be testimonial, it ruled that statements made to a doctor, who was a member of a child 
abuse protection team, were neither entirely testimonial nor non-testimonial. Rather, be-
cause they were accusatory, the portion of the statement identifying the perpetrator was 
testimonial while the portion regarding the nature of the condition was not. Id. at 803. 
While some conversations should be divided between testimonial and non-testimonial 
segments, it is unclear that this opinion captures a manageable division since that portion 
about what was done to the child was likely clearly about criminal activity and therefore 
not different in kind from the portion identifying the perpetrator. 
 507. 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004). 
 508. Id. at 286. 
 509. Id. 
 510. See id. 
MOSTELLER MASTER 392.DOC 11/15/2004 9:05 AM 
604 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:511 
[T]he victim was taken to the hospital by her family to be examined 
and the only evidence regarding the purpose of the medical examina-
tion, including the information regarding the cause of the symptoms, 
was to obtain medical treatment. There was no indication of a pur-
pose to develop testimony for trial, nor was there an indication of 
government involvement in the initiation or course of the examina-
tion.511 
The conclusion of the court on the facts presented is a reasonable 
result. 
Likewise, two other cases found statements to doctors to be 
non-testimonial, but the correctness of that result is far less 
clear, principally because of the police involvement before the 
medical examination. Heard v. Commonwealth512 involves domes-
tic violence. In response to a call by a relative of the victim, the 
police and paramedics arrived at the relative’s home.513 While 
there, the victim, whose head wounds were bleeding, informed a 
police officer that the defendant “had kicked the door down and 
that he hit her in the head with a gun” and had taken their infant 
child.514 The court found these statements testimonial.515 Also, 
while the police were present, the defendant called and the police 
talked to him, but he refused to reveal where he had taken the 
child or “what had prompted him to assault” the victim.516 The 
victim was then taken to the hospital emergency room, where she 
was treated.517 She told the doctor that her cuts resulted from be-
ing struck with a pistol.518 The Kentucky Court of Appeals held 
that the statements to the police were testimonial but the subse-
quent statements to the doctor where not.519 
In People v. Cage,520 the victim of a somewhat atypical domestic 
assault—mother assaulting son—was interviewed at the hospital 
emergency room by a police officer before seeing the doctor.521 In 
response to a question as to what happened between him and the 
 
 511. Id. at 291. 
 512. No. 2002-CA-002494-MR, 2004 WL 1367163 (Ky. Ct. App. June 18, 2004). 
 513. Id. at *1. 
 514. Id. 
 515. Id. at *5. 
 516. Id. at *1. 
 517. Id. 
 518. Id. 
 519. Id. at *5. 
 520. 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 521. Id. at 849. 
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defendant, he told the officer that his mother had purposefully 
cut him with a piece of glass while his grandmother held him 
down.522 Somewhat later and apparently without the officer pre-
sent, the doctor asked him “[f]or purposes of treatment” what had 
happened, and again he said “‘he had been held down by his 
grandmother and cut by his mother.’”523 
The California Court of Appeal concluded that both the state-
ment to the officer and to the doctor were non-testimonial.524 It 
looked for close analogies to the function of the English justices of 
the peace under the Marian statutes and found the doctor’s func-
tion very different.525 It argued that as to the latter, the absence 
of government involvement in the making of the statement was 
important under Crawford.526 Finally, it rejected the argument 
that the declarant would have seen no difference between the po-
lice officer’s questions and that of the doctor and that a reason-
able person would have expected the doctor’s statements to be 
used prosecutorially at the defendant’s trial.527 
Cage is at least internally consistent in holding that both the 
earlier statements to the police and the later statements to the 
doctor are treated the same.528 It may be proven correct if the Su-
preme Court determines that statements must be received by 
government agents to be testimonial. In both Heard and Cage, 
however, the wounds were so severe that once the police became 
involved in an investigation and accusatory statements made to 
them, criminal prosecution was very likely, as should have been 
appreciated by reasonable people.529 In this situation, statements 
to physicians that involve obviously suspect wounds, which the 
physicians are likely obligated to report, should be considered tes-
timonial. 
People v. Vigil530 involved statements typical of many medical 
examinations in child sexual abuse prosecutions, which were gen-
 
 522. Id. 
 523. Id. 
 524. Id. at 855, 857. 
 525. Id. at 851–52. 
 526. Id. at 854. 
 527. Id. at 855. 
 528. Id. at 855, 857. 
 529. For further discussion of Heard v. Commonwealth, see supra notes 512–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 530. No. 02CA0833, 2004 Colo. App. LEXIS 1024 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004). 
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erally admissible under Ohio v. Roberts but may be excluded un-
der Crawford because of the association with prosecutorial func-
tions.531 In Vigil, the father of the victim walked in on the defen-
dant while he was sexually assaulting his son.532 The perpetrator, 
one of the father’s co-workers, fled.533 His son told him of the as-
sault in graphic detail.534 The father thereafter notified the po-
lice.535 
The Colorado Court of Appeals concluded that the statement of 
the child to his father was not testimonial.536 It concluded, how-
ever, that the statement made by the child to a doctor who exam-
ined him after the incident was testimonial, describing the facts 
and its reasoning as follows: 
The doctor was a member of a child protection team that provides 
consultations at . . . area hospitals in cases of suspected child abuse. 
He had previously provided extensive expert testimony in child 
abuse cases. He was asked to perform a “forensic sexual abuse ex-
amination” on the child and spoke with the police officer who accom-
panied the child before performing the examination. . . . 
We conclude that, under the particular circumstances present 
here, the child’s statements to the doctor were testimonial under 
Crawford. The statements were made under circumstances that 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that they 
would be used prosecutorially. Although the doctor himself was not a 
government officer or employee, he was not a person “unassociated 
with government activity.” . . . The doctor elicited the statements af-
ter consultation with the police, and he necessarily understood that 
the information he obtained would be used in a subsequent prosecu-
tion for child abuse.537 
Vigil reaches a very solid result that should become the law 
under Crawford. The issue should be where the testimonial line 
will be drawn between the facts of Vaught and Vigil. I contend 
that the courts in Cage and Heard reached very questionable re-
sults when they found the accusatory statements to doctors not to 
be testimonial after police interviews had already been conducted 
with the witnesses. The outcome in Heard appears particularly 
 
 531. Id. at *17–18. 
 532. Id. at *1–2. 
 533. Id. at *1. 
 534. Id. at *2. 
 535. Id. 
 536. Id. at *17. 
 537. Id. at *17–18. 
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problematic in that the court found an earlier statement to the 
police to be testimonial,538 after which other accusatory state-
ments that are not made confidentially should generally be tes-
timonial. The task of applying Crawford in this area is a part of 
the larger task facing courts to carefully and consistently flesh 
out (or revise) the meaning of Crawford. 
B.   Providing Confrontation and Enabling Effective Prosecution 
in Domestic Violence Cases 
My approach to satisfying Crawford’s construction of the Con-
frontation Clause encourages more witnesses to testify and has 
its costs and difficulties, even with the testimony of children. This 
approach is less likely to be an effective mechanism for providing 
confrontation and admitting evidence in domestic violence 
cases.539 The frequent pattern in these cases is for victims to re-
fuse to appear for trial, and, if they testify, to do so unwillingly. 
This reluctance is presumed in many cases to be the result of 
pressure from the defendant. 
As jurisdictions implemented policy judgments that abusers 
should be arrested and prosecuted in domestic violence cases re-
gardless of the wishes of the immediate victim, prosecutors de-
veloped methods for “victimless” prosecutions.540 These prosecu-
tions were based on the introduction of hearsay through excited 
utterances,541 statements for medical treatment,542 past recollec-
tion recorded,543 special exceptions,544 and the catch-all provi-
sion.545 Ohio v. Roberts allowed the Confrontation Clause to be 
satisfied automatically for hearsay exceptions, such as excited ut-
 
 538. Heard, 2004 WL 137163, at *5. 
 539. Another example is with co-defendants who have been interrogated by the police. 
After Crawford, those statements are excluded unless the co-defendant testifies. The Fifth 
Amendment creates a potential bar that can be raised by the prosecution. Crawford may 
do more to persuade prosecutors to grant the use of immunity than any legal argument by 
the defense. 
 540. People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004). 
 541. Id. 
 542. Id. 
 543. See Hudders, supra note 33, at 1058 (describing expanded interpretation of past 
recorded recollection exception in domestic violence cases). 
 544. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(1) (Supp. 2004) (providing that hearsay is not excluded 
if “[t]he statement purports to narrate, describe, or explain the infliction or threat of 
physical injury upon the declarant”). 
 545. See Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 878. 
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terances, that were “firmly rooted” and required no showing of 
unavailability.546 Crawford has disrupted domestic violence 
prosecutions to a degree not seen in any other area. It erected a 
“stop sign” in front of most of this evidence, which combined with 
its reluctance to treat excited utterances as a historic exception to 
confrontation,547 has caused massive disruption and great uncer-
tainty.548 
In domestic violence prosecutions, I see a number of possible 
responses to Crawford. I principally examine one providing early 
opportunities for confrontation through preliminary hearings. In 
the next subsection, I examine briefly a second response—the 
general argument that 911 calls should be excluded from the tes-
timonial category. Another response should be noted—forfeiture 
through wrongdoing. It could eliminate the Confrontation Clause 
objection if responsibility for the victim’s unavailability can be at-
tributed to the defendant,549 but I worry that expansion of this 
 
 546. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1979). 
 547. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1368 n.8. 
 548. Preventing “victimless” prosecutions might indeed have been at the core of the 
Framers’ intention for the Confrontation Clause, and thus, the impact on this manifesta-
tion of modern domestic violence prosecutions may be historically “correct.” Although the 
current testimonial approach makes no direct or indirect use of accusatory hearsay or of 
“accusers,” the concern with forcing public accusation, and the defendant facing his or her 
accuser, was at the center of much of the history of the Confrontation Clause. See WRIGHT 
& GRAHAM, supra note 303, § 6348, at 788 (arguing that the responsibility of accusers, 
who had often testified in secret and were “more likely to give vent to spite or acquiesce in 
[government] manipulation” as a result, was more of historical concern than the lack of 
cross-examination or trial by dossier). If we are to imagine the Framers’ reaction to prac-
tices that did not exist at the time, we could imagine few practices that would have been 
more abhorrent to their values than the concept of a prosecution through the out-of-court 
accusations of a victim who was not compelled, even if available, to take the stand and 
make those charges in person to the defendant. 
 549. In Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), the court noted the pos-
sible use of Crawford’s “forfeiture by wrongdoing” in domestic violence cases, but ex-
pressed concern that application would be “difficult,” requiring a separate investigation 
and resolution of whether psychological pressure would be sufficient and, if so, how much 
would be required. Id. at 950 n.3. 
Prospects for expansion of the forfeiture by wrongdoing, which I do not particularly sup-
port, has perhaps more potential than Hammon’s treatment suggests through the use of 
presumptions. Crawford cites Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which itself 
deferred to the trial court’s admission of evidence in a situation where the proof of wrong-
doing and the defendant’s responsibility for the witness’s absence was not clear, but the 
Court believed the evidence was sufficient to create a presumption that cast the burden of 
explanation on the defendant. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1371 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 
158–59). The Court set out the evidence and its procedural reasoning as follows: 
The testimony shows that the absent witness was the alleged second wife 
of the accused; that she had testified on a former trial for the same offence 
under another indictment; that she had no home, except with the accused; 
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exception might be generalized so as to make suspicion of the de-
fendant’s involvement in the witness’s unavailability or uncoop-
erativeness sufficient to deny confrontation. 
Before examining expanding the opportunities to create prior 
cross-examined testimony, I want to at least note that there may 
be some possibilities for securing more confrontation at the cur-
rent trial. In domestic violence cases, the witness typically has no 
legal objection, such as the Fifth Amendment or the marital privi-
lege, from being called to testify.550 Prosecutorial efforts to compel 
testimony, however, may be unseemly and viewed as further vic-
 
that at some time before the trial a subpoena had been issued for her, but by 
mistake she was named as Mary Jane Schobold; that an officer who knew the 
witness personally went to the house of the accused to serve the subpoena, 
and on his arrival inquired for her, either by the name of Mary Jane 
Schofield or Mrs. Reynolds; that he was told by the accused she was not at 
home; that he then said, “Will you tell me where she is?” that the reply was 
“No; that will be for you to find out;” that the officer then remarked she was 
making him considerable trouble, and that she would get into trouble herself; 
and the accused replied, “Oh, no; she won’t, till the subpoena is served upon 
her,” and then, after some further conversation, that “She does not appear in 
this case.” 
It being discovered after the trial commenced that a wrong name had been 
inserted in the subpoena, a new subpoena was issued with the right name, at 
nine o’clock in the evening. With this the officer went again to the house, and 
there found a person known as the first wife of the accused. He was told by 
her that the witness was not there, and had not been for three weeks. He 
went again the next morning, and not finding her, or being able to ascertain 
where she was by inquiring in the neighborhood, made return of that fact to 
the court. At ten o’clock that morning the case was again called; and the fore-
going facts being made to appear, the court ruled that evidence of what the 
witness had sworn to at the former trial was admissible. 
In this we see no error. The accused was himself personally present in 
court when the showing was made, and had full opportunity to account for 
the absence of the witness, if he would, or to deny under oath that he had 
kept her away. Clearly, enough had been proven to cast the burden upon him 
of showing that he had not been instrumental in concealing or keeping the 
witness away. Having the means of making the necessary explanation, and 
having every inducement to do so if he would, the presumption is that he con-
sidered it better to rely upon the weakness of the case made against him than 
to attempt to develop the strength of his own. 
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159–60. 
 550. The law in Washington that allowed the defendant in Crawford to assert the 
spousal immunity privilege is atypical. See Pamela A. Haun, Note, The Marital Privilege 
in the Twenty-First Century, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 137 (2001). Haun found that a majority of 
the states with a spousal testimony privilege permit only the witness spouse to assert the 
privilege. Id. at 158. Six states, including Washington, give control of the privilege to the 
defendant alone, and three allow either spouse to exercise it. Id. at 159. Furthermore, all 
states that recognize the privilege create an exception for cases like domestic violence 
when one spouse commits a crime against the other. Id. at 163. 
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timizing the victim, although there may be benefits in calling 
even uncooperative witnesses to testify, as much as they are will-
ing, and then having them remain available for recall by the de-
fense for cross-examination when their prior statements are in-
troduced. Under California v. Green and United States v. Owens, 
a complete refusal to testify renders the witness unavailable for 
confrontation purposes, but inadequate responses and evasions 
generally do not.551 Holding victims in contempt for failure to tes-
tify goes too far, but the prosecutor calling the witness, and 
strong judicial encouragement of her testimony, may be produc-
tive. Although hardly certain, an unwilling victim may in this 
context be a reasonably effective witness given the assumption of 
many factfinders that the reticence results for pressure by the de-
fendant. 
1.  Providing an Early Opportunity for Confrontation 
In domestic violence cases, instead of the prosecution attempt-
ing to secure more victim testimony, another approach is likely to 
be more effective. This approach creates opportunities for testi-
mony by the victim at the outset of the prosecution, when she 
may be a more willing witness, with a right of cross-examination 
by the defendant. An examination of the lower court case law af-
ter Crawford reveals promising possible elements of this new ap-
proach. 
In People v. Price,552 the California Court of Appeal upheld the 
admission of an out-of-court statement made by the defendant’s 
wife to a police officer shortly after the police arrived at the vic-
tim’s home, in response to a 911 call, because at the preliminary 
hearing the defendant was given the opportunity to, and did, 
cross-examine his unavailable spouse regarding the statement 
made to the police.553 In People v. Zarazua,554 the court rejected 
 
 551. A concurring opinion in Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), ar-
gued that the uncooperative domestic violence victim, who had refused to testify that the 
defendant battered her, id. at 961, had been sufficiently available, and could have been 
recalled by the defendant for cross-examination after her statement to the police about the 
battering was introduced. Id. at 965-66 (Crone, J., concurring). At some point, the refusal 
to submit to cross-examination will be held to deny confrontation, but during cross-
examination, the incentive of the defendant may shift to encouraging rather than discour-
aging co-operation. 
 552. 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 553. Id. at 238–40; cf. Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798, 800–01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
MOSTELLER MASTER 392.DOC 11/15/2004 9:05 AM 
2005] CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 611 
the state’s argument that the defendant waived his confrontation 
right, by waiving a preliminary hearing, because of lack of notice 
to the defendant of the need to cross-examine and the absence of 
a showing that the victim would have testified.555 Instead, if the 
government provides a hearing and the defendant fails to take 
advantage of cross-examination opportunities, the result will be 
different and the statement admissible if the witness is unavail-
able at trial. 
People v. Fry556 shows another aspect of the picture. The Su-
preme Court of Colorado has held that its preliminary hearings 
fail to provide adequate opportunities for cross-examination to 
meet the Confrontation Clause requirement.557 If states wish to 
satisfy confrontation through early hearings, those hearings must 
allow for adequate cross-examination. Moreover, if prior state-
ments are to be received, an opportunity to cross-examine must 
be provided both as to the event and to the prior statements.558 In 
many jurisdictions, the scope of preliminary and other hearings 
accordingly will need to be expanded and other procedural 
changes made by legislative or judicial action.559 
 
2004) (finding receipt of hearsay statement of unavailable child witness did not violate 
Crawford where the defendant took witness’s deposition). 
 554. No. H025472, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3831 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004). 
 555. Id. at *13. 
 556. 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004). 
 557. Id. at 976–80. 
 558. See Price, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 238–40; see also People v. Ochoa, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
365, 373 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting state’s concession that testimonial statements which were 
not discussed or identified at the preliminary hearing could not be received under Craw-
ford when witness refused to testify at trial but concluding that some expansion in details 
of those statements was allowable where the defendant was alerted to the existence of the 
statements, finding opportunity and (perhaps questionably) motive to cross-examine or 
that extensions were harmless). The adequacy of motive to cross-examine a prior incrimi-
nating statement of the witness, as opposed to her incriminating testimony at the pre-
liminary hearing, is quite problematic unless the prior statement is introduced since a 
party lacks the motive to damage its own position by introducing new damaging state-
ments during cross-examination. Even if a defendant has the opportunity, unless incrimi-
nating evidence is admitted by the prosecution, he or she clearly has no motive to produce 
that damaging information that would otherwise not be admitted to attempt to undercut 
its damaging force, with the potential disadvantage that the evidence would be admissible 
under the Confrontation Clause at a subsequent trial if the witness is unavailable. Thus, 
if this avenue is to be used, rules must allow admission of prior statements, and, as a gen-
eral matter, the prosecution must actually introduce them to give the defense not only the 
opportunity, but also the motive, to cross-examine. 
 559. For example, in State v. Whitehead, 950 P.2d 818 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997), the court 
held that the prosecution was barred under its constitution and rules of procedure to de-
mand a preliminary hearing if the defendant chose to waive that hearing. Id. at 819–22. If 
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One of the merits of developing prior cross-examined testimony 
is that once the testimony is “in the can,” the incentive for con-
frontation falls on the party with the greatest likelihood of being 
able to encourage testimony—here the defendant. If cross-
examined testimony has been secured, which makes the prior 
statements of the witness admissible if she is unavailable at trial, 
the defendant has much less incentive to keep the victim off the 
stand and may even encourage her testimony in the hope that 
she will disavow the prior incriminating statements, which the 
finder of fact can credit or readily disbelieve. 
2.  911 Calls 
Emergency 911 calls can be offered in any type of prosecution, 
but they are frequently offered in domestic violence cases under 
the hearsay exception for excited utterances, which, if accepted, 
automatically satisfy the Confrontation Clause through Roberts 
and White. They are frequently critical in domestic violence 
prosecutions. One of the first post-Crawford opinions reached the 
conclusion that such calls were generally non-testimonial. In Peo-
ple v. Moscat,560 the trial court reasoned that unlike testimonial 
police interrogation, which “is undertaken by the government in 
contemplation of pursing criminal charges against a particular 
person,” a 911 call is initiated by a citizen calling for the aid of 
the government.561 
In People v. Cortes,562 another lower New York court took a 
very different general position regarding 911 calls, finding them 
generally testimonial.563 The focus of this court’s analysis was on 
the protocols for organized questioning established for most 911 
systems, and it concluded that “[w]hen a 911 call is made to re-
port a crime and supply information about the circumstances and 
the people involved, the purpose of the information is for investi-
 
early confrontation is to be afforded effectively, the prosecutor should be able to conduct a 
preliminary hearing regardless of the defendant’s strategic interests, and state law proce-
dures should be amended accordingly. 
 560. 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004). 
 561. Id. at 879. Contra Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testi-
mony, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1242–43 (2002) (discussing extensively 911 calls as a class 
of statements that the authors contend should generally, if not universally, be considered 
testimonial). 
 562. 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 563. Id. at 415. 
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gation, prosecution, and potential use at a judicial proceeding” 
regardless of the individual caller’s beliefs.564 
Some 911 calls would likely be non-testimonial under either 
mode of analysis as illustrated by People v. Conyers,565 where the 
court concluded that the calls, which were made “while the as-
sault [was] still in progress,” were for the purpose of stopping the 
assault and without consideration of the legal consequences.566 
I will spend no more time discussing directly the testimonial 
status of 911 calls, which is a major subject unto itself. Their 
treatment should largely follow, however, from the resolution of 
issues developed earlier. These include the allocation of the bur-
den between the government and the state, when statements may 
be considered made for either testimonial or for another purpose; 
the treatment of excited utterances; the existence of, and if so, 
the precise nature of a requirement that the statements be made 
to a government agent; and whether the statement’s testimonial 
status is determined by the perspective of the witness, or when 
received by a government agent, the receiver’s perspective, by 
both, or in another manner. 
At some point in a conversation, which initially began for a 
purpose other than establishing guilt in a criminal case, the pur-
pose may change to the testimonial purpose of creating evidence. 
Certainly there is no necessity to treat all parts of the conversa-
tion in the same manner, as opposed to breaking it into smaller 
statements manifesting different purposes.567 In several well- 
known situations, such divisions occur.568 The change during a 
 
 564. Id. The test used for determining whether hearsay generally was testimonial was 
whether the statement “was made primarily for another purpose” other than investigation 
or prosecution of crime. Id. at 414. 
 565. 777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004). 
 566. Id. at 276–77. In State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 302–03 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), 
the court noted that the majority of courts have found 911 calls to be non-testimonial, but 
in reaching its conclusion consistent with that position, the court did not reject the ap-
proach of Cortes, but rather found that nothing in that case indicated that the operator 
had used a formal protocol to elicit the witness’s statement. 
 567. The approach in Cortes can in some ways be reconciled with Moscat through the 
division of the conversation into parts. The initial part may well be for a purpose that is 
not testimonial, but, as the operator guides the conversation with his or her structured 
questioning, the purpose may be transformed. 
 568. See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994). In Williamson, the 
Court construed the term “statement,” as used in statements against interest under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), to be quite narrow—“‘a single declaration or remark’”—
rather than “an extended declaration.” Id. at 599. Another example is the long established 
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conversation from speaking for another purpose to making a 
statement aimed at criminal prosecution may come on directions 
by, and through questions from, the person receiving the state-
ment rather than the speaker. Indeed, the purpose can change 
from the receiver’s perspective without the speaker ever knowing. 
The difference in perspectives may not matter in privately made 
statements, but in those made to known government agents, an 
important question to be answered is whose perspective matters 
in deciding whether a statement is testimonial. I have argued 
earlier that if the government agent is intentionally creating tes-
timony, the statement should be treated as testimonial regardless 
of whether the speaker recognizes that purpose.569 Such analysis 
could transform the later parts of some 911 calls into testimonial 
statements. 
VII.  THE REMAINS OF THE OLD SYSTEM 
A.  Idaho v. Wright—The Uncertain Precedent 
Idaho v. Wright570 may or may not be a difficult case to resolve 
under Crawford’s analysis. We do not know because the majority 
inexplicably never mentioned Wright, although the concurring 
opinion did.571 In its footnote recognizing the problematic nature 
of White v. Illinois, the Court noted that it was the “[o]ne case ar-
guably in tension with the rule requiring a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination when the proffered statement is testimo-
nial.”572 Since Wright approved exclusion of, rather than admis-
sion of, testimony, the Court’s statement did not strictly include 
Wright within its carefully formulated category, but I still suspect 
 
“non-hearsay” use of the prompt reporting of rape to demonstrate that the complaint was 
made promptly, but not including its details or allowing them to be used by the jury to 
prove the truth of the allegations. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 192, § 272.1, at 421 (not-
ing that “only the fact that a complaint was made [not the details] could be admitted”). In 
a similar fashion, statements of arresting officers regarding the fact that they received a 
police communication sending them to a particular location is admitted to explain their 
presence there, but the details of the call are not admissible. Id. § 249, at 378. 
 569. See supra Part III.B. 
 570. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
 571. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1378 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Wright as 
the authority under which he would easily reverse without overturning the Court’s well-
established confrontation doctrine). 
 572. Id. at 1368 n.8. 
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that the majority’s failure to discuss Wright was not inadver-
tent.573 Explaining how Wright fit would likely have required a 
more detailed treatment of the definition of testimonial than the 
Court was willing to provide. 
The statements at issue in Wright were made by a child who 
was two and one-half years old to Dr. John Jambura, “a pediatri-
cian with extensive experience in child abuse cases.”574 They were 
made after the child’s older sister, who was five and one-half 
years old, had undergone a medical examination that revealed 
evidence of sexual abuse.575 One of the doctors conducting the 
older child’s examination was Dr. Jambura.576 The younger child 
was then taken into custody for protection and investigation, and 
the following day, Dr. Jambura examined her and secured the 
statements excluded by the Court in Wright.577 
The Court agreed with the Supreme Court of Idaho that 
“[g]iven the presumption of inadmissibility accorded accusatory 
hearsay statements not admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception . . . ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness’” had not been shown.578 In addition to the lower court’s fo-
cus on the “presumptive unreliability of the . . . statements,”579 
 
 573. Wright’s fit had been examined by the seminal authorities to the majority’s ap-
proach. The amicus brief for the United States in White compared results under the pro-
posed approach with the Court’s prior cases, but unlike Crawford, the brief noted that 
Wright presented a possible deviation between the Court’s proposed approach and decided 
cases. In its brief however, the United States argued that the result was not “necessarily 
inconsistent” because “the questioning in [Wright] occurred after the declarant had been 
taken into custody by police, and the state court’s characterization of the questioning sug-
gests that it was designed to develop evidence for a criminal case. . . . The questioning 
therefore may be regarded as functionally equivalent to other forms of official interroga-
tion that result in statements by a ‘witness.’” Amicus Brief for the United States in White, 
supra note 494, at 28 n.18. 
Professor Akhil Amar, whom the Supreme Court cited as one of its principal theoretical 
sources for its new approach, see Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370, likewise squared his ver-
sion of a new approach with decided cases. In his book, Professor Amar stated that 
“[h]appily, our reading of the confrontation clause squares with the results of almost all 
modern Supreme Court cases.” AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 131 (1997). He used the explanation given by the United 
States in its amicus brief in White to square this one potential outlier. Id. at 245 n.193. 
 574. Wright, 497 U.S. at 808–09. 
 575. Id. at 809. 
 576. Id. 
 577. See id. 
 578. Id. at 827. 
 579. Id. at 826. “Presumptive unreliability” for the lower court came simply from the 
fact that the statement was “inculpatory” and fell within no traditional hearsay exception. 
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the Court noted the suggestive manner of Dr. Jambura’s ques-
tioning.580 
Wright illustrates the complexity of the testimonial determina-
tion even as to what might be highly problematic hearsay. The 
questioning was done by a private individual, a medical doctor.581 
Indeed, there appears to be no reason why these statements could 
not have been admitted under the exception for statements for 
the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment but for the failure 
of the prosecutor and the Idaho courts to reach a result in this 
early case that was adopted later in most other jurisdictions.582 
The statements were, in the words of the Court, accusatory,583 
which does not appear to be a significant term under Crawford. I 
believe that such statements should not be admitted under the 
Confrontation Clause without at least careful scrutiny, and while 
the United States as amicus in White would accept at least that 
premise, Justice Thomas in White questioned generally the clar-
ity of this functional approach.584 
Wright apparently remains good law. Indeed, after Crawford, it 
is the only case where evidence was excluded that cannot neces-
sarily be accounted for by Crawford. It constitutes an exclusion-
ary result from the “old system” that is not consistent with the 
testimonial approach if that approach is restrictively applied. 
B.  The Confrontation Clause Application to Non-testimonial 
Statements 
In Ohio v. Roberts,585 Justice Blackmun articulated a general 
standard of trustworthiness and reliability for all hearsay in 
which the declarant was unavailable that created the now-
familiar term “firmly rooted hearsay exception,” which was an 
automatic route to satisfying the Confrontation Clause in many 
 
See State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Idaho 1989). 
 580. Wright, 497 U.S. at 826. 
 581. Id. at 809. 
 582. See Mosteller, Medical Hearsay Exception II, supra note 36, at 69–74 (examining 
carefully the Idaho case law, including the briefs and arguments of the parties, and con-
cluding that there was no clear reason why the statements could not have been offered 
and received as statements for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment). 
 583. Wright, 497 U.S. at 827. 
 584. See White, 502 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 585. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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situations.586 As part of a summary, the opinion stated: “[the] 
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reli-
ability.’ Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where 
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In 
other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a 
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”587 
What remains of the old system? The Court did not give an an-
swer. One part of it is clearly gone. When statements are testi-
monial under Crawford, the reliability and trustworthiness 
analysis is irrelevant. Only cross-examination or one of the other 
limited exceptions described above avoids Crawford’s “stop sign” 
under the Confrontation Clause. The Roberts system is thus 
obliterated as to testimonial statements. 
What of non-testimonial statements? Two alternatives are sug-
gested. Perhaps Roberts’s reliability and trustworthiness analysis 
remains the operative test as to all non-testimonial statements. 
The other competitor is that the Confrontation Clause has noth-
ing whatsoever to say about non-testimonial hearsay, and admis-
sibility depends solely on satisfying hearsay and other eviden-
tiary restraints that rules of evidence impose.588 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia entertained the possibility of re-
solving this uncertainty and revising the Confrontation Clause to 
apply “only to testimonial statements, leaving the remainder to 
regulation by hearsay law.”589 He noted that this proposal had 
been in fact considered and rejected in White.590 Intriguingly, he 
recognized that “our analysis in this case casts doubt on that 
holding,” but did not resolve that question because it was not nec-
essary to “definitively resolve whether [Roberts] survives our de-
cision today” in that the hearsay in Crawford would be inadmis-
sible regardless of whether Roberts survives.591 
 
 586. See id. at 66. 
 587. Id. 
 588. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (stating that “[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is 
at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in 
their development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that ex-
empted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether”). 
 589. Id. at 1370. 
 590. Id. 
 591. Id. 
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Resolving Roberts’s future will not have an impact on the out-
come of many cases since the Confrontation Clause was generally 
easily satisfied under the Roberts test as to most admissible hear-
say, and indeed, admissibility under Roberts’s reliability and 
trustworthiness analysis was most often decided automatically 
when the statement met a broadly accepted and long estab-
lished—“firmly rooted”—hearsay exception. How this pathway to 
admissibility is defined will matter, however, in situations of non-
testimonial hearsay that is highly unreliable and fits no “firmly 
rooted” exception. 
Difficult examples can easily be imagined regarding highly 
problematic accusatory statements and the frequently difficult 
statements by children in child sexual abuse cases. Some of these 
statements will be considered testimonial, as a Maryland appel-
late court determined as to an interview by a social worker em-
ployed by the county Child Protective Services conducted after 
the social worker had received a police report that children had 
been sexually abused592 and was done for the purpose of develop-
ing the children’s statements for admission under a hearsay ex-
ception.593 
Where the dividing line will be located has not yet been deter-
mined for statements made by children to family members, doc-
tors, school teachers, social workers, and police officers when the 
purpose of the statement is not entirely clear. Many of those 
statements may be ruled non-testimonial as illustrated by the de-
cision of a Michigan appellate court that concluded that state-
ments of a child made to an interviewer at Child Protective Ser-
vices, after the agency was contacted for an evaluation by a 
parent concerned about possible abuse, were not considered tes-
timonial because the interviewer was not a governmental em-
ployee.594 
The statement might also be argued to be non-testimonial for 
other reasons, such as a lack of awareness of the purpose of the 
questioning by the child595 or because the statements were not 
 
 592. Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 42 n.10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). 
 593. Id. at 47. 
 594. People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
 595. See Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hear-
say, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 250–51 (2002) (arguing on one hand that statements 
by young children might properly not be considered testimonial because the child may not 
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made in response to structured questioning, which would be most 
persuasive in the early stages of an inquiry when suspicion is 
vague and unformed. 
In states that have a broad catch-all exception or a similarly 
general exception that applies to children, one can imagine state-
ments of the child to relatives, family friends, and probably school 
teachers which might be found lacking in reliability under Rob-
erts, particularly given that under Wright reliability and trust-
worthiness may not be proved by corroboration of the truth of the 
statement through external evidence.596 Thus, whether the Con-
frontation Clause still applies to statements like those in Wright 
has practical significance in child sexual abuse cases, and it has 
even greater significance if jurisdictions relax their hearsay rules 
as that body of law and confrontation diverge. 
Presently, lower courts should still apply the “old system” to 
non-testimonial hearsay because Crawford did not overrule Rob-
erts in this area.597 Whether the applicability of the Confrontation 
Clause will remain the law in the future, however, is uncertain. 
We can be relatively confident of the votes of Justices Thomas 
and Scalia in White that they would free such statements from 
any control under the Confrontation Clause. The inclinations of 
the rest of the Court have not been revealed. I believe, however, 
that any “betting line” would treat Roberts as a clear underdog. 
 
appreciate that he or she is providing information about wrongful conduct that may be 
used in a criminal prosecution, and on the other, that elicitation by a state officer might be 
sufficient). More likely, the reasonable witness awareness that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial is not to be judged based on an objective child similar to 
the witness, but as to an ordinary reasonable observer. People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 753, 758 n.3 (Ct. App. 2004). For example, when a government agent is openly develop-
ing evidentiary materials that fall within the core of the inquisitorial model, lack of appre-
ciation of that fact by a witness with mental limitations should not render the statement 
non-testimonial. 
 596. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819–20. See Miller v. State, 98 P.3d 738, 744–48 (Okla. Ct. 
Crim. App. 2004). 
 597. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 227 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying Rob-
erts to non-testimonial statements at the same time it noted Crawford’s strong criticism of 
the trustworthiness methodology). 
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C.  The Case for a Secondary System of Confrontation Clause 
Protection—The Brief for Roberts Continuing to “Live” 
I sense there are few academics who would favor retaining the 
Roberts analysis as a supplement to Crawford because of the ap-
parent theoretical incompatibility of the two systems and because 
of Roberts’s proven inadequacy as an effective way to enforce the 
Confrontation Clause. I contend the conflict need not be viewed 
this starkly and believe there will be a need for Roberts to sup-
plement the definition of testimonial statements that I assume 
will not cover all statements of proper concern under the Con-
frontation Clause. 
When one examines with a broad perspective the overall his-
tory of hearsay and the Confrontation Clause, I suggest that the 
story is one of a confrontation right arising at a time when hear-
say law was largely unformed and few hearsay exceptions were 
recognized. Most hearsay was not a threat to confrontation be-
cause most problematic hearsay was not admissible. The confron-
tation right arose to block admission of a particular type of hear-
say—inquisitorial hearsay—and it had little to say directly about 
other hearsay because such hearsay was not admissible.598 
As hearsay law developed, practices arose and evidence from 
out-of-court declarants was offered, which the Framers had never 
seen and about which they had no opinion. The question now is 
how that new form of evidence should be treated. In the words of 
the Sixth Amendment, are these hearsay declarants “witnesses 
against”599 the defendant, or should they be treated as outside its 
scope? If determining how the Framers would have answered the 
question is a relevant question, I believe we simply cannot know 
the answer. 
Crawford does seem to correctly perceive the area where we 
can be most certain of the Framers’ intent—testimonial state-
ments of an inquisitorial sort offered in judicial proceedings.600 
Thus, treating these types of statements as particularly deserv-
 
 598. See Mosteller, supra note 18, at 746–55 (taking a similar approach to the ambigu-
ity of knowing the meaning of or how the Framers would have applied the Confrontation 
Clause given that the hearsay rule of that period was both different and somewhat un-
formed). 
 599. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 600. See Mosteller, supra note 18, at 751–53. 
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ing of scrutiny and exclusion makes perfect theoretical sense. 
Also, targeting some narrower group of statements for special 
scrutiny makes practical sense. A broad rule that mandates ex-
clusion will be difficult to maintain in that courts will feel tre-
mendous pressure to make accommodations.601 A narrower rule 
has a better chance of maintaining integrity, particularly if the 
remedy is to exclude important evidence. 
But having defined a core and recognized a practical need for 
restricting that core does not prove that the Framers were only 
concerned with the category of testimonial statements as Craw-
ford “defines” it or that the Confrontation Clause has no other le-
gitimate formulation. I contend that the Framers were likely con-
cerned about accusatory statements more generally, or they 
would have been had the historical practices presented them-
selves.602 
If testimonial is not broadly defined, however, I contend con-
tinued scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause is justified for an 
additional group of statements. Wright presents such a case. I be-
lieve the Confrontation Clause has something to say about the 
admission of this type of accusatory hearsay. 
Another case, Commonwealth v. Robins,603 which is not well 
known, presents a similarly problematic fact pattern and one that 
Crawford may be construed not to cover. In Robins, a police in-
formant, Downey, was incarcerated and seeking to negotiate his 
release.604 He learned in jailhouse conversations with Auman, 
who was confined in the same cellblock, that Auman and others 
had committed a burglary.605 Although he did not name Robins as 
one of those accomplices, the details he described were incrimi-
 
 601. The erosion of the protections of the Confrontation Clause under the broad rule of 
Roberts is rightfully attributed in part to this practical difficulty. 
 602. Perhaps virtually everything that I would consider to be accusatory will be treated 
as testimonial under a generous interpretation of the amicus definition, but such full cov-
erage is far from clear. 
 603. 812 A.2d 514 (Pa. 2002). I want to thank Professor Roger Kirst for bringing this 
case to my attention as an archetypal problematic case. I do not implicate him, however, 
in my arguments to preserve some part of Roberts. United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 
225–31 (2d Cir. 2004) involves facts somewhat similar to Robins, finds Crawford inappli-
cable, see id. at 225–26, and determines that Roberts is satisfied. Id. at 231. The court af-
firms the use of the statements. Id. at 231–32. 
 604. Robins, 812 A.2d at 516–17. 
 605. Id. at 516. 
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nating to Robins.606 To secure his release, Downey agreed to par-
ticipate in a sting operation to secure further details of the bur-
glary.607 Along with an undercover police officer who posed as a 
potential purchaser of valuable stamps stolen in the burglary, he 
met with Auman.608 In their conversation, which was secretly re-
corded, Auman described the burglary apparently to explain how 
he had possession of expensive stamps and gave more details of 
the burglary, a discussion which Downey and the agent prodded 
Auman to continue.609 Auman still did not name Robins but 
added details that further incriminated him.610 Auman entered 
into a plea agreement, and, despite his unavailability, both of his 
statements were admitted against Robins.611 
The statements were offered initially as co-conspirator state-
ments, but admission under that exception was rejected because 
the conspiracy was determined to have ended in the year since 
the burglary.612 They were then offered and admitted as state-
ments against Auman’s interest.613 
Robins is a great case to test the limits of a testimonial state-
ment approach. One statement was made while in custody, one 
statement at liberty, one statement was recorded, but unknown 
to the defendant, the other was not recorded at all. The state-
ments were not made to known government agents. They were 
also not made in furtherance of a conspiracy. Indeed, they were 
elicited by a person with motives to develop more incriminating 
details, and Auman even noted with concern that he was incrimi-
nating himself.614 
Depending on how testimonial is defined, this statement may 
be within that category. The Crawford Court has suggested, how-
ever, I believe incorrectly, that statements which were made to a 
person not believed to be a government agent may not be consid-
ered testimonial.615 Furthermore, if the witness’s perspective is 
 
 606. Id. at 517. 
 607. Id. 
 608. Id. 
 609. Id. 
 610. Id. at 516–17. 
 611. Id. at 517–18. 
 612. Id. at 518. 
 613. Id. at 517. 
 614. Id. 
 615. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. 
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exclusively considered and the intent of the government agent ig-
nored, the statement will likewise be considered non-testimonial. 
I contend that, like Wright, Robins presents facts that are a 
proper matter of concern under the Confrontation Clause. If 
Crawford does not handle this class of problematic, accusatory 
hearsay, Roberts or some variant should. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Crawford leaves many important issues undecided regarding 
the scope of its application. These issues can be resolved effec-
tively by making Crawford cover virtually all statements to gov-
ernment officers, except those that are unrelated to crime or 
clearly made for another purpose. While the line that I am sug-
gesting does not limit statements to those closely analogous to 
the preliminary examinations under the Marian statutes, it is a 
division consistent with the practices at the time of the Framing 
in that outside dying declarations, few, if any, of the additional 
statements covered would have been admissible in criminal 
prosecutions under the evidence law of that era. Statements to 
private organizations performing government functions and for-
mally prepared statements made to private individuals that are 
intended to be used testimonially should also be covered. The di-
viding lines become progressively more debatable from this point 
forward, except that I believe accusatory statements made after 
the police have publicly begun their investigative conversations 
should generally be treated as testimonial. 
More broadly and controversially, I suggest that statements 
made to private parties should be considered testimonial if accu-
satory and made to individuals who stand at arms length from 
the witness or are expected to communicate the statements to 
others. Creating testimonial statements is not something about 
which ordinary individuals make reasonable judgments. Rather, 
they make statements for another purpose—part of living their 
lives—or they make statements that are accusatory; they either 
make them confidentially to friends, family, and intimates, or 
they put them into the hands of those they do not control to be 
used as the third party determines. When speaking to a private 
individual, just as when they are being questioned by the police, 
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the speakers are not giving testimony or being witnesses.616 More 
formalism may be required, but neither history nor the words of 
the Constitution compel it. 
Assuming statements made to private individuals may be con-
sidered testimonial, they are different and may be treated some-
what differently. First, for private statements, it may be appro-
priate to impose on the defendant the burden of showing that the 
statement was intended to be accusatory, or testimonial, rather 
than being made for another purpose. Because of specially recog-
nized dangers of manipulation, when statements are made to 
government agents the burden should shift, and the government 
should be required to demonstrate that they were made for an-
other purpose for the statement to be treated as non-testimonial. 
Second, when statements are made to private individuals, the 
only perspective that matters is that of the witness, who must 
have an accusatory or testimonial intent. On the other hand, 
when the statement is made to a government agent or to a pri-
vate organization exercising government functions, the perspec-
tive of the receiver/hearer should also matter. A statement should 
be treated as testimonial if the government agent as receiver, 
who does often think of generating testimony, is producing a 
statement to be used testimonially even if the witness is uncer-
tain as to intent. Surely those who rely on history will acknowl-
edge that the Framers feared the role of the government in ma-
 
 616. Testimony is obviously given in court or in a deposition. A statement in a police 
station may be highly incriminating, but that is against the speaker, which is not the is-
sue under the Confrontation Clause. Moreover, it is not testimony, even if formally re-
corded. Thus, arguing that police interrogations are particularly close to testimony when 
used against another participant does not seem accurate. These statements are generally 
made to shift blame and win leniency, not in anticipation of evidentiary use. Indeed, his-
torically statements made while in custody by one participant incriminating, not the 
speaker, but another were generally not admissible until the exception for statements 
against interest was expanded to include those against penal interest. See 2 MCCORMICK, 
supra note 192, §§ 318–19. Thus, if the test is whether a reasonable person believed his or 
her statement made in custody was admissible as evidence, the answer for knowledgeable 
witnesses would have been “no” in federal prosecutions until about 1975 and “no” or 
“probably not” in jurisdictions that faithfully followed Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 
(1999), at the time Crawford was decided. The statements, however, were always accusa-
tory, made to individuals (in this case government agents) operating at arms length from 
the witness, and subject to whatever use the persons receiving the statements might make 
of them. Making the witness’s anticipation of the later use of the statement a central con-
cern adds unnecessary imprecision to the determination, and it was not done under the 
Marian statutes, where the witnesses were giving testimony, but they were oblivious to its 
later use, which was the concern of the Framers. 
MOSTELLER MASTER 392.DOC 11/15/2004 9:05 AM 
2005] CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON 625 
nipulating the statements received and would not have excused 
them if the government deluded the witnesses or took advantage 
of their inadequate knowledge or limited mental capacity. 
Statements that are accusatory and made to clandestine gov-
ernment agents are likely to be excluded from the testimonial 
category, but I contend that result is at least problematic and 
sometimes wrong. Most co-conspirator statements should not be 
treated as testimonial because they are in furtherance of the con-
spiracy and not accusatory. Those rare statements that are accu-
satory and made to a government agent should be prime candi-
dates for testimonial treatment. The witness is not speaking for 
another purpose and it is a government agent who is receiving 
the statement and who can engage in the most dangerous types of 
manipulation. Deluding the speaker about the identity of the 
agent has a useful law enforcement purpose, but that delusion 
has no positive impact in terms of eliminating the concerns of the 
Confrontation Clause when the statements are accusatory and 
thus provides no substantive basis for non-testimonial treatment. 
A significant issue is how the definition of testimonial that is 
adopted will interact with the dynamic response of law enforce-
ment, prosecutors, courts, and legislatures. The boundaries 
should be established so that countermeasures adopted by the po-
lice that change the form of the statements, but not their sub-
stance, should not be permitted to eliminate the protection of the 
Clause. 
Many of the above conclusions are controversial. I hope those 
who disagree can de-couple those arguments from the perspective 
that follows, which I believe is largely uncontroversial and help-
ful both to the prosecution and to furthering the interests of the 
Confrontation Clause. It focuses on the future development of the 
law. 
Crawford, which will be implemented in a dynamic environ-
ment, should be developed with the goals of encouraging and en-
suring confrontation. As suggested with child sexual abuse and 
domestic violence prosecutions, this can be done in a way that 
minimizes the loss of evidence and maximizes the actual confron-
tation in the courtroom. Mechanisms will have the best chance of 
success if they give incentives to encourage confrontation to the 
party with the best opportunity to accomplish the task of securing 
appearance and testimony. 
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After Crawford, the world of confrontation law has been radi-
cally altered. Given that the old system was incapable of policing 
problematic hearsay effectively, the new system that reliably ex-
cludes the most problematic statements is almost certainly an 
improvement. How well it will cover accusatory and other prob-
lematic hearsay, however, is yet to be decided and will take care-
ful work. How effective it will be in providing confrontation as 
opposed to the exclusion of a limited class of evidence is even 
more in doubt, and better accomplishing that task should be the 
priority of reformers. 
The shape of hearsay in the future is intriguing. Whatever else 
it has done, Crawford has certainly breathed new interest into 
the law of evidence and particularly confrontation and hearsay 
theory. The devil is in the details, and that is our immediate, im-
portant task. Solid work on the Confrontation Clause will help 
lay a firm foundation for broader evidence revision and potential 
broad scale procedural reform that both allows for the effective 
working of the criminal justice system and is true to the central 
concerns of the Constitution—evidence that is tested in the cal-
dron of confrontation. 
 
